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THE RISE OF THE ʿALAWĪ DYNASTY IN MOROCCO 1631 - 1672

by

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ABSTRACT

The political crisis sparked off by the death of al-Mansūr had so compromised Sa^{c}dian authority that the dynasty saw its sovereignty increasingly encroached upon by rival, local leaders who carved out for themselves independent principalities in different parts of Morocco.

The Sūs was controlled by the Awlād Sīdī Ahmad Ou Mūsā from their zāwiya of Iligh in the Tazarwalt, the Tafilalt and the Saharan region by the Filālī sharīfs, the centre of Morocco by the murābitūn of Dilā' and the Gharb/Habt by the mujāhid, al-^{c}Ayāshī, and later al-Khadir Ghailān. On the Bū Regreg, the Morisco refugees from Spain had also repudiated Sa^{c}dian authority, proclaiming themselves into an independent republic which treated with the European Powers on a sovereign basis. Such was the background of division and

rivalry against which the ʿAlawī dynasty was established by al-Rashīd.

It is the politics of this period of power-vacuum, the period between Saʿdian decadence and the rise of the ʿAlawīs, that is the object of this study. The central feature of the investigation is the Jewish connection with the accession to power of the new dynasty. The assassination of a wealthy Jew or Jewish King by al-Rashīd, an event commonly accepted as a fact of Moroccan national history, - it is the origin of the annual feast of students in Fes, the ʿīd al-tolba - is here subjected to a critical reassessment.

CONTENTS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION : MOROCCO AND THE SHARĪFIAN TRADITION

The history of the sharīfate in the Maghreb al-Aqṣā begins with the arrival of Idris I at Volubilis in 172/788-9 and the subsequent recognition of his leadership by the Berber community of Awraba.[1] This history may be divided into three phases: An initial phase of sharīfian political leadership covering the 9th to the 11th centuries during which the Idrīsids, save for periods of interruption by the Fāṭimids of Ifrīqīya and the Umayyads of Spain, exercised

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1. Abū ᶜUbaid ᶜAbdallāh al-Bakri: Kitāb al-Masālik wa'l-Mamālik transl. Mac Guckin de Slane: Description de l'Afrique Septentrionale Paris 1859, p.118 Ar.text, 268 Fr. transl.
ᶜAbd al-Rahmān ibn Khaldūn: Kitāb al-ᶜIbar Vol. IV 1867 transl. de Slane: Histoire des Berberes Vol. II Paris 1927, p.12 Ar. text, 559 Fr.transl.
Salāh ibn ᶜAbd al-Halīm : Rawḍ al-Qirṭās transl. A. Beaumier Paris 1860 p.14.

political power in the norther Maghreb. The second phase spans a period of five centuries (from the 11th to the 16th centuries) and was characterised by the loss of sharīfian political leadership to the Berber dynasties - al-Murābiṭūn (Almoravids), al-Muwaḥḥidūn (Almohades) and the Marīnids/Waṭṭāsids. The third phase witnessed the re-emergence of sharīfian political leadership in the Maghreb al-Aqṣā. It began with the rise of the Saᶜdians in the 16th century, an important watershed in the history of the sharīfate, and has, since the second half of the 17th century, been continued by the ᶜAlawīs. It is the accession to power of this dynasty that constitutes our main interest. This third phase marks the supreme point of sharīfian power in the Maghreb al-Aqṣā.

In the following discussion, we shall be concerned not so much with the rise of the Saᶜdians - the broad outlines of the story are already well

known[1] - as with the significance of this event on the sharīfian question in Morocco.

An understanding of the circumstances in which the dynasty was established is essential to a proper assessment of this significance. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the Portuguese occupied amongst others the following posts on the Atlantic littoral of Morocco: Ceuta (1415), al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr (1458), Tangier and Arzila (1471), Azemmour (1486), Safi (1481), Mazagan (1514) and Agadir (1505)[2]. This occupation was to lead to the extension of Portuguese power into the hinterland. Tribes within the Portuguese suzerainty were made to pay tribute to

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1. The works of reference are A.Cour: L'Établissement des Dynasties des Chérifs au Maroc et leur rivalité avec les Turcs de la Régence d'Alger 1509-1830 Paris 1904, p.53ff.
H. Terrace: Histoire du Maroc Vol.II Casablanca 1950 p.158ff. Ch. - André Julien : Histoire de l'Afrique de Nord Vol.II Paris 1966, p.204ff.

2. Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc (henceforth Sources Inédites) 1er Série Portugal t 1 Introduction: "Les Débuts de l'Occupation Portugaise au Maroc" p. VIIff.

the King of Portugal[1], while those outside their fold were now and again subjected to raiding expeditions.[2] The Portuguese domination also entailed imposition of restrictive trade measures on tribes within their jurisdiction.

The resistance of the Banū Waṭṭās, the ruling power in Morocco, to the Portuguese encroachment was confined to the northern part of the country as, for instance, Arzila, Larache and Tangier.[3] The Banū Waṭṭās were, however, a weak power with no effective control over the country. "In the Sūs region (for instance) Waṭṭāsid authority had diminished.....and was only mominal."[4]

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1. C.f. for instance, the treaty of vassalage imposed on the people of al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghīr - R. Ricard: "Le Maroc Septentrionale au XV^e siècle d'après les chroniques Portugaises" in Hespéris Vol. XXIII 1936 pp.130-31. See also by the same author: Les Portugaise au Maroc de 1495 à 1521 (Extraits de la Chronique de roi D. Manuel de Portugal) Rabat 1937 p.75.

2. R.Ricard: Les Portugaises au Maroc etc. p.13 ff; also by the same author: "Les Portugaises et l'Afrique du Nord sous le regne de Jean III (1521-1559) d'après la chronique de Francisco de Andrade" in Hespéris Vol. XXIV p.259 ff; Pierre de Cenival: Chronique de Santa Cruz du Cap de Gué (Agadir) Paris 1934 pp.37-9.

3. Muḥammad al Ṣaghīr al-Wufrānī: Nozhet el-Hâdi: Histoire de la Dynastie Saadienne au Maroc (1511-1670) transl. O. Houdas Paris 1889 p.10 Ar.text; 20 Fr. transl.

4. Loc.cit.

Portuguese power in Morocco therefore did not meet with any serious challenge as "the Muslims had no leader who could rally them together and organize the forces of Islam"[1] against the infidel (kuffār).

It was in answer to this need for a leader that the Sūs community swore the bayᶜa to Abu ᶜAbdallāh al-Qā'im in 916/1510-11.[2] He was the shaikh of the zāwiya[3] of Tagmadārt in the Darᶜa a position which ensured him some local power[4] in the area. His leadership of the jihād against the Portuguese post of Agadir was later taken over by his two sons Abū ᶜAbbās Ahmad al-Aᶜraj and Muhammad al-Shaikh al-Mahdī.

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1. Loc.cit.

2. Al-Wufranī op.cit. p.16 Ar. text; 32 Fr.transl.

3. Equivalent to a convent or medieval monastry. Features of the zāwiya include a prayer room (mihrāb), a dome (qubba) elevated above the grave of a saint or murābit; the zāwiya caters for Islamic education and hospitality to pilgrims, students and travellers. See E. Lévi-Provencal article Zāwiya in Encyclopaedia of Islam (1st Edition).

4. See Chapter V pp. 266 - 267 and note 1

The Sa^{c}dian leadership of the holy war was an important development in the relationship of the Sūs community vis á-vis the Portuguese of Agadir. To a people hitherto without a unified military command in the face of the foreign aggression, it gave a certain cohesion and solidarity, thus presenting the Portuguese with a much more formidable opponent. The Sa^{c}dian organisation also meant increasing isolation of the Portuguese post from the hinterland and the surrounding country.

This was a dangerous turn of events for a small establishment such as Agadir whose survival depended on a friendly or divided local population since it was very poorly supported by the home government. Since its foundation in 1505 by João de Sequeira, Agadir had had a chequered history.[1] Its garrison remained small with

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1. Sources Inédites 1^{ér} Série Portugal. t 3. Introduction: "L'Occupation Portugaise d'Agadir (1505-1541)". p. IXff

inadequate provision of food, arms and ammunition, even during the period of struggle with the Muslims. In the critical days of 1541 when it was under Muslim seige, requests for reinforcements to the beleaguered post were never promptly met. Such reinforcements that were sent were hardly enough to sustain a prolonged struggle against the enemy. Attempts made to relieve the _fronteira_ were delayed by bad weather.[1] Further misfortune was caused by the unexpected explosion of a barrel of powder which opened a breach in the defences of Agadir. Dominated by a hill, Agadir had a weak defensive position. The occupation of this hill by the Muslims made the Portuguese post extremely vulnerable to attack. The death of Yaḥyā ou Taᶜfuft and Mālik ibn Dawud, the Portuguese local allies, greatly eroded the much needed local assistance to the beseiged garrison.[2]

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1. P. de Cenival _op.cit._ pp.99-101 and notes 1 and 4 on p.98;

2. Ibid p.41; "L'Occupation Portugaise d'Agadir" _op.cit._ p. XIV

The Portuguese were thus increasingly unable to meet the challenge of the Muslims whose military position, besides their superiority in numbers, had become formidable thanks to the contraband traffic in arms and ammunition at Massa, Tarkuku and Tafatna by the European merchants.[1] They, because of their resentment at Portuguese trade monopoly, readily identified themselves with the Muslim struggle. Agadir succumbed to Muḥammad al-Shaikh's seige on the 12th of March 1541.

The fall of Agadir created a crack in the Portuguese defence structure on the Atlantic littoral. Agadir served as a cover for the Portuguese posts to the north; its fall deprived these posts of their advance protection, thus weakening their resistance to Muslim attacks. Soon Safi and Azemmour were evacuated (October.1541),

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1. Notably Genoese and Castillians - P. de Cenival op.cit. p.37 and note 2 on p.36; also the English and the French - Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre t 1 Introduction pp. ii-iii; p. 46. R. Ricard: Études sur l'Histoire des Portugais au Maroc 1955, p.132ff.

then al-Qaṣr al-Saghīr and Arzila (1550).[1] The fall of Agadir was therefore crucial to the collapse of Portuguese power in Morocco. It also strengthened and popularised Muḥammad al-Shaikh's leadership, leading to his overthrow of Waṭṭāsid power in Fes in 956/1549.[2]

By forcing the Portuguese to abandon some of their positions on the Atlantic coast, the Sa^{c}dians became identified with the defence of the dār al-Islām and success against the infidel. The victory thus gave the dynasty immense prestige; coming as it did after the failure of a non-sharīfian dynasty, it was not unlikely that the faithful saw it in terms of the baraka of the new power. The Sa^{c}dian achievement also gave prominence to the tradition they represented, namely, the sharīfian tradition. For sharīfs, after about five centuries of obscurity on the political plane, had again risen

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1. P. de Cenival op.cit. p.157 and notes 3 and 4 on p.156; R. Ricard op.cit. p. 357ff.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.29 Ar. text; 54 Fr. transl.

to a position of political power in the Maghreb al-Aqṣā.

This prominence manifested itself also on the social plane. The rise of the Saᶜdians not only enhanced the importance of the sharīfian tradition, but also that of the murābiṭūn tradition[1] which they too represented and from which they were sprung. The murābiṭūn as holy

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1. Thus Muhammad al-Shaikh, founder of the Saᶜdian dynasty was so alarmed by the power of the murābiṭūn that he ordered their persecution in 958 (1551/2) - Ibid p.41 Ar. text; 76-77 Fr. transl. Cf. Ibn ᶜAskar: Dawḥat al-Nāshir transl. A. Graulle in Archives Marocaines Vol.XIX p.90.
The great fear evoked by the power and influence of the murābiṭūn was best expressed by Muhammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar (1636-1654) in his correspondence with Muhammad al-Hājj the shaikh of the zāwiya of Dilā':

"The sources of calumny, treason, slander, hypocrisy and effrontery, they are the zāwiyas, the ribāṭs" - Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.249 Ar. text, 413 Fr. transl. Notice that zāwiya and ribāṭ are used synonymously.

men (awliyā') and as religious and ṣūfī[1] leaders enjoy

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1. It is not exactly certain when and by whom oriental ṣūfī doctrines were first introduced into the Maghreb. It is thought, however, that by the 10th century ṣūfī ideas had already penetrated into the Maghreb. One of the earliest teachers known was Abū ᶜImrān ibn ᶜĪsa, an ᶜālim of Fes who went to Baghdad about the end of the 10th century and returned to Qairawān where he taught ṣūfism of the Junaid's school, i.e. a pantheism reconciled with Muslim dogma as opposed to the purely pantheistic school of Bestami irreconcilable with Islamic teaching - see R. Dozy, Essai sur l'histoire de l'Islamisme Paris 1879 p.322 ff.
In the 12th century Junaid's doctrines were taught in the Maghreb al-Aqṣā amongst others by ᶜAlī ibn Hirzihim and Abū Median. An Idrīsid sharīf and pupil of these two teachers, Abd al-Salām ibn Mashish adopted ṣūfism in the 12th century and became the 2nd pole (Quṭb) of the West, the first being ᶜAbd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, the founder of the Qādirīya ṭarīqa, Junaid's ideas took corpus in the West under the Shādilīya ṭarīqa, founded in the 13th century by another Idrīsid sharīf and pupil of ᶜAbd al-Salām, Abu'l-Hasan al-Shādilī who became the third pole of the West. Thus the Shādilīya, like the Qādirīya in the East, became the main exponent of Junaid's ideas in the West. It was not until the latter part of the 15th century and early 16th century that Shādilism, under the Portuguese pressure, was popularised by Muhammad ibn Sulaimān al-Jazūlī, founder of the Jazūlīya ṭarīqa and fourth pole of the West, and his disciples. Thus Shādilism of the 13th century became Jazūlism from the 16th century onwards. The doctrines of the Jazūlīya form the basis of a great majority of the zāwiyas of Morocco and it is to al-Jazūlī that the founders of these zāwiyas date their ṣūfī instruction - see M.E.Michaux-Bellaire, "Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc" in Arch. Maroc. Vol. XXVII pp.1-86; also by the same author, "Essai sur l'histoire des Confréries Marocains" in Hespéris Vol. I 1921 pp.141-59; A. Graulle, Preface to Ibn Askar's "Dawhat al-Nāshir" in Arch. Maroc. Vol. XIX, and supplement p.277 ff. L.Rinn Marabout et Khouan Alger 1844 p.211ff; Duppont et Coppolani: Les Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes Alger 1897 p.166 ff; 443 ff.

so much prestige and veneration that the distinction between them and sharīfs is almost non-existent[1]. Thus Moroccan society, after the great politico-religious movement of the murābitūn in the 16th century became increasingly characterised by a pronounced sharīfian element.[2]

This posed an obvious problem. Who was the true sharīf? Questions of claims to nobility could provoke heated arguments and controversy. The Sa^{c}dians themselves engaged in such polemic with their detractors.

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1. ".....hagiolatry and sharīfism are closely linked in the Maghreb al-Aqsā - E. Levi-Provencal: Les Historiens des Chorfa(Essai sur la Littérature Historique et Biographique au Maroc du XVI^{e} au XX^{e} siècle) Paris 1922 p.46. On pretension to the sharifate by the murābiṭūn see M.E. Michaux-Bellaire: "Les Confréries Religieuses au Maroc" in Archives Marocaines Vol. XXVII pp.33-34; 59 ff.
The confusion between spiritual and genetic descent could give rise to false claims to sharīfian origin - M.E. Péretié "Le Rais El-Khadir Ghailan in Archives Marocaines Vol.XVIII pp.17-18.

2. Michaux-Bellaire Loc.cit. Cf.,for instance,the phenomenon of tribes transforming themselves into shurafā' tribes by attributing their foundation to eponymous sharīfian murabiṭun - E.Doutté: "Notes sur l'Islam Maghrebin: Les Marabouts" in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions Vol. 41 pp.41-42.

At the time they came to power, they were regarded as sharīfs. In fact it would seem that the choice of Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Qā'im as leader of the holy war in the Sūs was influenced by his quality as sharīf. The doubt that later surrounded the sharīfian origin of the Saᶜdians was probably without any proper foundation, being no more than an attempt by detractors of the dynasty to disparage it and derogate from its prestige. It is very significant that the nisba Saᶜdī was never associated with the dynasty in its early history. Never was the term used in the presence of sovereigns of the dynasty nor did they employ it in their official records and correspondence.[1]

To say that the Saᶜdians are sharīfs is really a contradiction of terms, for the designation was used pejoratively to denote the dynasty's descent from the Banū Saᶜd (son of Hawāzin) the tribe to which belonged the nurse of

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.7 Ar. text; 14 Fr. transl.

the Prophet, Halīma al-Saᶜdīya.[1] Ironically however, this derogatory term has stuck to them and it is by it that history knows them.

It would seem that the ᶜAlawīs were at the forefront of this attack on Saᶜdian nobility. How far this was inspired by personal grievance against the dynasty, we are not certain.[2] Our first recorded evidence of the denial of Saᶜdian nobility was during the reign of Aḥmad al-Manṣūr (1578-1603). The sulṭān once asked ᶜAbdallāh ibn ᶜAlī ibn Ṭāhir, an ᶜAlawī sharīf, the following question while both of them were at table: "Where my cousin do we meet?"[3] By this al-Mansūr meant the meeting point where their

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1. Loc.cit.
2. Cf. an ᶜAlawī sovereign Sīdī Muhammad ibn ᶜAbdallāh's statement in the 18th century that his ancestors had refuted the sharīfian origin of the Saᶜdians because the Saᶜdians while in power "did not treat them as brothers" - Abū 'l-Qāsim al-Ziyāni : Al-Turjumān al-Muᶜarib ᶜan Duwal al-Mashriq wa l-Maghreb . Rabat Archives MSS D1577 pp.4-5. Also in E. Lévi-Provençal: Extraits des Historiens Arabes du Maroc Paris 1929 p.79
3. Ahmad ibn ᶜAbd alᶜAziz al-Anwār al-Hasanīya fi nisba man bi-Sijilmāsa min al-Ishrāf al-Muhammadīya Ministry of Information Rabat 1966, p.26 note 2; Al-Wufrāni p.8 Ar. text, 16-17. Fr. transl.

genealogical trees merged into a common ancestry. ᶜAbdallah ibn Ṭāhir whose family had often denied a common ancestry with the Saᶜdians replied, "We meet on this table" and this caused al-Manṣūr great embarrassment and distress.

Throughout the reign of the Saᶜdians the ᶜAlawīs continued to deny their sharīfian origin. The following correspondence between the Saᶜdian sulṭān Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar (1636-54) and the ᶜAlawī sharīf Maḥammad[1] ibn al-Sharīf is a good example of the type of polemics that were provoked by questions of nobility. "I have learnt", wrote Muḥammad al-Shaikh, "that you declare in city as well as in Bedouin assemblies that we are descended from the Banū Saᶜd ibn Bakr ibn Hawāzin in spite of the fact that our descent from the Banū Nizār ibn Maᶜdd[2] has been attested by ample and weighty evidence.. .....If your intention is to undermine the basis

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1. Note the distinction, Maḥammad rather than Muḥammad, i.e. a fatḥa rather than a ḍamma on the "Mīm".

2. I.e. the very family of the Prophet. O.Houdas p.15 note 2 of al-Wufrānī Fr. transl.

of our power on the question of origin, then you will pay a high price for it in ignominy; and if your attempt is to delete our name from the pages of nobility, here too your pretension will be without high dividends...."[1]

Mahammad in his reply to the Sa^{c}dian sovereign, defended his position. "You reproach us," he said "for tracing your origin to the Banū Sa^{c}d ibn Bakr ibn Hawāzin ibn Manṣūr and for propagating this in tents, cities and qaṣrs. By God we do not intend by that any defamation or disparagement, neither do we intend to include you amongst those without relations or family. On this question we have relied with the help of God on the information of analysts, namely the ^{c}ulamā of Marrakesh, Tilmasān (Tlemcen), Fes and Maknasat al-Zītūn (Meknes). And after careful examination and reflection on this matter, they have come out with the finding that you are

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1. Ibid p.7 Ar. text; 15 Fr. transl.

descended from the Banū Sa^{c}d ibn Bakr....."[1].

Mahammad ibn al-Sharīf's declaration "in city as well as in Bedouin assemblies" that the Sa^{c}dians were not of noble descent might have been politically motivated. For during the unsettled political conditions of the time - this was the time of Sa^{c}dian decadence - Maḥammad had his own ambition for power, though this remained unfulfilled.[2]

It is worthy of note that the ^{c}Alawī position with regards to the origin of the Sa^{c}dians was not consistently maintained. Having come to power, they acknowledged their common ancestry with the Sa^{c}dians. Controversy about Sa^{c}dian origin seemed to have flared up again in the second half of the 18th century and the historian and diplomat Abū'l-Qāsim al-Ziyānī asked the ^{c}Alawī sulṭān Sīdī Muḥammad ibn ^{c}Abdallāh (1757-1789) his opinion on the subject; and he replied: "They (i.e. the Sa^{c}dians) are our brothers and cousins; we have a

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1. Loc.cit.
2. See Chapter III pp. 124-25

common ancestor and a common village in Yanbū' called Banū Ibrāhīm".[1] We know that Sīdī Muḥammad was a great admirer of the Sa^{c}dian sulṭān Aḥmad al-Manṣūr[2] and it is not certain how far his statement was influenced by this fact.

An idea of the concern shown by families with questionable claims to prove the authenticity of their origin may be gained from the example of the Qādirī family in the 17th century. The Qādirites are descended from Mūsā al-Jūn, though known by the name of their immediate forbear ^{c}Abd al-Qādir al-Jilānī, the Pole. The first of the Qādirī family in Morocco was Abū ^{c}Abdallāh Muḥammad[3]. He emigrated to Fes from Granada just

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1. Al-Ziyānī op.cit. pp.4-5; Lévi-Provençal op.cit. p.79.

2. Lévi-Provençal: Les Historiens des Chorfa p.73 note 2.

3. ^{c}Abd al-Salām ibn al-Tayyib al-Qādirī: Al-Durr al-Sanī fī ba^{c}d man bi-Fas min ahl nasab al-Hasanī. Bibliotheque Nationale Rabat Mss A^{5} 3930 pp.60-61. There is a summary of al-Durr al-Sanī by G. Salmon in two parts: "Les Chorfa Idrisids de Fès d'après Ibn al-Tayyîb al-Qādiry in Archives Marocaines Vol.I 1904 p.425 ff; Les Chorfa Filâla et Djilâla de Fès d'après Ibn al-Tayyîb al-Qâdiry op.cit. Vol. III p.97 ff.

before the fall of the city to the Christians in 1491. The sharīfian origin of his descendants had become, it seems, a subject of controversy in the last quarter of the 17th century. ᶜAbd al-Salām, a member of the Qādirī family, therefore marshalled all the evidence at his command in an attempt to dispel the doubts surrounding his family's origin. This he did by citing the zahīrs and the rusūm of his ancestors[1]. He had carefully preserved these documents as proof of his family's descent from the Prophet.

In the midst of the confusion created by false claims to nobility, there are,

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1. Al-Qādirī op.cit. pp.63-65. Zahīrs were authoritative documents given by sulṭāns to sharīfs certifying the privileges accorded to them as sharīfs. For examples of zahīrs see Arch.Maroc Vol.II p.341 ff. Rusum were documents testifying to the authenticity of the sharifian origin of a claimant; this testimony was given either by the naqīb of the sharīfs or by a qādī in the presence of witnesses. For examples of rusūm see Arch.Maroc Vol.III p.164. When the possessor of a zahīr or rusūm moved from one place to another, he ensured that his document was renewed by the qādī of his new locality.

however, some families whose sharīfian origin is so well attested that it is subject to no controversy. No less an authority than Muḥammad al-ᶜArbī ibn Yūsuf al-Fasī, the author of the Mir'āt al-Maḥāsin, made the following pronouncement on the sharīfian question about the beginning of the 17th century: "The shurafā' in the Maghreb about whose nobility there is no doubt are many, like the Jūṭites[1] (Idrīsid Ḥasanīs[2]), the shurafā' of Tafilalt (Muḥammadites[3] also Ḥasanīs) the Ṣaqalites[4]

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1. Their ancestor is Yaḥyā al-Juṭī, hence their name.

2. So called because of their descent from Ḥasan as opposed to the Ḥusainī sharīfs, descendants of Ḥusain.

3. Their ancestor is Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakīya. The Saᶜdians also belonged to this group of sharīfs.

4. The appelation derives from the fact that they had stayed in Sicily before coming to Fes; the ᶜIraqites because they came from ᶜIrāq, al-Qādirī op.cit. p. 69. Apart from these two small groups of sharīfs, all the sharīfs in Morocco fall into three big groups: The Idrīsids, the Muḥammadites and the Musawites (Qādirites). Their ancestors, Idrīs I, Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakīya and Mūsā al-Jūn were all sons of ᶜAbdallāh al-Kamīl, the great grand son of Prophet.

and the ʿIrāqites (both of whom are Husainīs). No two people amongst their compatriots or foreigners who know them will dispute their nobility[1]." ʿAbd al-Salām's al-Durr al-Sanī is in fact a study of these genuine sharīfian families represented in Fes in 1679, including the Dabāghites (or Katānites), the ʿAlamyites - these two, like the Jutites, are Idrīsids - and the Qādirites, and the work was most probably intended as a record of the sharīfs in the Moroccan capital.

The need to identify the nobility was to necessitate a policy of registering sharīfs in Morocco. Thus Mawlay Ismāʿīl (1672-1721) alarmed that "genealogies had become mixed up and confused and that people with no affinities or ties of relationship had merged into a common

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1. Yūsuf al-Fasī : Mirʾāt al-Mahāsin min Akhbār al-Shaikh Abī'l-Mahāsin : Biblio. National Rabat. Ms A° 2933 p.176. On Yūsuf al-Fasi (1580-1642) see Historiens des Chorfa pp.245 ff.

origin so much so that the great and the small, the high and the lowly had become equal"[1], had to institute a rigorous inspection of genealogies of claimants to a sharīfian origin. Their zahīrs and rusūm were inspected by agents commissioned by the sulṭān. Those with genuine documents were entered into a register by the chief naqīb of sharīfs at the time of Mawlay Ismāʿīl, Abū'l-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd al-Salām.[2] The false documents were burnt and their possessors eliminated from the nobility. The Shudhūr al-Dhahab fī Khair Nasab[3], an inventory of sharīfs in Morocco compiled by al-Tuhāmī ibn Muḥammad ibn Raḥmūn on the orders

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1. Abū'l-Ḥasan ibn ʿAbd al-Salām: Dīwān al-Ashrāf No. 323 in ʿAbd al-Salām ibn Sūda's Dalīl al-Mu'arrikh al-Maghreb al-Aqṣā 1st part Casablanca 1960 p.97.

2. Abū'l-Qāsim al-Ziyānī : Tuḥfat al-Ḥādī'l- Muṭrib in Ibn Sūda op.cit. p.98.

3. In Rabat Archives Mss 1484. Summary by G. Salmon: "Ibn Raḥmoûn et les Généalogies Chérifiennes" in Arch.Maroc Vol. III p.159 ff.

of Mawlay Ismā^{c}īl was also inspired by the need to keep a register of the true sharīfs in Morocco. The sultān Sīdī Muḥammad ibn ^{c}Abdallāh (1757-1789) was to order a similar procedure when he found that his lieutnants sent to collect the zakāt and the ^{c}ushr were faced with an ever-increasing number of people who attributed to themselves a sharīfian origin and therefore exemption from taxation.[1]

If the sharīfian tradition began with the Idrīsids in the last years of the 8th century, the importance of this tradition has been immensely enhanced by the rise of the Sa^{c}dians in the 16th century and the continuity of sharīfian political leadership provided by the ^{c}Alawīs since the second half of the 17th century.

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1. Al-Ziyānī: Tuḥfat al-Hādī in Ibn Sūda op.cit. p.99 (Diwan al-Shurafā' No. 324.)

Genealogy of the ᶜAlawīs

ᶜAlī and Fāṭima
Al Ḥasan al-Sibṭ
Al Ḥasan II
ᶜAbdallah al Kāmil
Muḥammad al Nafs al Zakīya
Qāsim
Ismāᶜīl
Aḥmed
Ḥasan
ᶜAlī
Abū Bakr
Al-Ḥasan
ᶜArafa
Abū Muḥammad
ᶜAbdallāh
al-Ḥasan
Muḥammad
Abū Qāsim
Muḥammad
Qāsim
al-Ḥasan - First to arrive in the Maghreb (1265)
Muḥammad
Al-Ḥasan
ᶜAlī al-Sharīf
Yūsuf
ᶜAlī
Muḥammad
ᶜAlī
Muḥammad
ᶜAlī
Muḥammed al-Sharīf
Al-Rashīd - Founder of the ᶜAlawī dynasty (6th June 1666)

Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakīya
ᶜAbdallāh al-Ashtar
Muḥammad al-Kābulī

Al-Ḥasan al-Aᶜwar
Qāsim

According to al-Wufrānī (op.cit. p.4 Ar.text 8-9 Fr.transl.) this genealogical tree has a lacuna of three generations.

Ancestors of the three big groups of sharīfs in Morocco



CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO THE RISE OF THE ʿALAWĪ DYNASTY : MOROCCO AFTER THE DEATH OF ABŪ ʿABBĀS MAWLAY AḤMAD AL-MANṢŪR AL-DHAHABĪ (1603-1631)

The reign of al-Manṣūr marked the zenith of Saʿdian power. One of the foundations of al-Manṣūr's success was his emphasis on the army as an instrument of authority and a weapon for maintaining order. Al-Manṣūr brought to the affairs of government the firmness and resolution[1] characteristic of "one who aspires to every distant goal".[2] Respect for or fear of authority was foremost in his political thinking. His strict and severe disciplinary methods

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1. Al-Wufrānī : op.cit. p.157 Ar. text; 257 Fr. trans.
2. ʿAbd al ʿAzīz ibn Muḥammad al-Fishtālī : Manāhil al-Safā fī Akhbār al-Mulūk al-Shurafā Tetuan 1964 (Abridgement of the second part edited by ʿAbdallāh Ganūn) p.17.

reflected his commitment to the achievement of this principle and his philosophy of government, namely, to hold the people in "chains and manacles" as a guarantee of "peace and security" in Morocco.[1] The maintenance of a powerful army was thus a keystone of his internal policy. This army, which was trained along lines of Turkish military practice, attained a degree of strength and efficiency unprecedented in Saᶜdian history.[2] With his position strengthened by the army al-Manṣūr "eliminated most of the rebels and perpetrators

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p. 158 Ar. text; 259 Fr. trans.

2. For the organisation of al-Manṣūr's army see: al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.115-118 Ar. text; 195-201 Fr. trans.

of outrages" in Morocco.[1] In this way he gained firm control of his kingdom and was able to aspire to the possession of the fabled gold mines of the bilād al Sūdān, an aspiration partly motivated by the need for means to maintain his large army. The progressive expansion of his kingdom southwards,[2] was to culminate in the

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1. Al-Fishtālī op.cit. p.18. Among the revolts against al-Mansur's authority, we may note the following: the insurrection of Dāwud ibn ᶜAbd al Mu'min, his nephew: Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.85 Ar.text; 150-151 Fr.trans. Perhaps the greatest challenge to al-Manṣūr's authority was the revolt of another nephew of his, al-Nāsir ibn al-Ghālib-billāh, who had been resident at the court of Philippe II of Spain since the death of ᶜAbd al Mālik at the battle of wādī Makhāzin (30th Jumādā 1st 986/4th August 1578). After an initial success against al-Manṣūr's forces he was defeated and killed in 1005/1596. - Ibid p.102 Ar. text; 175-8 Fr. trans. See also Sources Inédites 1er Série France t II p.205 ff. Al-Manṣūr also had to put down the revolt of his own son Muḥammad al-Shaikh al Ma'mūn in 1011/1602. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.179-181 Ar.text; 289-292 Fr.trans.

2. The oases of Tuat and Tīgurāra (Gūrara) were conquered and occupied in 989/1581. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.87 Ar.text; 154-155 Fr.trans. Al-Manṣur's next ambition was to possess the salt mine of Taghāzā. By means of 1000 dinars he had acquired the right from sulṭān Dāwud of Songhai to exploit the mine for a year; he benefited so much from this contract that he desired to become the owner of the mine. Al-Manṣūr proposed to al-Ḥājj who succeeded Dāwud in 1582 that Taghāzā be ceded to him, but al-Ḥajj refused. Al-Manṣūr therefore

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conquest of the Askia empire of Songhai. His empire thus stretched roughly from the Mediterranean with the Ottoman Regency of Algiers as boundary, to Timbuctoo on the banks of the Niger. This marked the greatest territorial possession of the Saᶜdian dynasty.

Al-Manṣūr averted the external danger that threatened Morocco by clever diplomacy. His brother ᶜAbd al-Malik had, as condition for the Turkish assistance with which he overthrew his nephew Muḥammad al-Mutawwakil,[1] promised inter alia that Fes and its dependencies would be ruled by his

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2. /continued from previous page

occupied the mine in 1585, though the occupying force had to abandon it because of privation. - M.Delfosse "Relation du Maroc et du Soudan à travers les ages" in Hespéris Vol.IV 1924 pp.162 ff. Al-Manṣūr's covetousness was to lead to the Sūdān expedition led by pāsha Jūdar under the pretext that "the mine was the property of the Bait al-Māl" and that "...to the Imam (therefore) belonged its supervision, control and disposal in the way he considers appropriate" - Al-Fishtālī op.cit. pp.55,57.

1. On this episode see al-Wufrānī, op.cit. p.59 ff Ar.text; 105 Fr.trans. Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série France t I p.346

son Ismāᶜīl who was in Constantinople.[1] After his victory, however, ᶜAbd al-Mālik failed to carry out his promise and entered into a defensive and offensive alliance with Philippe II of Spain as a safeguard against Turkish reprisals.[2] The danger posed by this unfulfilled promise, which became the cloak behind which sulṭān Murād III hid his ambitions, made al-Manṣūr retain the Spanish alliance. Furthermore al-Manṣūr needed to remain on amicable terms with Spain because Philippe II had at his court two Saᶜdian princes whom he could oppose to him as pretenders.[3]

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1. For the conditions of Turkish help see Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série France t I p.512 note 1; al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.63 Ar.text; 111 Fr.trans.
2. Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Angleterre t II pp.46-55.
3. These two princes were his nephew al-Nāsir and his grand nephew al-Shaikh. It was al-Nāsir, however, that was the real threat to al-Mansūr. Because of this potential danger, al-Manṣūr could not afford to antagonise Philippe II and this explains Queen Elizabeth's failure to secure al-Manṣūr's alliance against Spain. - see Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Angleterre t I p.530 ff. It was not until the death of al-Nāsir in 1596 that al-Manṣūr was able to manifest openly his hostility to Spain. Thus he welcomed the triple alliance of France, England and the United Provinces (Holland) (31st Oct.1576) against Spain and even went as far as to suggest the conquest of the country jointly with Queen Elizabeth. - Op.cit. t II p.177 ff. Before al-Nāsir's death, however, the Spanish alliance and a détente with Spain shaped al-Manṣūr's foreign policy.

Philippe II, however, was careful not to exploit the weak position of al-Manṣūr for fear of the sulṭān's support of Dom Antonio's pretention to the throne of Portugal.[1] Al-Manṣūr in fact had always kept this a menacing possibility by assuming a posture of sympathy for Queen Elizabeth's support of Dom Antonio's cause.[2] Philippe II was so conscious of his vulnerability as to order the evacuation of Arzila (13th Sept. 1589) to win al-Mansūr's neutrality.[3] His gesture,

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1. & 2. One of the grave consequences of the battle of wādī Makhāzin (4th Aug.1578) was the loss of independence of Portugal for a time; following the death of Dom Sebastien in this battle, the Portuguese crown fell to his 70 year old uncle Henri who soon passed away leaving the House of Avis without an heir. The grand nephew of Dom Sebastien, Dom Antonio, appeared as a pretender to the throne and his cause was supported by Queen Elizabeth against her enemy, Philippe II of Spain, who had annexed Portugal in 1585. Queen Elizabeth tried to enlist the support of al-Manṣūr in this connection but she failed in spite of al-Manṣūr's pledged promises of financial subsidies towards the cause of the pretender. Al-Manṣūr's outward gesture of collaboration was purely deceptive and was meant to serve the political purpose of strengthening his position vis-a-vis Philippe II who had the "infantos moros" in his court. - see Sources Inédites 1er Série Pays Bas t I p.3. & note 2; op.cit. 1er Série Angleterre t I pp 513-523; 527-536; t II pp 1-34.

3. Sources Inédites 1er Série France t II p.286 note 5.

however, was hardly rewarding; for neither did it allay his fears about the potential threat of al-Manṣūr to his position, nor did it result in a similar gesture by al-Manṣūr to cede Larache to Spain, a promise the sulṭān had repeatedly made to Philippe II, not, however, with any genuine intentions but merely for his own political ends of securing Philippe II's friendship and alliance; for, not withstanding his promises, al-Manṣūr was in fact engaged in fortifying Larache against a possible Spanish attack.[1]

The same Realpolitik characterised al-Manṣūr's dealings with the Turks. The Spanish alliance and the victory of wādī Makhāzin had strengthened his position vis-a-vis sulṭān Murād III and so he could afford to maintain a more independent

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1. Ibid p.2 note 3; Sources Inédites 1ère Série Angleterre t II p.51.

position towards him.[1] But this was never a constant posture, his attitude being always tailored to meet the exigencies of the moment. Thus when his position was threatened by ᶜUlūj ᶜAlī the Kapudan Pāsha he placated the Sublime Porte by adopting a humble and submissive attitude, sending him an ambassador with rich presents.[2] As to the question of fulfilling the promise pledged by his brother, ᶜAbd al-Mālik, to give Fes to Ismāᶜīl, al-Manṣūr remained vague and evasive;[3] he never totally renounced carrying out the promise but always kept up the hopes of sulṭān Murād III so as to retain his goodwill;

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série France t II p.189 & note 7; al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.85-86 Ar.text; 151-152 Fr.trans; Cf.E.Lévi Provençal : Les Historiens des Chorfa p.107 and note 1.

2. Loc.cit.

3. It is thought that al-Manṣūr himself renewed this promise on his accession to the throne. - see Sources Inédites 1ère Série Angleterre t II p.46 ff.

and when the Sublime Porte felt cheated of his expectations al-Manṣūr resorted to his usual tactics of humility and excuses, and the despatch of handsome presents. While buying time with his courtesies, however, al-Manṣūr had, as was the case with Larache, strengthened the defences of Fes against a possible Turkish offensive.[1]

It was by such diplomacy and statecraft, coupled with strong leadership that al-Manṣūr was able to maintain the integrity of his empire and to exercise over it an effective control. But such stability as al-Manṣūr succeeded in maintaining in Morocco lacked an institutional foundation and was therefore very precarious, based as it was on his own personal power and political acumen; and hence the stability did not survive his death. The power-struggle by his sons after his death (16th Rabīᶜ1 1012/24th Aug. 1603) highlighted the fragility and the hollowness behind the bright exterior of his

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1. Loc.cit.; al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.86 Ar.text; 152 Fr.trans.

regime. The dissident forces which he had successfully confined in "chains and manacles" during his lifetime, now manifested themselves; Morocco was plunged into a period of political disorder and it was not until the rise of the ᶜAlawī dynasty that the country enjoyed an effective central leadership.

II

Al-Manṣūr had partly contributed to the political crisis which followed his death by his failure to arrange for a successor; furthermore the division of Morocco into administrative provinces (wilāyāt) headed by his sons, invested his sons with power thus sowing the seed of a future power-struggle.[1] Muḥammad al-Shaikh had

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1. The account of the power-struggle that follows is based on: Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.190 ff Ar.text; 305 Fr trans; Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t I p.82 ff; 105 ff; 172 ff; 306 ff; 259 ff; 267 ff; 278 ff; 306 ff; 463 ff;.

been al-Manṣūr's khalifa in Fes and its dependencies, Zīdān that of Tadla, and Abū Fāris that of the Sūs. Al-Manṣūr had been forced to deprive Muḥammad al-Shaikh of his governorship of Fes and imprison him in Meknes (31st Oct. 1602) because of his debauched, irresponsible conduct and his abuse of power;[1] he was then replaced by Zīdān as governor of Fes. Al-Manṣūr died shortly afterwards[2] without, however, arranging for a new successor, now that Muḥammad al-Shaikh, named heir-apparent since 2nd Shaʿbān 987/24th Sept.1579[3] had proved unworthy of the high office that was intended for him. On al-Manṣūr's death, therefore, Zīdān was

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1. Muḥammad al-Shaikh was blood thirsty, was given to excessive drinking, never observed the precepts of the religion. Evidence of his tyranny and abuse of power was his seizure of the treasures of the secretary of al-Manṣūr; - al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.179 Ar.text; 289-290 Fr.trans.

2. Al-Manṣūr died of pest, but there is also the rumour that he was poisoned by Zīdān. Ibid p.189 Ar.text; 360 Fr.trans.

3. Ibid p.84 Ar.text; 149 Fr.trans.

proclaimed sulṭān in Fes and Abū Fāris in Marrakesh.[1] To establish his supremacy, Zīdān marched against Abū Fāris. The forces of Abū Fāris were commanded by pāsha Jūdar the conqueror of the Sūdān and Muḥammad al-Shaikh who had now been released from prison.[2] In the encounter between the two forces Zīdān, betrayed by his troops, was defeated (Jan.1604). He fled to Fes where he was rejected by the people in preference for Muhammad al-Shaikh their erstwhile governor.[3] Muḥammad al-Shaikh, however, defected from the army sent against Zīdān, making himself proclaimed sulṭān in Fes. The power-struggle was thus given a new dimension with the entrance of a third contestant. Meanwhile Zīdān had gone in the direction of Tlemcen from

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1. Ibid. p.190 Ar.text; 308 Fr.trans.

2. After Zīdān's proclamation in Fes, he tried to seize Muḥammad al-Shaikh from the prison in Meknes and keep him under his supervision as a safeguard against his challenge to his power; he was forestalled, however, by pāsha Jūdar who led Muhammad al-Shaikh to Abū Fāris, his full brother, in Marrakesh. Abū Fāris imprisoned Muhammad al-Shaikh in the qasba of Marrakesh again for reasons of security but had to release him to lead his army because of the prospect of victory his leadership was likely to offer.

3. Ibid. p.192 ff Ar.text; 311 ff Fr.trans.

where he tried unsuccessfully to obtain Turkish help through the Regency of Algiers; then he went to Sijilmāsa and the Darᶜa, finally seeking refuge in the Sūs.[1]

With Zīdān eliminated for the time being, the rivalry centred round Muḥammad al-Shaikh and Abū Fāris.[2] Two engagements took place between them (May and Dec.1606) with Abū Fāris suffering defeat on both occasions.[3] ᶜAbdallāh, son and commander of Muḥammad al-Shaikh's forces,[4] entered Marrakesh (20th Shaᶜbān 1015/21st Dec.1606). The vandalism of the victors provoked an insurrection in the city;[5] the people of Marrakesh invited Zīdān

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1. Loc.cit.

2. Muḥammad al-Shaikh and Abū Fāris were sons of a concubine, al-Khaizurān and she had tried unsuccessfully to reconcile her two sons to unite their forces against Zīdān son of a legitimate wife of al-Manṣūr, al-Shabāniya

3. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t I p.105 ff.

4. Throughout the struggle Muḥammad al-Shaikh remained in Fes, his forces being commanded by ᶜAbdallāh because of his superstition that he would die if he went to Marrakesh. Ibid. p.174, note 1.

5. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.193-194 Ar.text; 313-314 Fr. trans; Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t 1 p.172 ff.

from the Sūs, pledged him support and collaborated with him in effecting the defeat of ᶜAbdallāh (25th Feb. 1607)[1] ᶜAbdallāh fled to Fes and returned with a strong reinforcement to avenge his defeat. In two combats (10th Oct. and 6th Dec. 1607)[2] Zīdān's forces were routed and ᶜAbdallāh entered Marrakesh; many of the inhabitants of the city fled for reasons of security; they gathered together at the High Atlas and proclaimed a murābiṭ of the place, Abū Ḥassūn as leader.[3] Abū Ḥassūn descended on Marrakesh and defeated ᶜAbdallāh (6th Shawwāl 1016/24th Jan.1608); he did not, however, occupy Marrakesh for a long time, for on 22nd April 1608 he was evicted by Zīdān who had recruited new forces from the Sūs since his last defeat by

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1. Loc.cit.
2. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t I p.259 ff; 267 ff.
3. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.194 ff Ar.text; 316 ff Fr. trans. There is some controversy about the actual name and ancestry of this murābit; some called him Mawlay Muhammad; he was either the grandson of Muhammad al-Shaikh al-Mahdī, the founder of the Saᶜdian dynasty, or of Abū ᶜAbbās Aḥmad al-Aᶜraj, elder brother of Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Mahdī.

ᶜAbdallāh.[1] Now master of Marrakesh, Zīdān aspired to possess Fes, still held by Muḥammad al-Shaikh. He marched against ᶜAbdallāh, commander of Muḥammad al-Shaikh's forces, and defeated him on the banks of the Bū Regreg (27th Jan. 1609).[2] Zīdān left Muṣṭafā as his khalīfa in Fes while he went to the south to quell the revolt of a murābiṭ, Sidī Ibrāhīm.[3]

The power-struggle had for six years embroiled Morocco in a most ruinous and destructive civil war; there was a certain element of rivalry between Fes and Marrakesh,[4] a factor which was largely responsible for the great carnage of the war such as that at Janān Bakkār (25th Feb. 1607).[5]

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t 1 p.278 ff.
2. Ibid. p.306 ff.; al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.195 Ar. text; 317 Fr. transl.
3. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays-Bas t 1 p.355 note 3; pp.473-474.
4. Ibid. Introduction by H. de Castries p.XIII.
5. Ibid. p.172; al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.194 Ar.text; 314 Fr.transl.

Morocco at this time was a "country of famine, pest and war" in which "reigned a state of misery".[1] Though the victory of Bū Regreg had assured Zīdān a temporary supremacy over his opponents, a major part of the country, however, escaped his control. The breakdown of authority was typified by the position in Sale, where, against Zīdān's express commands, "each caid did only what appeared proper to him"[2]. The political disorder created by the fratricidal power-struggle led to a reaction against the Saᶜdian leadership.

> "The sons of al-Manṣūr, in pursuit of royal power, are engaged in a war of self-destruction that has occasioned much loss of life, the plunder of property and the violation of taboos....."

Such was the indictment of Abū ᶜAbbās Aḥmad ibn

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t1 "Lettre de P.M.Coy (the then representative of the United Provinces in Morocco) aux Etats-Generaux" p.283; Cf. also p.292.

2. Op.cit. t II "Lettre de Eversten aux Etats-Generaux". p.339.

ᶜAbdallāh, popularily known as Abū Maḥallī. To restore order and security amidst the anarchy, ".....it is imperative to strike at their authority and crush their power."[1]

Abū Maḥallī was born in Sijilmāsa in 967/1559;[2] his family the Awlād Abū Maḥallī had a tradition of learning and was famous for producing qādīs; they claimed descent from Sayyid al-ᶜAbbās, son of ᶜAbd al-Muṭṭalib, grandfather of the Prophet. After his studies in Fes (980-986/1572-1578) Abū Maḥallī joined the brotherhood of Sīdī Muḥammad ibn Mubārik al Zaᶜirī. He remained under the guidance of this shaikh for eighteen years, and twice made the hājj before finally settling at the wādī Sāwarā (1592)[3]. He was later to pose as the expected Mahdī and the reformer of the abuses of the time.

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.206 Ar. text; 336 Fr.transl.
2. Ibid. pp.200-209 Ar.text; 325-340 Fr. transl. On Abū Mahallī cf. also Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Pays Bas t II pp.117-125; 440-443.
3. "Relation de la Révolte d'Abou Mahalli" in Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Angleterre t II p.466 and note 2.

Abū Maḥallī's posture coinciding, as it did, with a period of political crisis, won him much popularity and a great following; this fired his ambition for power. At the head of his followers, he marched on Sijilmāsa (March 1611)[1] and defeated Zīdān's khalīfa. Zīdān sent another army commanded by his brother, ᶜAbdallāh al-Zubda, against Abū Maḥallī, but he too suffered defeat. Having united Sijilmāsa and the Darᶜa under his authority, Abū Maḥallī led his forces against Zīdān in Marrakesh and overthrew him (20th May 1612)[2]. Zīdān fled to Safi from where he made his way to Agadir.[3] Helpless, he appealed to Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAbdallāh to help him get rid of Abū Maḥallī who now occupied Marrakesh as sulṭān.

Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAbdallāh was the grandson of Saᶜīd ibn ᶜAbd al-Munaᶜim al-Ḥāḥī, a walī who was

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t II p.118 note 2.
2. Relation de la Révolte d'Abou Maḥallī op.cit. p.466 and note 1. On this battle see also Mémoire de John Harrison sur Maroc Ibid t III p.142.
3. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t II p.106, note 6.

renowned for his piety and learning and for his revival of Islam and the Sunna in the Sūs.[1] When he died (953/1546) his son ᶜAbdallāh founded a new zāwiya known as the zāwiya of Tafilalt.[2] ᶜAbdallāh was one of the powerful murābitūn at the time of al-Manṣūr; the sulṭān had, in fact, tried unsuccessfully to capture him, feeling threatened by his power. On his death (1012/1603) his son Yaḥyā became the shaikh of the zāwiya of Tafilalt. Yaḥyā continued in the pious and erudite tradition of his predecessors; he enjoyed great influence in the High Atlas; his

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1. Al-Wufrānī p.209 ff Ar.text; 342 ff Fr.transl.

2. It is called the zāwiya of Beradāᶜa by al-Wufrānī (op.cit. p.210 Ar.text; 343 Fr. transl.) Recent research has shown that this is a misnomer. Pierre de Cenival quotes the mss. of al-Fawā'id al Jamma from which al-Wufrānī (op.cit. p.211 Ar. text.344 Fr.trans.) got some of his information about ᶜAbdallāh: "ᶜAbdallāh....after numerous travels settled in Jebel Deren in a place of this mountain called Tafilalt, among the...bi Zdagha...". The curious name of Baradāᶜa (بردا ع) has arisen from the inadvertent omission of two points, one on the ب and the other on the غ ; thus we ought to have بزداغ (bi Zdagha,) this being the name of the tribe amongst whom the zāwiya of Tafilalt was established. The oral tradition that survives amongst the people refers to Yaḥyā's zāwiya as the zāwiya of Tafilalt, not Beradāᶜa.- See Pierre de Cenival: "La zaouia dite de "Beradāᶜa" in Hespéris Vol. 15 pp. 137-139.

power had grown considerably in response to Sa^{c}dian weakness and incompetence. Appealed to by Zīdān for help[1] against Abū Maḥallī, Yaḥyā organised his forces against his fellow murābiṭ. Abū Maḥallī died in the encounter (30th Nov. 1613);[2] he had occupied Marrakesh for about two years.

Though Yaḥyā had helped Zīdān recover his throne, he was later to revolt against him because of his own political ambition. This he had manifested earlier on after his defeat of Abū Maḥallī when he tried to assume power as sulṭān; lacking the support of his Berber soldiers, however, he had to abandon the throne for Zīdān.[3] Yaḥyā was later to make another bid for power; he dreamed of uniting under his leadership, the tribes and cities of Morocco divided and broken by the civil war.[4] The

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.208 Ar.text; 339 Fr.transl.
2. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t II p.443.
3. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p. 209 Ar.text; 341 Fr.transl.
4. Ibid. p.212 Ar.text; 346 Fr. transl.

first stage in this process was the capture of Tarudant after a bitterly contested battle with Abū' l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī.[1] Then in 1629 he marched against Zīdān compelling him to seek refuge in Safi.[2] He laid siege to Safi but could not sustain it because of the division within his army. It was this disarray of Yaḥyā's forces that helped Zidan recover his throne. Yaḥyā had tried unsuccessfully to attract popularity and rally support by adopting a sharīfian pedigree - he had changed his name to Mawlay al-Shaikh ibn ᶜAbdallāh.[3] He died (6th Jumādā II 1035/5th March 1626) without realising his ambition for power in Morocco.

While Yaḥyā was alive, his rival in the Sūs was Abū'l - Ḥasan ʿAlī;[4] his family the Awlād

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1. Loc.cit.
2. Sources Inédites 1ère Série France t III p.20ff; Op.cit. 1er Série Pays Bas t III p.81.
3. Op.cit. 1ère Série France t III p.44 ff.
4. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.286 Ar.text; 475-476 Fr.trans.

Aḥmad ou Mūsā al-Sūsī al Samālī had been very influential in the Sūs since the sixteenth century. Following the decline of Zīdān's power, Abu 'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī had carved out for himself an independent sphere of influence in the Sūs centred round the zāwiya of the family at Iligh in the Tazarwalt. His open revolt against Zīdān appears to have started about 1623.[1] The only check to the growth of his power in the Sūs had been Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAbdallāh who had defeated him in the contest for Tarudant. With the death of Yaḥyā in 1626, Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī became the undisputed master of the Sūs. He conquered the Darᶜa and incorporated it under his suzerainty. This "prince of the Sous" maintained his own independent relations with the European powers.[2] The order and security provided by his authority gave a great boost to commerce in the Sūs.[3]

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t III p.284; 291 and note 2.
2. Op.cit. 1ère Série Angleterre t III "Lettre de Sidi Ali a Charles 1er p.95;97.
3. Op.cit. 1ère Série France t III "Memoire sur le Maroc" p.365 and notes 4,5 and 6.

At the mouth of the Bū Regreg autonomous political entities had also sprung up.[1] Following Philippe III's decree (4th Aug.1609-17th April 1610) expelling the Moriscos from Spain, many of them had sought refuge in Morocco. A group of them from Hornachos in Estremadure (hence their name Hornacheros) settled in the Qaṣba[2] on the southern bank of the Bū Regreg. The Hornacheros were soon joined by other refugees; these were called Andalusions as distinct from the Hornacheros and

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1. On the republics at the mouth of the Bū Regreg see H. de Castries: "Les trois Republiques du Bou Regrag" in Sources Inédites 1er Série Pays Bas t V Introduction pp.I-XXVIII. "Les Moriscos à Sale et Sidi el-Ayachi" op.cit. 1ère Série France t III pp.187-198.

2. This Qasba is today called Qasba Udāya; it was built in the 12th century by the Almohade sulṭān ᶜAbd al-Mu'min to garrison Sale which he conquered in 1146. - Sources Inédites 1er Série Pays Bas t V pp. ii-iii and note 2 on p.ii. The Hornacheros who settled in the Qasba had lived in Estremadure in Spain; they formed an isolated self-governing community, preserving their Muslim faith and oriental customs. They bought from Philippe II the privilege to carry arms; they struck false money and committed all sorts of abuses such as plundering travellers that came their way. They assumed an air of superiority over other Moriscos, an attitude they continued to maintain on their arrival in Morocco. Ibid. p.VI.

they lived outside the Qasba. Their settlement gave rise to a new city called New Sale (modern Rabat) in contrast to the old city on the northern bank of the Bū Regreg. The new arrivals were dominated by the much fewer Hornacheros who constituted a type of oligarchy; moreover Zīdān had formed the Hornacheros into a militia as a prop to his position. The Moriscos (the Hornacheros and the Andalusians) engaged in piracy at first only against Spanish shipping - they bore Spain a grudge because of their expulsion - but later against the shipping of all Christian nations. This activity acquired a strong impetus with the arrival of pirates chased away from Larache and Mamora following their occupation by Spain (20th Nov.1610 and 6th Aug. 1614 respectively). The pirates of Sale soon became no less notorious than those of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. They became very rich and powerful because of the proceeds from the ransom of Christian captives and the sale of their

valuable booty. It is estimated that between 1618 and 1626 about six thousand Christians were captured and the value of captured goods ranged from £15 million. Such was the wealth and power of the ruling group, the Hornacheros, that they could afford to renounce Zīdān's authority - which in any case was minimal - with impunity. They deserted the maḥalla Zīdān had sent to the Darᶜa against the insurgent murābiṭ Abu 'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī and refused to be enrolled for a second expedition; they made Zīdān cashier his caid in Sale ᶜAbd al ᶜAzīz al-Zaᶜrūrī in 1625 and chased away his replacement ᶜAjīb in March 1627. Finally they proclaimed their independence (1627) constituting themselves into a republic run by a governor or caid, elected annually and assisted by a Dīwān (council).

This republic maintained its own independent relations with the European powers, particularly Holland. In 1629, for instance, it

sent Muhammad Venegas as its emissary to the country[1] and on 3rd September 1630 it concluded a truce of two years with Louis XIII of France regulating the relations between the contracting parties; both engaged inter alia to return reciprocally captured vessels including the crew and merchandise, to allow free access of their own traders to their respective ports subject to custom duties on their merchandise as well as guarantee the traders' security; the truce also made provision for a French consul at the "castle and city of Salay".[2]

Rabat was not represented in the government of this republic which was in the hands of the Hornacheros of the Qaṣba. The Andalusions, who were more numerous, rightly demanded a share in their own government; they

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t IV p.236.
2. Op.cit. 1ère Série France t III pp.292-296

also demanded a share in the revenue accruing from the customs and goods captured on the sea. Because these demands were not met there was a civil war between the Qaṣba and Rabat. This was brought to an end by a settlement in May 1630. Rabat acquired an autonomous status through this settlement: the Andalusians now had an elected caid though he resided in the Qaṣba. There were thus two caids in the Qaṣba, Muḥammad ibn ᶜAbd al-Qādir Seron representing the Hornacheros of the Qaṣba, and ᶜAbdallāh ibn ᶜAlī al-Qaṣarī, the Andalusions of Rabat. The Hornacheros and the Andalusions each had eight elected representatives in the Dīwān which held its sessions in the Qaṣba. The Andalusions were now also entitled to a share in the revenue.

Sale on the northern bank of the Bū Regreg was under the control of Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Mālikī al-Ziyānī, popularily known as

al-ᶜAyāshī.[1] Al-ᶜAyāshī came from an influential family of the Banū Mālik, an Arab tribe of the Gharb; he was a walī[2] and a mujāhid committed to the defence of the frontiers of Islam. He had been the disciple of ᶜAbdallāh ibn Ḥassūn al-Salāsī and it was on the orders of this shaikh that he settled in Azemmour to direct the jihād against the Spaniards in Mazagan.[3] This was the beginning of his career as a mujāhid; henceforth al-ᶜAyāshī engaged in a relentless attack on the Spanish possessions on the Atlantic coast. The success of his expeditions against Mazagan won him such popularity that on the death of the caid of Azemmour, he was nominated by Zīdān as caid of the city. The Spaniards, greatly disturbed by al-ᶜAyāshī's

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.260-274 Ar. text; 431-455 Fr. trans.

2. Referred to by al-Wufrānī as "the qutb of his period". The expression is used to describe one who is remarkable for his sanctity and uprightness and therefore serves as an example to his contemporaries.

3. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.263 Ar.text; 436 Fr.trans.

expeditions, sought to rid themselves of their enemy by wooing the favour of Zīdān; they sent him rich presents and presented al-ʿAyāshī as a potential threat to his position.[1] Zīdān succumbed to the intrigues of the Spaniards and sent his caid Muḥammad al-Sanūsī with four hundred horsemen to capture al-ʿAyāshī. Forwarned of the plot by the sympathetic caid, al-ʿAyāshī escaped to Sale with forty men composed of cavalry and infantry.[2]

Aided by the Moriscos who also were enemies of Spain, al-ʿAyāshī continued to direct expeditions against Mamura, Larache, Tangier and Ceuta. He endeared himself to the Muslim community by his ceaseless harassment of Christian settlements in Morocco. The notables of territories between Taza and Tamesna had duly elected him as their leader in

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1. Ibid. p.263 Ar. text; 437 Fr. trans.
2. Ibid. p.264 Ar. text; 437 Fr. trans.

the holy war.[1] His effective authority, however, centred round Sale, Tamesna and the Gharb.[2] Once again the sultān's authority had been supplanted by that of a local leader.

Fes and its dependencies had also escaped Zidān's control. After Zidān's victory at the Bū Regreg (1609) Muḥammad al-Shaikh had fled to Larache from where he crossed to Spain to solicit the help of Philippe III in his struggle for power.[3] Philippe III's condition of help was the cession of Larache which was eventually occupied by Spain on 4th Ramaḍān 1019/20th Nov.1610. Muḥammad al-Shaikh forfeited the loyalty of the Muslims by his cession of a Muslim city to a Christian power. Discredited, he took to plundering and pillaging the regions of the Rīf and the Ghomara with his band of ignoble companions; this led to his assassination on 5th Rajab 1022/21st August 1613.

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1. Ibid. p.265 Ar. text; 440 Fr.trans.
2. Ibid. p.280 Ar. text; 448 Fr.trans.
3. Ibid. p.197 Ar. text; 319 ff Fr. trans.

Meanwhile his son ᶜAbdallāh who had fled to Dār ibn Mashᶜal after his defeat at the Bū Regreg had reoccupied Fes with a group of Sharaqa (Sheraga)[1] (7th Rabīᶜ II 1018/10th July 1609) killing the caids of Zīdān and his khalīfa Muṣṭafā.[2] Having wrested Fes from Zīdān, ᶜAbdallāh could not, however, establish his authority in the city. From 1020/1611 to the date of his death 1033/1623 he engaged in several struggles for the city without being able to subject it to his control; his power was circumscribed round Fes al-Jadīd[3] where he was supported by the Sheraga to whom he distributed landed property seized from the people. The privileged position of the Sheraga made them arrogant; their brigandage provoked a rising (1019/1610) against them in Fes

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1. The Sheraga lived in the mountainous country between Fes and Tlemcen and they claimed an Arab origin. ᶜAbdallāh married into this tribe which explains why they constituted the prop to his power. - Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Pays Bas t 1 p.463, note 6.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p. 196 Ar.text; 318 Fr.trans.

3. Fes is divided into two parts; old Fes (Fes al Bālī) and new Fes (Fes al-Jadīd). When Fes is unqualified by an epithet, it refers to old Fes.

under Sulaimān. The death of many of the Sheraga reduced the menace posed by their power.

ᶜAbdallāh was succeeded in Fes al-Jadīd by his brother ᶜAbd al-Mālik who too could not exercise any control over Fes during his reign of three years (1033-1036/1623-1626). Left without a recognised authority, Fes was rent by a persistent power struggle between the two quarters (ᶜUdwatain): the quarter of the Andalusians and that of the Qarawīyīn.[1] The hostilities of the ᶜUdwatain occasioned much loss of lives, insecurity and dearth; large parts of Fes were ruined and became deserted.[2]

Further north Tetuan lived in virtual independence. After its destruction in 1437 by

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1. The old city of Fes is divided into two quarters: the quarter of the Andalusians and that of the Qarawīyīn. The city was founded by Idrīs I, not Idrīs II as was formerly supposed. The Madinat Fas founded by Idrīs I in 172/789 was in the present Andalusian quarter. The name of this quarter derives from the Andalusian refugees who settled in Madinat Fes in 202/1817-18 - See Lévi-Provencal: "La Fondation de Fes" in Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales Vol. IV (1938) pp.23-52. The other quarter of Fes, the Qarawīyīn quarter, was founded by Idrīs II in 193/809; it owes its name to refugees from Qairawan who fled from the Aghlabides.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.233-238 Ar.text, passim; 387-397 Fr.trans.

the Portuguese, D. Duarte de Menezes, Tetuan was reconstructed towards the end of the century by a small band of Moriscos who sought refuge in Morocco after the fall of Granada in 1491. This band was led by the Granadian ra'īs Abū'l-Hasan ʿAlī al-Manzarī.[1] Owing to a preponderant Morisco settlement in Tetuan after Philippe III's edict of expulsion, (1609-1610) the Moriscos soon became the dominant force in Tetuan.[2] Power in the city was vested in the al-Naqsīs family. A Spanish origin was attributed to this family, but a local tradition also traced their descent from the Banū Idar, a tribe of the Jabala.[3] During this

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1. See J. D. Latham: "The Reconstruction and Expansion of Tetuan: The Period of Andalusian Immigration in Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R.Gibb. Edited by George Makdisi 1965 p.387 ff.

2. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t V Introduction, p.VI; op.cit. 1er Série France t III "Memoire sur le Maroc" p.362 and note 3.

3. Ibid. p.82 note 2.

period the city was ruled by the muqaddam Aḥmad ibn ʿĪsa al-Naqsīs. Considerable power had accrued to him in Tetuan as a result of the feeble authority of the Saʿdians. In 1608 he led a revolt against Muḥammad al-Shaikh[1] and he was not unconnected with the assassination of the prince in 1613.[2] His revolt against ʿAbdallāh in 1622[3] further emphasised the autonomy he had been enjoying since the political crisis in Morocco.[4] He exercised sovereign power in Tetuan which itself had grown to exercise some hegemony over the Jabala and the Habṭ,[5] and he

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t I p.299 and note 4.
2. Al-Wufrani op.cit. p.199 Ar. text. 323 Fr.trans.
3. Sources Inédites 1ère Série France t III p.82 note 2. Cf. al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.237 Ar.text; 394 Fr.trans.
4. Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays Bas t I p.325 note 1.
5. Op.cit. 1ère Série France t III p.273 and note 2.

treated with the European powers on a sovereign basis.[1]

At the centre of Morocco was the zāwiya of Dilā'; the people of Dilā' belonged to the Majāṭ group of the Sanhāja Berbers.[2] The zāwiya was founded in the sixteenth century by their ancestor Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad (b. 943/1536; d. 3rd Shaᶜbān 1021/29th Sept. 1612). The zāwiya very early became famous because of Abū Bakr's reputation for learning and hospitality. During this period of Moroccan history ".....when there was anarchy..... and when the foundations of royal power had collapsed... Abū Bakr became the refuge of the people of learning and the consoler of the weak and the afflicted".[3] His successor Sīdī Muḥammad ibn Abū Bakr possessed great spiritual powers and was

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1. Op.cit. 1ère Série Pays Bas t II pp.490-3; 496-9; 597-9; 619; 632-7; 662-9; 687-8; 722. op.cit. 1ère Série France t III pp.82-85.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.274-286; Ar.text; 455-475 Fr.trans.

3. Ibid. p.275-276 Ar.text; 458 Fr.trans.

accomplished in various sciences; he was particularly versed in kalām (theology) and tafsīr (exegesis).[1] It was this tradition of learning that made the zāwiya of Dilā' a popular resort for students, while the hospitality and security it offerred made it a particularly attractive haven in a "country of famine, pest and war" denied of peace and a stable government. The zāwiya of Dilā' thus exercised tremendous influence on the surrounding population. This was to serve as a powerful source of strength in the subsequent political expansion initiated from the zāwiya by Muḥammad al-Ḥājj.

III

Just as in the sixteenth century when murābiṭūn led the Muslim reaction against Portuguese advance on Morocco, so in the seventeenth century

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1. Ibid. p.277 Ar.text; 460 Fr. trans.

it was the murābiṭūn who represented the Muslim protest at the internecine power-struggle and political disorder in Morocco. Here again was a classic illustration of the importance of zāwiyas as focuses of power; being centres of religion, zāwiyas possessed a force to which the faithful owed a common allegiance, a source of common fellowship within the Muslim community. Since the shaikhs of the zāwiyas enjoyed much loyalty from their Ikhwan[1] they could mobilise substantial support in the event of crises when zāwiyas could assume overt political postures. The political aspirations of Sīdī Ibrāhīm, Abū Hassūn, Abū Mahallī, Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAbdallāh, Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī and later of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj of the zāwiya of Dilā' represent examples of the exploitation of the power-base provided by zāwiyas for political ends. Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAbdallāh carried this further by adopting a sharīfian pedigree which,

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1. See Chapter V. p. 267 note 1

however, failed to turn the scales in his favour.

This raises the much wider question of the reverence for sharīfs and the relevance of a sharīfian status or claim to the success of political movements. The Sa^{c}dian success in the jihad against the Portuguese at Agadir, for instance, could hardly be attributable to their sharīfian connection in spite of the attractiveness of such an explanation.[1] The Sa^{c}dians owed their victory to a number of factors - e.g. the numerical superiority of their forces owing to the support of the Jazūlīya shaikhs and their clientele, their access to arms and ammunition through the contraband traffic, the support of European merchants who saw in the collapse of the Portuguese establishment a greater freedom of trade, the weakness and the inadequate defence of the small

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1. Cf., for instance, Brahim Boutalib's review of Muhammad Hiji's La Zaouia de Dila. Son role religieux, scientifique et politique Rabat, 1964 in Hespéris Tamuda Vol. IV 1963. p.417.

Portuguese garrison[1] - among which their sharīfian origin, which might not have been unimportant as a source of charisma, was just one and by no means a crucial and determinant factor.

The 16th century Muslim resistance to the Portuguese expansion in Morocco and its political and social consequencies[2] demonstrated the power of the murābiṭun tradition in Moroccan society. The political crisis triggered off by the death of al-Manṣūr again gave scope for the revolutionary expression of this power. The murābiṭūn vied to supplant the weak and discredited Sa^{c}dian leadership and as none of them enjoyed an overall supremacy (as the Sa^{c}dians did in the 16th century) they became rival leaders of small independent principalities.

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1. See chapter I pp. 24-26
2. See chapter I pp. 27-30 and notes 1 and 2 on p. 30

Thus was the political situation in Morocco in 1631. Zīdān had died in 1037/1627 and had been succeeded by his son ᶜAbd al-Malik after a power-struggle with his two brothers, al-Walīd and Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar.[1] With the assassination of ᶜAbd al-Mālik by renegades (6th Shaᶜbān 1040/10th March 1631) al-Walīd became sulṭān, but with hardly any writ beyond Marrakesh and its immediate environs. His reign saw the further dwindling of Saᶜdian power which had started since the time of Zīdān. Morocco fell more and more under the control of the murābiṭūn.

In the south Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī had become the undisputed master of the Sūs and the Darᶜa, following the death of Abū Maḥallī and Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAbdallāh. On the Atlantic littoral at the mouth

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1. Al-Wufrānī p.244 Ar.text; 405 Fr.transl.

of the Bū Regreg were three independent entities, the two republics - the Qaṣba and Rabat[1] - and the city state of Sale. The Qaṣba and Rabat were ruled by ᶜAbd al-Qādir Seron and ᶜAbdallāh ibn ᶜAlī al-Qaṣarī, assisted by a Dīwān of sixteen. Sale was ruled by the indefatigable mujāhid, al-ᶜAyāshī, whose authority also embraced Tamesna, the Gharb and Tetuan - this city-state which was dominated by Moriscos, like the Qaṣba and Rabat, and, like them too, enjoyed an independent existence under its muqaddam, Aḥmad ibn ᶜĪsa al-Naqsīs, fell to the power of al-ᶜAyāshī in 1631[2]. Fes remained without a recognised authority, a

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1. De Castries says three republics - the Qasba, Rabat and Sale. We would not describe Sale as republic in the same way as the word has not been used for Tetuan and the other spheres of influence ruled by the various local leaders.

2. See Chapter III p.122

prey to internecine conflict and leadership struggle between the two rival quarters [1]. In the centre of Morocco was the zāwiya of Dilā', a stable enclave amidst the political turmoil of the time, with a high potential for political power which, however, was not to be exploited until the time of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, son and successor of Sīdī Muḥammad.

In 1631 Sijilmāsa produced its own leader just as leaders had sprung up in other parts of Morocco. In this year Mawlay al-Sharīf, "one of the outstanding men in the whole Saharah region" was chosen by the people of Sijilmāsa "to head their affairs and their community." [2] This was the beginning

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1. The sources tell us nothing about the politics of Fes al-Jadīd after the death of its Sa^{c}dian prince ^{c}Abd al-Mālik (1626). It is very probable that it, too, had no effective leadership at this time.

2. Abū'l-Qāsim al-Ziyānī: Al-Turjumān al-Mu^{c}arib ^{c}an Duwal al-Mashriq wa'l-Maghreb transl. O. Houdas under the title: Le Maroc de 1631 à 1812. Paris 1886 p.1 Ar.text; 2 Fr. transl. The manuscript translated by Houdas is different from the one in Rabat Archives cited in Chapter I p.31 n.2, 36 n.1. The former has no account of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty whereas the latter has.

of the movement which was to bring to power the ᶜAlawī dynasty. The chapters that follow will examine how, after the unsuccessful bid for power by Mawlay Mahammad, al-Rashīd established the ᶜAlawī dynasty, thus filling the power-vacuum created by Saᶜdian decadence.


MOROCCO ABOUT 1631
Al-Qasr al-Saghir
Tangier
Ceuta
Arzila
Larache
Tetuan
Badis
Al-Hucemas
Melilla
Al-Qasr al-Kabir
JABALA
GHOMARA
RIF
KEBDANA
BANU YAZNASEN
Dar ibn Mash'al
Tlemcen
HABT
W. Sebu
Mamura
Sale
Rabat
Fadela
GHARB
Volubilis
Taza
ANGAD
Ujda
Fes
Meknes
Azemmour
Mazagan
TAMESNA
Bu Regreg
Azru
W. Muluya
Debdu
Dila'
Safi
Umm Rebir
W. Gnir
W. Zusfana
Mogador
Marrakesh
W. al-'Abid
Aghmat
Demnat
Todra
TAFILALT
Sijilmasa
Tabu'asamt
Tafatna
Tarkuku
W. Sus
Agadir
Tarudant
Tedsi
SUS
Massa
IAZARWALI
Iligh
W. Nun
Tagmadart
DAR'A
W. Sawara

CHAPTER III

MOROCCO BETWEEN 1631 - 1659 : THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE ʿALAWĪ DYNASTY

Tradition relates that the home of the ʿAlawīs, descendants of Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiya was Yanbū' al-Nakhīl in the Hijāz.[1]

The first of the ʿAlawīs to arrive in the Maghreb was al-Ḥasan ibn Qāsim and hence his title al-Dākhil. He lived, like other members of the ʿAlawī family, in the Banū Ibrahīm village in Yanbū' al-Nakhīl. He arrived in Sijilmāsa in 664/1265-6 with a group of pilgrims led by the Sayyid Abū Ibrahīm.[2] This was during the reign

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1. Abū Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Salām al-Qādirī : Al-Durr al-Sanī, p.51 ff; Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz : Al-Anwār al-Ḥasaniya, p. 26 ff; al-Wufrānī p.288,ff; 479 Fr. transl.

2. Why al-Ḥasan came to Sijilmāsa is shrouded in legend; according to the most popular theory, he came on the insistence of the pilgrims of Sijilmāsa; the people of Sijilmāsa desired a descendant of the Prophet in their community in the belief that his presence would improve their date-palm produce.

of the Marīnid sulṭān Abū Bakr ibn ᶜAbd al-Ḥaqq. Al-Ḥasan enjoyed much esteem in Sijilmāsa because of his nobility; he owed this esteem also to his piety and learning; he is said to have been particularly accomplished in rhetoric ᶜilm al-bayān.[1] He lived for twelve years in Sijilmāsa and died in 676/1277-8 at the age of 72. He left an only son Abū ᶜAbdallāh Muḥammad; Muḥammad himself left an only son al-Ḥasan who fathered ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān and the Sayyid ᶜAlī al-Sharīf. It is from the two sons of ᶜAli al-Sharīf, the Sayyid Abū ᶜAbdallāh Muḥammad and the Sayyid Abū'l-Jamāl Yūsuf that the ᶜAlawīs or Filālīs have multiplied.[2] Only the descendants of Yūsuf through his wife Sayyida al-Khalfīya,, however, became sovereigns. Sayyida al-Khalfīya had a murābiṭ ancestry; Yūsuf's

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1. The editor of al-Anwār al-Ḥasanīya suggests that it was al-Ḥasan who introduced this science into the Maghreb, p.27, note 3.

2. Yūsuf al Fāsi : Mir'āt al-Maḥāsin, pp.185-6

other wife, Sayyida al-Ṭahirtīya was also descended from one of the murābiṭūn families in Sijilmāsa.[1]

The Al-Durr al Sanī and the Mir'āt al-Maḥāsin mention some of the distinguished members of the family as, for instance, the Sayyid ᶜAlī al-Sharīf, the renowned mujāhid;[2] he is said to have engaged in holy wars in Spain where he stayed for about twenty years; the Andalusions desired to offer him leadership of their community, but he declined, preferring a life of religious devotion, and returned to Sijilmāsa. One of his jihād expeditions is said to have carried him as far as Agadez in the Sūdān.[3] The family also produced

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1. Al-Qādirī, op.cit., p.54.
2. Ibid., pp.53,55.
3. ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz, op.cit., p.55; al-Wufrāni, p.296 Ar. text; 492 Fr. transl.

ᶜulamā' of repute. We may cite Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Wāhid and Abū ᶜAbdallāh ibn ᶜAlī ibn Ṭāhir, both contemporaries of al-Manṣūr.[1] Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Wāhid was the muftī of Marrakesh and both teacher and preacher at the mosque of Shurafā' in Marrakesh. According to Lévi-Provençal, he was, in his time, the greatest traditionist (muhaddith) in Morocco.[2]

Thus the ᶜAlawī family already enjoyed some influence before it came to power. Abū'l-Amlāk al-Sharīf, head of the ᶜAlawī family in Sijilmāsa, for instance, was "one of the most outstanding men in the whole Saharan region". This explains his choice in 1631 by the people of Sijilmāsa as leader of their community during the political crisis in Morocco. Al-Sharīf's effective leadership soon made his

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1. Yūsuf al Fāsī, op.cit., p.186; Abū ᶜAbdallāh Muḥammad al-Qādirī: Nashr al-Mathānī transl. in Archives Marocaines, Vol. 21. p.34 ff; 361 ff.

2. Lévi-Provençal: Les Historiens des Chorfa, p.238.

authority widely recognised in the Saharan region.[1] Only the Banū al-Zubair of Tabū^{c}asāmt refused to recognise him. In a bid to conquer them, al-Sharīf appealed for assistance from his friend, the murābiṭ, Abū'l-Ḥasan ^{c}Alī, master of the Sūs and the Dar^{c}a, because his opponents were strongly defended by their citadel of Tabū^{c}asāmt. The Banū al-Zubair countered al-Sharīf's move by soliciting the support of the zāwiya of Dilā' which intervened on their behalf (1043/1633).[2] Abū'l-Ḥasan ^{c}Alī therefore refrained from attacking Tabū^{c}asāmt; the Banū al-Zubair, through a clever riposte, had averted an impending danger but the antagonism between them and al-Sharīf still remained, if temporarily submerged, and this was to occasion conflict later on.

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1. Al-Ziyānī op.cit. p.2 Ar. text; 3 Fr. transl.

2. Loc.cit.; al-Wufrānī, op.cit. p.299 Ar.text; 496 Fr. transl; al-Nāsirī: Kitab al-Istiqsā' (Casablanca edition) 7th part p.13 Ar.text; 16 Fr. transl. in Arch. Maroc Vol. 9.

To strengthen their position vis-a-vis Sijilmāsa the Banū al-Zubair sought to break the friendship between al-Sharīf and Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī so as to deprive al-Sharīf, in future, of the military support of his ally. They offered their services faithfully and with great devotion to Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī, to the jealousy and great mortification of al-Sharīf. Through their machination, they succeeded in straining and finally breaking the friendship between al-Sharīf and Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī.[1] The Banū al-Zubair had thus achieved their desired aim of isolating their enemy. It would appear that it was at this time, when the two friends had broken, that Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī marched on Sijilmāsa and captured it. The Kitāb al-Instiqsā' quoting al-Bustān, relates that the annexation of Sijilmāsa by Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī took

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., pp.299-300 Ar. text; 496 Fr. transl.

place when he was invited by al-Sharīf to help him subjugate the Banū al-Zubair.[1] This version is unsubstantiated by other evidence and so has not been accepted, even though such perfidy is not impossible. Having taken possession of Sijilmāsa, Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī installed his representatives and returned to his capital in the Sūs.[2] His jurisdiction now embraced the Sūs, the Darᶜa and Sijilmāsa.

Maḥammad, son of al-Sharīf, was provoked to action by the subjugation of Sijilmāsa. The Banū al-Zubair, whose machination had led to the estrangement between his father and ᶜAbū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī, and the eventual seizure of Sijilmāsa, he decided to attack. He parted at night with a force of two hundred horsemen, concealing his designs. They made a sudden attack on Tabūᶜasāmt, penetrating the citadel through a breach they had made in the wall. They killed many of its defenceless inhabitants and seized their treasures.[3]

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1. Al-Nāṣirī, op.cit., p.13 Ar.text; 16 Fr.transl.
2. Loc.cit.
3. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit. p.300. Ar.text; 496 Fr.transl.

Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī greatly incensed by Maḥammad's outrage, wrote to his ᶜāmil in Sijilmāsa, Abū Bakr, ordering him to capture by strategem, either al-Sharīf - he had been highly elated by his son's conquest of his enemy - or Maḥammad, and to send the captive to him in the Sūs.[1] Abū Bakr could not get hold of Maḥammad, but al-Sharīf fell into his hands; he led him to the Sūs and here he remained prisoner until he was ransomed by Maḥammad for a considerable sum of money (1047/1637-8). On his return to Sijilmāsa, al-Sharīf renounced all political activities, and retired to a life of religious devotion until his death in 1659.[2]

While al-Sharīf was captive in the Sūs, Maḥammad was secretly engaged in planning the overthrow of Abū'l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī's power in Sijilmāsa. With the treasures he seized in Tabuᶜasāmt, he was able to raise a modest army.[3] His attack on

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1. Al-Nāsirī, op.cit., p.14 Ar.text; 18 Fr.transl.
2. Al-Ziyānī, op.cit., p.3 Ar.text; 5 Fr.transl.
3. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.300 Ar.text; 496 Fr.transl.

Tabū-ʿasāmt had probably made Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī's rule particularly onerous. His functionaries oppressed the people with every sort of taxation - "they imposed the kharāj on all property". Maḥammad exploited the people's grievances to great advantage. He expelled from Sijilmāsa all the representatives of Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī and declared Sijilmāsa independent of the latter's authority. The rebellion was sanctioned by the formal recognition of Maḥammad's authority by the people of Sijilmāsa 1050/1640-1.[1] This marked the beginning of Maḥammad's political career. He carried his rebellion further by attacking Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī in the Darʿa. After a gruelling struggle he defeated him and forced him to seek refuge in the Sūs. Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī's possessions had shrunk to the Sūs alone: he had lost Sijilmāsa and the Darʿa to Maḥammad; he had also lost his pre-eminence in southern Morocco to Maḥammad and henceforth Maḥammad was the more important factor in the politics of the south.

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.301 Ar.text; 498 Fr.transl.

We may now turn to the situation on the Bū Regreg. The settlement of an alien group on the southern bank of the river naturally aroused some suspicion on the part of the indigenous population on the opposite bank. They doubted the faith of the Moriscos.[1] They also resented their monopoly of trade.[2] In the early days of their arrival al-ʿAyāshī found them ready collaborators in his jihād against the Spanish settlements on the Atlantic coast because of their inveterate hatred of Spain.

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1. In fact they were referred to by the people of Sale as the "Christians of Castille" - H. de Castries: Les trois republiques du Bou Regrag in Sources Inédites 1er Série Pays Bas t 5 p. VIII and note 4. About the Moriscos, Harrison remarked in 1631: "...the King of Spaine... banished as good or better Christians out of Spaine than is in Spaine" - Relation de John Harrison in Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre t.III, p.52. And had not the Moriscos when about to be expelled from Spain protested that "they were Christians living in the law of the Church and that as a matter of conscience, they could not be made to cross into Barbary" - Roger Coindreau: Les Corsaires de Sale, Paris 1948, p.38 quoted from C.Penz: Les Captives Francais du Maroc au XVIIe Siècle, Rabat 1944.p.10.

2. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit. p.267 Ar.text; 444 Fr.transl.

On 7th Feb. 1631 al-ᶜAyāshi had ambushed a Spanish garrison in Larache, inflicting on it heavy casualties; this was followed by another expedition against Mamora in May in which al-ᶜAyāshī reported similar success.[1] The mujāhid accused the Moriscos of reluctant and half-hearted support during the attack on Larache - their sluggishness had made possible reinforcement of the Spanish garrison.[2] Al-ᶜAyāshī also accused them of betraying military intelligence to the Spaniards; thus "they had transgressed against God and his Prophet by allying themselves with Christians".[3] Al-ᶜAyashī sought a fatwā from the ᶜulamā' which legitimised his hostilities against the Moriscos. From this time dated the enmity and conflict between al-ᶜAyashī and the Moriscos.

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1. H. de Castries: Les Moriscos à Sale et Sidi El-ᶜAyashi in Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Pays Bas t. III, p.195 and note 3.
2. Al-Wufrānī, Loc.cit.
3. Loc.cit.

In 1631 al-ᶜAyāshī attacked the Qaṣba from the mouth of the river while his son, at the command of a cavalry force attacked it on land.[1] The attack, however, failed to reduce the solidly constructed Qaṣba; al-ᶜAyāshī raised the seige and led his mujāhidūn against Mamora (Oct. 1632).[2] More conflicts followed in later years between al-ᶜAyāshī and the Moriscos; part of the former's motivation was his desire to be the sole power on the Bū Regreg and so control its lucrative trade.

There was a four-year period of peace (1632-36) on the southern bank after the seige of

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1. H. de Castries, Les trois républiques du Bou Regrag, op.cit. p. XVIII ff.

2. Al-ᶜAyāshī's attack on Mamora could be seen as a new strategy of economic warfare against the Moriscos; if he captured Mamora, a much better port, then he could make it supplant Rabat by diverting to it the trade of Rabat. The success of this strategy would have meant the economic ruin of the Moriscos. In spite of repeated attacks, however, al-ᶜAyāshī failed to capture Mamora. See Georges S. Colin: "Projet de traite entre les Morisques de la Casba de Rabat et le roi d'Espagne en 1631," in Hespéris, Vol. 42. 1955, p.21.

al-ʿAyāshī. The deep divisions between the Andalusians and the Hornacheros which had closed temporarily as a result of the common external danger, soon came again into the open. The accord of May 1630[1] could, in fact, not provide the basis of lasting peace. The provision for a dual leadership in the form of two caids with equal powers bedevilled the smooth working of the constitution; the two caids were rivals rather than partners in a common administration and so there existed the potential for a power-struggle. In September 1636, the Andalusian caid, al-Qaṣarī, seized power by ruse and expelled the Hornacheros from the Qaṣba. Some sought refuge in Algiers and Tunis; others in Sale; a third group were allowed to remain in Rabat.[2]

Al-Qaṣarī was not satisfied with mastery

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1. See Chapter II p.70

2. Memoire de Giles Penn, Dec.1636 in Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre t. III, p.267; Journal de G. Carteret 30 Avril -9Nov. 1638 Ibid., p.447; Relation sur le Maroc, Ibid., p.476; Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit., 1er Série France t. III, p.541.

only of the southern bank; he sought control of the whole estuary of the Bū Regreg as insurance against al-ᶜAyāshī's hostilities and the possible plot of the Hornacheros who had fled to Sale. He made a bridge of boats across the river to enable him to lead his Andalusion forces to Sale; he laid seige to the city for two months (January - February 1637). Alᶜ Ayāshī who was away on one of his expeditions against the Spanish settlements hurried back to relieve his capital.[1] In 1637 Admiral William Rainsborough arrived in Sale[2] at the command of a naval expedition, commissioned by

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1. "Relation de Jean Marges", op.cit. p.539 ff.

2. "Lettre de W. Rainsborough à W. Aston" in Sources Inédites 1ère Série Angleterre t.III, p.281. The first negotiation with the Salatins for the release of English captives was undertaken in 1626 by John Harrison; the following year he concluded a treaty with them for the mutual respect of their respective vessels on the high seas. This treaty was, however, broken by a certain Englishman, Maddock, and the Salatins reacted with extreme reprisals against English shipping, particularly between 1635 and 1636. Flying English flags, they surprised English vessels laden with fish coming from the New World. The number of English victims of Salatin piracy and the injury done to English commerce reached such alarming proportions that Charles I was prevailed upon by the merchant class to take stern measures to release English captives and save English commerce from the ravages of the Salatins. A naval expedition was planned against Sale; this took place in 1637 and was commanded by W.Rainsborough officer of the Royal Marines -Ibid., p.258 ff: 276 ff.

Charles I with "suppressing....pyrattes and redeeming His Majesty's subjects whome they (i.e. the pirates of Sale) had taken and detayne captives".[1] He and al-ʿAyāshī signed a treaty of friendship and joint operation (May 1637) against their common enemy.[2] They attacked al-Qaṣarī and forced him to raise the seige of Sale and to retreat to the southern bank. Then they took the offensive against the Qaṣba, blocking it by land and sea in the hope of starving it into submission.[3]

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1. Ibid., p.277.

2. Ibid., pp.284-291.

3. "Relation de Jean Marges" Loc.cit. The greatest advantage of Rabat as a haven of pirates is the protection offered by the bar at the mouth of the Bū Regreg. This bar prevented Rainsborough's big ships from coming near the Qasba for a close range artillery bombardment and so his operations against the Qaṣba produced no effect. The only course left for him was to reduce the Qasba by starvation. On the geographical advantages of Rabat as a resort for pirates see Roger Coindreau, op.cit., p.34ff.

At this time (1637) there was already a change of leadership in Marrakesh: Al-Walīd had died (14th Ramaḍān 1045/21 February 1636) and had been succeeded by his brother Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar.[1] He was "not above 18 yeares of age"[2]. The plight of the beseiged Qaṣba seemed to offer him a good opportunity of reasserting the control of Marrakesh over the rebellious Moriscos; he was also concerned that the Qaṣba should not fall into the hands of al-ᶜAyāshī or W. Rainsborough. Muḥammad al-Shaikh therefore set out for the Qaṣba at the head of an expeditionary force. Al-ᶜAyāshī hurried to prevent the sulṭān from reaching the Qaṣba, in spite of his claims - which were meant to camouflage his ambitions - that his attacks against the Qaṣba had no other purpose than to

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1. Al-Wafrānī, op.cit.,p.246 Ar.text; 407 Fr.transl.
2. Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Angleterre. t. III, p.374.

restore it to the sultān's control. Al-ᶜAyāshī engineered the burning of the crops on the route of the sultān's army; with no food to sustain them, many soldiers could not withstand the rigours of the expedition and so deserted the sultān's army. Muhammad al-Shaikh, therefore, could not make progress beyond Fadela and was forced to retreat to Marrakesh (June 1637).[1]

The three months' (April - June 1637) combined seige by al-ᶜAyāshī and Rainsborough was causing great suffering and distress to the beseiged Andalusians and had taken a great toll of their powers of resistance. There was a division within their ranks; three groups emerged representing three different views; meanwhile they deposed their caid al-Qasarī, and entrusted the government of the Qasba temporarily to three men, Saya Vasher,

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1. Lettre de W. Rainsborough à l'Admiraute, Ibid., p.323; Lettre de G. Carteret à E.Nicholas, Ibid., p.340; Relation sur le Maroc, Ibid., p.472-3; Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit., p.539 ff.

brother-in-law of al-Qaṣarī, al-Ḥājj ᶜAbbās and al-Harrado, while a course of action was being debated by the three groups.[1] Haunted by fear and uncertain of their future, the Andalusians, as an ultimate guarantee of security, had arranged secretly with Spain to send a representative to negotiate her occupation of the Qaṣba.[2] Meanwhile the debate continued. There was a group favouring a deal with al-ᶜAyāshī, another asserting its loyalty to the sulṭān and a third group supporting the continued leadership of al-Qaṣarī. Al-ᶜAyāshī's conditions for a settlement were that the Andalusians pay an indemnity for the damage done

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1. Relation de Jean Marges op.cit., p.539 ff.

2. Lettre de Rainsborough à l'Amiraute, op.cit. pp.324-325. In fact only the chance delay, caused by rough sea, in the arrival of the Spanish representative from Mamora, Don Johan de Toledo, prevented the Qaṣba from being occupied by Spain. At the time the Spanish representative arrived, the Andalusians received a letter of pardon for their rebellion (the Mariscos had seized independence in 1627, See Chapter II p.68) from the sulṭān; this gave them some assurance of support and eventual rescue by the sulṭān and so they refused to carry on any negotiation with the Spaniard.

to Sale during the 1636 attack led by al-Qaṣarī; that he (al-ᶜAyāshī) be entitled to a 50% share in the revenue derived from the customs and captured goods - a clear indication of the hidden economic motive behind al-ᶜAyāshī's activities on the Bū Regreg; and finally that the Hornacheros expelled from the Qaṣba be given their property and restored to the government of the Qaṣba. The Andalusians accepted the first two conditions but rejected the third; of course, they could not accept such a suicidal proposal which would have meant abandoning their newly won power to the Hornacheros, who, for long, had dominated them. An accommodation with al-ᶜAyāshī thus foundered on this particular clause. After about twenty days of debate the loyalist party triumphed. It argued the inadvisability of the continued leadership of al-Qaṣarī whom they accused of tyranny and ambitious pretensions to power; submission to

their enemy, al-ʿAyāshī, on the other hand, would be sheer cowardice; besides they owed responsibility to the sulṭān who had installed them in the Qaṣba.[1] Finally they pointed out that there was the comforting possibility of their being rescued by the sulṭān in spite of the problems posed by rebels in his country.[2]

As token of their loyalty the Andalusians decided to send al-Qaṣarī to the sulṭān in the hope of getting a replacement. Al-Qaṣarī was despatched secretly at night by boat to Azemmour from where the caid of the city conducted him to the sulṭān who was, at that time, camped with his army at Tamesna. Contrary to the expectation of the Andalusians the sulṭān pardoned al-Qaṣarī and sent him in company

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1. In their hour of crisis the rebels now talked of loyalty to the sulṭān.

2. Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit., loc.cit.

of a caid and a certain Robert Blake,[1] both of whom were commissioned by the sultān to "pacify the trouble"[2] in the Qaṣba and "settle him (al-Qaṣarī) in his place".[3] They left Safi for Sale aboard Robert Blake's own vessel with the sultān's provisions for the famished Andalusians. On their arrival at Sale, they met the English Admiral William Rainsborough still occupied with the blockade of the

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1. Robert Blake first came to Morocco in 1636 as representative of a London group of merchants. The sultān Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Asghar became very fond of him and gave him the monopoly of processing and exporting the saltpetre extracted in Morocco; in addition he farmed out to him the customs of the ports of Safi and Ayer; this made Blake incur the hatred of English merchants. In 1637 he acted as agent of the sultān (the role in which he is now engaged) in restoring al-Qaṣari to the governorship of the Qaṣba. He and Jūdar ibn ᶜAbdallāh went to England jointly as ambassadors of the sultān to ratify the friendship treaty between Morocco and England. He returned to Morocco in 1638 as representative of the new Barbary Company which he was instrumental in creating; in return for the supply of saltpetre to Charles I, the Company was given monopoly of trade in the region between Cape Blanc and Tlemcen. The privileges of the Company ruined the old English merchants and their opposition led to the withdrawal of the Company's monopoly rights; thus ended the Barbary Company. - Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre. t. III, p.247, note 1; op.cit.; 1er Série France, t.III, p.543, note 1.
2. Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit., p.543.
3. Lettre de W.Rainsborough à l'Amirauté, op.cit.,p.325.

Qaṣba. He allowed them to go ashore to carry out the sulṭān's commission on condition that "all the captives, His Majesty's subjects should be delivered ... freely"[1] to him. The Andalusians accepted the sulṭān's recommendations contained in the letter given them by his emissaries. Al-Qaṣarī was thus rehabilitated, signifying the Qaṣba's recognition, temporarily at least, of the sulṭān's authority. The combined land and sea blockade by al-ᶜAyāshī and Rainsborough, bringing in its wake great privations, had thus contributed indirectly to giving the feeble Saᶜdian authority a new lease of power, howbeit nominal, over his rebellious subjects. The English captives were released as arranged and Rainsborough set sail for home (20th August 1637).[2] The departure

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1. Loc.cit.; Relation sur le Maroc, op.cit.,p.473.

2. Journal de W.Rainsborough-Sources Inédites 1ère Série Angleterre, t.III, p.352; Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit., p.544. Rainsborough claims he went home with about 300 captives - Journal de W. Rainsborough, op.cit., p.325 and note 1; his lieutenant G. Carteret, however, puts the number at about 270 - Lettre de George Carteret à E. Nicholas, op.cit., p.341; According to Jean Marges the number was about 230 - Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit., p.544.

of the English Admiral greatly eroded the effectiveness of al-ᶜAyāshī's blockade; moreover the despatch of relief supplies by the sulṭān and the Duke of Medina Sidonia,[1] always with a political interest in the affairs of the Qaṣba, wrecked the whole strategy of starving the Qaṣba to submission. The reinstatement of al-Qaṣarī, his arch-enemy, as governor, must also have embittered al-ᶜAyāshī.

No sooner had al-Qaṣarī taken up the governorship of the Qaṣba than he started flouting the sulṭān's authority. He would not send to Marrakesh the hostages he had promised as token of allegiance, nor would he accept that the sulṭān's men be installed in the Qaṣba.[2] His tyranny was evidenced by his killing of the ring leaders

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1. H. de Castries: Les trois républiques du Bou Regreg, op.cit. p. xxii. Gaspar-Alonso Perez de Guzman was the Duke of Medina Sidonia from 1636 and he had jurisdiction over matters of the Ocean and the coasts of Andalusia.

2. Memoire de G. Penn sur le Maroc, Sources Inédites, 1ᵉʳ Série Angleterre, t. III, p.360; Journal de G. Carteret, Ibid., p.445.

of the revolt against him;[1] some were exiled while others fled on their own accord. Al-Qaṣarī himself soon died (1638) victim of an assassin's knife.[2] He was succeeded by his son during whose governorship the Qaṣba reverted to loyalty to the sulṭān. To ensure this loyalty the sulṭān installed in the Qaṣba a contingent of 450 men commanded by the French renegrade Morat Francois. With the restoration of the sulṭān's control over the Qaṣba, al-ᶜAyāshī, claiming that his objective had been attained - which was doubtful - stopped all hostilities, for a while, against the Qaṣba. Through his negotiation with the sulṭān, the Hornacheros who had fled to him after their expulsion from the Qaṣba in 1636 were resettled in Rabat. Al-ᶜAyāshī

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1. Relation de Gean Marges, op.cit., p.554; Journal de G. Carteret, see note 1 above, p.446; Relation sur le Maroc, op.cit., p.476.

2. Journal de Carteret, Loc.cit.

then led his mujāhidūn against Mamora (July 1638).[1]

He was later to intervene in Fes. We left Fes al-Jadīd and Fes al-Bālī in 1631 completely lost to Sa^{c}dian control. ^{c}Abd al Mālik the nominal sulṭān in Fes al-Jadīd had died in 1626; in Fes al-Bālī, already independent of Sa^{c}dian rule since about 1611, the two rival quarters vied for power. In 1636, however, a depraved Sa^{c}dian prince, Aḥmad al-Aṣghar,[2] appeared in Fes al-Jadīd[3] as rival to his younger brother, Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar, the sulṭān in Marrakesh. For a while he was able to maintain his position and contain the expanding

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1. Loc.cit.; Relation sur Maroc, op.cit., p.477.

2. Report d'anciens captifs au Maroc in Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre, t. III, p.246 and note 2; Relation sur le Maroc, Ibid., p.463 and note 7, pp.471-2; Lettre de Gaspard de Rastin à Richelieu in Sources Inédites 1er Série France, t.III. p.456 and note 4.

3. Although the sources do not say which of the two cities of Fes Ahmad al-Aṣghar occupied, it is almost certainly New Fes and not Old Fes where one or the other of the rival quarters held power. Al-Wufrānī in fact says that from about 1611 "the notables of (Old) Fes did not bow their head to any prince until the advent of al-Rashīd" - op.cit., p.238 Ar.text; 397 Fr.transl.

power of al-ᶜAyāshī. He defeated al-ᶜAyāshī's son sent against him and it was not until al-ᶜAyāshī himself led the attack that the prince was defeated (1638). By his victory the two cities of Fes came under al-ᶜAyāshī's sphere of influence.[1]

Meanwhile a new crisis had arisen on the southern bank of the Bū Regreg. The settlement of the Hornacheros in Rabat had reopened the old antagonism between them and the Andalusians. In a bid to regain their lost power, the Hornacheros organised an insurrection with the support of some disgruntled Andalusians and some Arabs they had caused to infiltrate into Rabat under the pretext of selling provisions. They succeeded in seizing power in Rabat, but not in the Qaṣba which was valiently defended by Morat and the sulṭān's contingent.[2] The usual war of attrition followed;

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1. It is very probable that the powerful and renowned al-ᶜAyāshī might have been able to extend his authority to Old Fes, although again the sources do not say so.

2. Journal of G. Carteret, op.cit., p.447 and note 2; p.448; Relation sur le Maroc, op.cit. p.477.

the Hornacheros blockaded the Qaṣba on land, and al-ᶜAyāshī, always ready to exploit possibilities of establishing his dominance on the Bū Regreg, assisted the Hornacheros with a sea blockade on his arrival from his Fes campaign. In this hour of trial there arrived (beginning of September 1638) a Spanish ship "having aboard them all six hundred land soldiers with a great deal of ammunition and victuals destined for the relief of the Castle."[1] The Spanish ship had come on the express request of the governor of the Qaṣba; he "had sent expressly to the Duke of Medina" advising him that the moment favoured the occupation of the Qaṣba by Spain "being out of hope of receiving anie more succour from the King".[2] The commander of the sulṭān's contingent, Morat, still, however,

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1. Relation sur le Maroc, op.cit., p.474-5.
2. Loc.cit.; Journal de G. Carteret, op.cit., p.456.

had some hope of ultimate "succour from the King" and so was prepared to hold out for a while; for the material position of the Qaṣba had improved slightly with the arrival of Carteret[1] who gave them some victuals; more supplies had also come by sea from the sulṭān.[2] Thus, with the hope of ultimate rescue by the sulṭān and some provision with which to tide over the difficult times until the sulṭān's arrival Morat opposed, against the wishes of the Andalusians, the landing of the Spanish contingent which would have meant occupation of the Qaṣba by Spain[3] They, therefore, had to leave, disappointed, after waiting for ten days. On the 23rd of September, however, when Morat received the news that the sulṭān on whom

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1. George Carteret was the vice-Admiral to W. Rainsborough in the naval expedition against Sale in 1637. He led back to Morocco in 1638 the sulṭān's ambassador to London, Judar ibn ʿAbdallāh. This explains his presence now in the Bū Regreg.

2. Journal de G. Carteret, op.cit. pp.445; 448.

3. Ibid., p.456.

he had counted for rescue could not arrive immediately because of his proposed campaign against the zāwiya of Dilā', he "seemed.... to be very much dejected and seemed also to entertaine thoughts of rendreinge the Castle into the King of Spaine's hands if his Kinge did not come within a short tyme to relieve them".[1] And of course "his King did not come" because he was routed at Abū ᶜAqaba (16 October 1638) by the zāwiya of Dilā'[2] and "since the loss of this battle the King of Morocco has not been able to recover to raise another army and is content to confine himself to the environs of Marrakesh."[3] The

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1. Ibid., p.459.

2. Journal de Robert Blake 31 March - 5 Janvier 1639 in Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre, t.III, pp.509-10; Lettre de Gaspard de Rastin à Richlieu, op.cit. 1er Série France t.III p.586 and note 1; al-Wufrānī op.cit.p.254 Ar.text; 423 Fr.transl.; Al-Wufrānī's date of 1640 for the battle of Abū ᶜAqaba is wrong - op.cit., p.281 Ar.text; 467 Fr.transl. Robert Blake was an eye-witness of this battle.

3. Lettre de Gaspard de Rastin à Richelieu. Loc.cit.

hope of rescue by the sultān was thus permanently dashed; the turbulence of a life of unceasing hostilities and blockades was unnerving to the besieged.[1] It was this combination of frustration and a nostalgia for some tranquillity that was responsible for the thought that was being entertained in 1640 "to deliver the castle to anie Christian prince that would transfer them and their estates to some parts where they might spend their remainder of dayes in more peace and quiett."[2]

However it was not a "Christian prince" but the zāwiya of Dilā' which brought "more peace and quiett" to the Qaṣba. Dilā''s hegemony over the Bū Regreg stabilised its troubled politics. Muḥammad al-Hājj had become the new shaikh of the zāwiya following the death of his father Sīdī

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1. Between 1637 and 1640, the Qasba, in fact, had been subject to intermittent blockades.

2. Memoire de R. Blake, Sources Inédites 1ère Série Angleterre, t.III, p.549.

Muḥammad Ibn Abū Bakr in 1046/1636-7.[1] Under him the zāwiya maintained its reputation for scholarship and hospitality;[2] it also acquired a political importance unprecendented in its history. With him started Dilā''s "imperialism" and its emergence as the greatest power in Morocco in the middle years of the 17th century. His predecessors, essentially men of religion and learning, recognised the authority of the Sa^{c}dians in spite of its feebleness after the death of al-Manṣūr.[3] Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, however, had little respect for a weak sovereign who did not show sufficient zeal for the affairs[4] of the country and who "acted according to

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.279 Ar.text; 464 Fr. transl.
2. The hospitality of the zāwiya is even acknowledged by its adversaries. Ibid., p.248, 282 Ar.text; 411, 468 Fr.transl.
3. Ibid., p.246 Ar.text; 408 Fr.transl.
4. Ibid., p.253 Ar.text; 422 Fr. transl.

the advice of renegades".[1] The sultān thus saw the zāwiya of Dilā' as one of the "abodes of ... treason"[2]; the growing power of the zāwiya made him accuse its shaikh of ambitions to dominate all the tribes and people of Morocco.[3] He appealed to the people of Dilā' to respect and rally round his authority but this failed to improve their attitude vis-a-vis the sultān. They co-operated with al-ᶜAyāshī in forestalling the sultān's relief expedition to the Qasba in 1637.[4] The hostility between the people of Dilā' and the sultān came to a climax in the battle of Abū ᶜAqaba (16th October 1638)

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1. Ibid., p.252 Ar. text; 419 Fr.transl. This is confirmed by a contemporary European observer: "The elches (corruption of ᶜilj) doe much incline him, who have his eare continually in transaction of any matter of importance." - Relation sur le Maroc, op.cit., p.478. Muhammad al-Shaikh, like his predecessor al-Walīd, had a Spanish mother and so his reliance on renegades is understandable.

2. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.249 Ar.text; 413 Fr.transl.

3. Ibid., p.248 Ar.text; 411 Fr.transl.

4. Muḥammad al-Hājj had helped to oppose some tribes to the sultān to prevent his progress - Relation de Jean Marges, op.cit. p.539 ff. See pp 103-4

and after his defeat the sultān "renounced opposition, struggle and hostilities against them" since "he realised his inability to withstand and hold his own against them; from this moment he ceased to exercise authority beyond the wādī ᶜAbid."[1]

The defeat of the sultān was the first important step in Dilā''s expansion. An outlet to the sea was a logical development in the expansionist process of this land-locked power. This inevitably led to Dilā''s intervention in the Bū Regreg in 1640[2] and the subsequent conflict with al-ᶜAyāshī, the master of Sale, Tamesna the Gharb. The immediate occasion for the conflict was al-ᶜAyāshī's refusal to accept Dilā''s intercession on behalf of certain Andalusians who had fled to Dilā' during the hostilities on the Bū Regreg [3]. The people of Dilā' defeated al-ᶜAyāshī

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.254, 281 Ar.text; 423, 467 Fr. transl.

2. H. de Castries: Les trois républiques du Bou Regreg, op.cit., p. xxiv.

3. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.270 Ar.text; 449 Fr.transl.

after a reverse at their first encounter; he sought refuge amongst the Khult but was soon betrayed and assassinated by them on 19th Muḥarram, 1051/30th April 1641.[1] With the death of al-ᶜAyāshī, Rabat, the Qaṣba and Sale came under the unified control of the zāwiya of Dilā'. The eldest son of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, Sīdī ᶜAbdallāh, had overall command over the three places, though each had its own caid.[2] Tamesna and the Gharb, formerly al-ᶜAyāshī's possessions, now became Dilā''s. Muḥammad al-Ḥājj installed his representatives in Arzila and al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr.[3]

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1. Ibid., p.271 Ar. text; 451 Fr. transl. The Khult are an Arab tribe of the Gharb to the south of al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr.

2. H. de Castries, Les trois républiques du Bou Regrag, op.cit., p.xxv. The caid of Sale Saᶜīd Ajnawī, deputised for Sīdī ᶜAbdallāh in his absence.

3. H. de Castries: Les Moriscos à Sale et Sīdī El-Ayashi in Sources Inédites 1er Série France, t. III, p.198. Dilā', after a long murabit tradition, acquired a mujāhid role, symbolised by its jihad against the Spanish possessions in the Gharb. loc.cit.

Fes al-Jadīd captured in 1638 by al-ᶜAyāshī came under Dilā''s power. The caid of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, Abū Bakr al-Thāmalī, occupied the palace in Fes al-Jadīd with jurisdiction over Fes al-Bālī.[1]

Dilā''s authority also embraced the city-state of Tetuan. Owing to the intrigues of opponents of the al-Naqsīs family, Tetuan had lost its independence to al-ᶜAyāshī in 1631;[2] the al-Naqsīs were dispossessed of power and the former muqaddam ᶜAbdallāh ᶜĪsa al-Naqsīs was replaced by al-ᶜAyāshī's appointee, Aḥmad Abū ᶜAlī. The Andalusians had revolted against al-ᶜAyāshī in 1638 but their independence was very short-lived as the city was again conquered the same year. After the death of al-ᶜAyāshī in 1641, the al-Naqsīs regained their lost power

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1. Al-Nāṣirī, op.cit., p.19 Ar.text; 25 Fr. transl.

2. Relation de Jean Harrison, Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre, t.III, p.54, ff. and note 2; p.182 note 2; pp.363-364 and note 1; 457 note 5; 554. Op.cit., France. t. III, p.583, note 1.

in Tetuan with the support of the zāwiya of Dilā'. Muḥammad al-Ḥājj was represented in the city by the new muqaddam, Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsa al-Naqsīs.

The defeat of the sulṭān in 1638 and the death of al-ʿAyāshī in 1641 ensured the safety of the western and northern fronts of Dilā''s 'empire'. Not so, however, was the southern front; in Sijilmāsa was the Filālī, Maḥammad ibn al-Sharīf, a man with an aggressive disposition, commanding an army of courageous men.[1] Dilā''s power was vulnerable to the rising sharīfian power in the south; her territories had, in fact, been subject to the raids of the sharīf.[2] The shaikh of Dilā' therefore decided to attack his opponent now that he was in a position of superiority. He

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.252 Ar. text; 420 Fr. transl.

2. Loc.cit.

invaded Sijilmāsa on 12th Rabi^{c} 1st 1056/ 28th April 1646.[1] Mahammad was defeated, Sijilmāsa was sacked and a peace treaty imposed by Dilā'. The Jabal ^{c}Ayyāsh was made the boundary between the spheres of influence of Dilā' and Sijilmāsa. The treaty further stipulated Dilā''s sovereignty over five regions in Sijilmāsa's territory.[2] The treaty was no sooner concluded than Mahammad attacked one of the five areas excluded from his control. This led to mutual recriminations between the two rivals; this verbal warfare became armed conflict in 1650.

The occasion for the engagement was the revolt of Fes al-Bālī against their Dilawite

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p.281 Ar.text; 467 Fr. transl; al-Nāsirī, op.cit., p.16 ff. Ar. text; 21 Fr. transl.

2. The five regions over which the zāwiya of Dilā' exercised control were: (1) the district of the Awlād ^{c}Isa commanded by Shaikh Mughfar; (2) Qasr al-Sūq commanded by Sayyid al-Tayyib; (3) Qasr Banū ^{c}Uthmān commanded by Ahmed ibn ^{c}Alī; (4) Qasr Halīma in the territory of Aghris and finally (5) Asrīs Farkalā. - Loc.cit.

governor, Abū Bakr al-Thāmalī.[1] The caid beseiged the city and cut off its water-supply. The inhabitants therefore wrote to Maḥammad ibn al-Sharīf appealing for help and promising to proclaim him as their sovereign. Maḥammad marched on Fes al-Jadīd (29th Jumādā II 1060/ 29th June 1650), seized al-Thāmalī and imprisoned him. The two cities of Fes swore the bayᶜa to Maḥammad on 7th Rajab/6th July; a month later, however, he was ejected from Fes by the forces of Dilā' (10th Shaᶜbān/8th August). A new caid, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥājj was appointed to the governorship of the two cities. He died on 20th Rabiᶜ 1st 1064/8th February 1654 and was succeeded by his brother Muḥammad (d. 1070/ 1659-60).

Frustrated in his attempt to seize power in Fes, Maḥammad looked eastwards and north-

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1. Al-Nāṣirī, op.cit., pp.19-20 Ar. text; 25-6 Fr. transl.

eastwards for personal aggrandizement. He subjugated tribes to the east and north-east of Sijilmāsa and captured the border town of Ujda, using it as a base for raids into Tlemcen and other parts of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.[1] Mahammad's activities caused great agitation in the Central Maghreb and provoked general disaffection and rebellion against Ottoman suzerainty. The bey of Mazuna[2] took military

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1. The Ottoman Regency of Algiers, like the Saᶜdian dynasty in Morocco, was the product of Muslim reaction against Christian invasion of the Maghreb. It was the work of two corsairs ᶜArūj and Khair al-Dīn Barbarossa, rather than an act of Turkish initiative. ᶜArūj captured Algiers in 1516 on the invitation of its inhabitants who desired to overthrow the Spanish yoke; he died as a result of a Spanish seige in 1518 and was succeeded by his brother Khair al-Dīn, who, faced with the problem of maintaining his precarious position against growing dissidence, offered his homage to sultān Selim I, thus availing himself of Ottoman support. This stroke of diplomacy established Ottoman presence in the Central Maghreb. See A. Cour, L'Établissement des Dynasties des Chérifs au Maroc et leur rivalité avec les Turks de la Régence d'Alger 1509 - 1830, Paris 1904. E. Watbled: Etablissment de la Domination Turque en Algerie in Revue Africaine No. 100 1873, p.286 ff; No. 101, 1873, p.352 ff.

2. The Moroccan sources say Maᶜskara; this is an error as this city did not become capital of the western baylik until 1710.

precautions against Maḥammad's invasions and alerted his superior the pāshā of Algiers about the violations against the Regency. The pāshā immediately despatched an army under his lieutenant against Maḥammad, but it arrived too late; Maḥammad had returned to Sijilmāsa, having sent away his Arab allies and arranged with them a rendezvous for the next campaign.

The Turkish army returned to Algiers and reported to the pāshā the desertion of the territories overrun by Maḥammad - the inhabitants had fled for refuge to the mountains; Tlemcen no longer belonged to the Regency, for it was Maḥammad's name that was being read in the Khuṭba. The pāshā summoned his Dīwān for consultation. They decided to write a letter of protest to Maḥammad; the letter remarked how Maḥammad's invasions had caused much disturbance amongst Ottoman subjects and led to their revolt against Ottoman authority; it warned Maḥammad to respect the territorial integrity of the Regency and to

desist from further acts of aggression in the mutual interest of peace and harmony. This letter was delivered by two faqīhs the Sayyid ᶜAbdallāh al-Nafzī and the Sayyid al-Ḥājj Muḥammad, and two high Turkish functionaries. Maḥammad was annoyed by the accusation of aggression contained in the letter; his reply to the Regency was not reassuring and so the two faqīhs had to be sent back to him to demand satisfaction. They reminded Maḥammad that his quality as sharīf demanded strict propriety of conduct; to pillage the weak, instigate revolt and wage the jihād against a fellow Muslim neighbour was surely unbecoming of a member of the family of the Prophet. The speech so impressed Maḥammad that he showed deep remorse and promised never again to cross the River Tāfnā. The ambassadors departed with a letter to the pāshā by Maḥammad in which he emphasised his promise. The Tāfnā thus became the boundary between Morocco and the Regency. Henceforth Maḥammad no longer directed expeditions

into Ottoman territory;[1] his sovereignty now stretched over the Sijilmāsa-Darᶜa region and the north-eastern part of Morocco.

Meanwhile the supremacy which the zāwiya of Dilā' enjoyed in the Gharb and the Habṭ since the death of al-ᶜAyāshī was being challenged by a new arrival to the Moroccan political scene. He was Abū 'l-ᶜAbbās Aḥmad al-Khaḍir Ghailān.[2] He belonged to the Banū Gurfaṭ tribe of the Habṭ and was descended from a reputable family of mujāhidūn. Probably because of the family's saintly reputation rather than any genuine connection with the family of the Prophet, the Awlād Ghailān were

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1. Al-Nāṣirī, op.cit., pp.20-27 Ar. text; 26-36 Fr. transl.

2. On al-Khadir Ghailān see M. A. Péretié: Le Rais El-Khadir Ghailān in Archives Morocaines, Vol. 18, 1912.

generally regarded as sharifs,[1] particularly by the Banū Gurfaṭ amongst whom they enjoyed very high esteem. The ancestor of the Ghailān family, ᶜUmar ibn Ibrāhīm was, for instance, one of the high-ranking Shādilī shaikhs of the 16th century and he taught Shādilī doctrines amongst the Banū Gurfaṭ.[2]

Al-Khadir's father, ᶜAli Ghailān was the muqaddam of the mujāhidūn of al-ᶜAyāshī in the region of the Habṭ. He died during an expedition against Tangier.[3] His son was also

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1. Cf. Chapter I pp.21-30 and note 1 on p.30. Officially however, the Awlad Ghailan were not regarded as sharīfs; as Péretié has pointed out, the rebellion of al-Khadir against al-Rashīd and Ismāᶜīl might have prejudiced his family's official recognition as sharīfs. Ibn Rahmūn who composed his genealogical treatise Shudhūr al-Dhahab fī Khair Nasab (see Chapter I, pp.40-41) on the orders of Mawlay Ismāᶜīl understandably does not regard the Ghailān family as sharīfian - Péretié, op.cit., p.12;

2. Péretié op.cit. p.21

3. Ibid., p. 22ff.

one of the companions of al-ᶜAyāshī and he was captured by the zāwiya of Dilā' after al-ᶜAyāshī's defeat and subsequent assassination. Al-Khaḍir was later released and became the leader of the Banū Gurfaṭ, a position his father had occupied.[1] This gave him an important leverage for overthrowing Dilā''s overlordship in the Habṭ. His first challenge to Dilā''s power was his revolt and capture of al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr in 1063/1652-3;[2] though he was soon driven away by the zāwiya, he later succeeded in permanently occupying the city. With it as base al-Khaḍir gradually extended and consolidated his power in the Habṭ. His other important base was Arzila; his attempts to conquer Tetuan were rebuffed.[3] Al-Khaḍir's revolt was the first chink in Dilā''s armour; he was to become so powerful in later years as to be able to defeat the zāwiya and to wrest from it its possessions on the Bū Regreg.

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1. Ibid., p.27 ff.

2. Al-Nāṣirī, op.cit., p. 27 Ar. text; 36 Fr. transl. Cf. de Castries date for Ghailān's revolt - 1650. Sources Inédites 2ᵉ Série France t I p.24 note 2.

3. Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série France, t. III, p.583, note 1.

II

The period covered by this chapter terminates with the end of Sa^{c}dian rule in Morocco. The last prince of the dynasty Mawlay al-^{c}Abbās - he succeeded Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar in 1654 - was assassinated in 1069/1658-9 by his maternal uncles the Shabāna; they proclaimed as sovereign ^{c}Abd al Karīm alias Karūm al-Ḥājj, son of Abū Bakr, the shaikh of the Shabāna. The tribe had become very influential because of their marital relationship with princes of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty.[1] This influence led to their usurpation of power; thus ended the history of the Sa^{c}dians in Morocco.

Even before the elimination of the last Sa^{c}dian prince, much of Morocco had been lost to

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., pp.257-8 Ar. text; 428 Fr. transl. It will be recalled that al-Mansūr's legitimate wife was a woman of this tribe. See Chapter 2, p. 56 note 2

Saᶜdian rule; their authority, already greatly diminished since the death of al-Manṣūr, paled further beside the growing power of the local chiefs and murābiṭūn. Contemporaries of Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar remarked how he "is much circumscribed in his dominions by the faqures (saints) (corruption of fuqarā')..... These men eclipse his sovereignty, check his power and encroach upon his dominions." [1]

The Moriscos also "eclipse his sovereignty" although in times of crisis they paid lip-service to Marrakesh as a possible way out of their predicament. As refugees in an alien environment where the local population was not always friendly, they resorted to various expedients to master the challenge of their new

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1. Relation sur le Maroc - Sources Inédites 1er Série Angleterre, t.III, p.486.

circumstance. Their's was a pragmatic frontier policy for survival. In spite of the deep division and the antagonism between the Andalusians and the Hornacheros, they could come together for the common purpose of defence, as for instance during the first attack by al-ᶜAyāshī in 1631; and notwithstanding their revolt against Saᶜdian authority since 1627, hard pressed, they pledged their loyalty to al-Walīd in 1631[1] and Muḥammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar in 1637 as a pragmatic approach to their dilemma. Security and survival were the justification for the attempts in 1637 and 1638 to hand over the Qaṣba to Spain;[2] and in the critical moments of 1640

1. H. de Castries: Les trois républiques de Bou Regrag, op.cit., p. xix; Les Moriscos à Sale et Sidi el-Ayashi, op.cit. p.195.

2. Overtures by Spain to the Moriscos for the cession of the Qaṣba to her started, in fact, as early as 1631. See Georges S. Colin: Projet de traite entre les Morisques de la Casba de Rabat et le Roi d'Espagne en 1631 - Hespéris, t.42, pp. 17-25. In this document, the Hornacheros stipulated as condition for Spanish occupation of the Qaṣba, their transfer to their home in Spain.

the beseiged Andalusians were no longer discriminatory in their choice of saviour; it was not just to Spain that they thought of handing over the Qaṣba, but any "Christian prince" that could offer them "more peace and quiett".

Spain, however, stood a better chance than other Christian powers of being offered the Qaṣba. The Moriscos, in spite of the bitterness aroused by their expulsion, had a sentimental attachment to Spain; moreover, Spain, for her own ends, showed more concern than any other Christian power for the welfare of the Qaṣba. The advantages of possession of the Qaṣba were obvious. Spain was perhaps the greatest victim of Morisco piracy; the practice, in fact, started as a reprisal against Spain. Occupation of the Qaṣba would ensure the security of Spanish shipping and protect her lucrative commerce with her West Indian empire; it would also place her in an advantageous position to

deal with her invincible enemy, al-ᶜAyāshī, whose jihād was making it increasingly difficult for Spain to maintain her position on the Atlantic. Little wonder that his death caused great rejoicing.[1]

England, through her agents on the spot, had become rivals of Spain for the possession of the Qaṣba. In 1638, for instance, when Morat intimated that he was contemplating delivering the Qaṣba to Spain, Carteret immediately advised him to prefer England, arguing that an addition to the existing Spanish possessions on the Atlantic could tempt Spain to embark on more conquests in Morocco.[2] And in 1640 when the thought of delivering the Qaṣba to any Christian prince was being entertained, Robert Blake would have undertaken to occupy the Qaṣba "on His Majesty's behalf,

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1. Al-Wufrānī, op.cit., p. 271 Ar.text; 451 Fr. transl.

2. Journal de G. Carteret: Sources Inédites 1ère Série Angleterre. t.III, p.459.

if he had had warrant, souldiers and shipps for that purpose".[1] He however "promised to propound" the idea to the Lords on his return to England and this he did in 1641. He analysed the advantages inherent in the occupation of the Qasba by England: It would ensure security of English subjects from "future annoyance and danger"; it would serve as a victualling station for English ships in nearby regions; sufficient salt might be extracted from the salt pans at the mouth of the Bū Regreg to make England independent of foreign supply;[2] it would give England preponderant share of the trade on the Bū Regreg and its environs, to the disadvantage of the French and the Dutch; the

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1. Memoire de Robert Blake, op.cit. p.549.

2. Salt pans were discovered at the mouth of the Bū Regreg in 1638. Journal of Carteret, op.cit., p.543. England at this time depended on France and Spain for her salt supply; the argument of self-sufficiency was therefore very attractive especially as England and Spain were often at war.

damage done to English commerce by the discovery of tin mines in Sale would be rectified by control of these mines.[1] The evidence does not show that France joined in the rivalry for the possession of the Qaṣba, although considerations of security and commerce were arguments which were not unattractive to her local agents.[2]

The international attention that was

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1. England carried on a lucrative trade in tin with Holland, France, Italy and Turkey. Cornwall was almost exclusively the source of tin for these countries. With the discovery of tin-mines near Sale in 1638 attention was diverted from the tin of Cornwall, to the great detriment of English commerce. The tin of Sale was cheaper and of better quality - Memoire de R. Blake, op.cit., p.550 and note 1; See also Lettre de Gaspard de Rastin à Richelieu, op.cit., p.588 and note 2.

2. These arguments influenced the French vice-consul in Rabat, Gaspard de Rastin, to advise a peace treaty with al-ᶜAyāshī who appeared to him likely to gain mastery of the entire Bu Regreg in his struggle with the Moriscos. The importance of the tin-mines of Sale, for instance, is mentioned "...by means of this treaty France would be able to dispense with England and provide herself with this tin at a much cheaper cost." Lettre de Gaspard de Rastin à Richelieu Loc.cit.

focussed on the Qaṣba had its origins in the piracy of the Moriscos. The need to ransom Christian captives and to maintain friendly relations with the pirates in the interest of trade and peaceful navigation of the high seas led to the establishment of European consulates in the Qaṣba and Rabat. Thus the southern bank of the Bū Regreg became the diplomatic centre of Morocco; it attracted more European attention than any other part of Morocco, an interest which became sharpened by the mineral discoveries and the flourishing trade on the Bū Regreg; for piracy went pari-passu with normal commercial transations between Morocco and Europe; in fact piracy could not thrive without the European merchants to whom the pirates sold their captured goods.

Piracy and commerce thus conferred on the Moriscos much more affluence than their neighbours on the opposite bank; in fact between Rabat and Sale, there was a real dichotomy emphasised by the

riverain division: To the much younger society of Rabat with no deep roots in its new environment and therefore unsupported by the cohesive force of a prolonged native tradition,[1] was opposed the old traditionalism of Sale. On the Bū Regreg therefore was a confrontation between the new and the old, and very appropriately Rabat was called New Sale; the orientation of the Moriscos was outwards towards the sea and Europe, their source of wealth, rather than inwards into their country of adoption; their fortunes, tied to daring foreign adventure and enterprise, were not easily identifiable with those of their neighbours on the opposite bank which were domestic, local and by comparison commonplace; their qualification as "Christian of Castille" by the Muslim community

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1. This was probably a contributory factor to its turbulent and unstable political life during its period of independence 1627-1641. By Rabat here, we also mean the other entity on the southern bank of the Bū Regreg i.e. the Qaṣba.

of Sale did not help to bridge this wide divergence; and given the political disorder and the absence of a strong central leadership in Morocco at the time of their arrival, it is understandable why their alienation was given a political sanction by a formal declaration of independence.

This independence ended with the control of the Bū Regreg by the zāwiya of Dilā'. 1638 marked a watershed in the history of the zāwiya. Before this date the zāwiya was essentially a centre of religion, learning, and hospitality; its political role was local. From 1638, however, the zāwiya acquired a wide territorial, political significance. In this year, the zāwiya reported victory over the Sa^{c}dian sulṭān at Abū ^{c}Aqaba and extended its jurisdiction southwards to the wādī ^{c}Abīd. 1641 witnessed the death of al-^{c}Ayāshī, the only formidable opponent of the zāwiya; in

1646 the zāwiya invaded Sijilmāsa to crush the power of Mahammad and when in 1650 the sharīf confronted the zāwiya in Fes, he was completely routed. The only remaining force of any consequence in Morocco was the murabiṭ of the Sūs, Abū'l-Hasan ᶜAlī, but since his defeat by Mahammad he had become a non-factor in the Moroccan power-struggle, though still the most important power in the Sūs. Even here his supremacy was already being undermined by divisions.[1] Thus by the middle of the 17th century Dilā''s power was supreme in Morocco. The first opposition - and this was easily eliminated - came in 1652 when al-Khaḍir Ghailān revolted in the Habṭ.

The question to be asked therefore is not why the zāwiya of Dilā' could not found

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1. Journal de G. Carteret, op.cit. p.455 note 2.

a dynasty in Morocco - for it could very well have done so had it embarked on such a scheme, having, in fact, between 1638 and 1650 defeated all its political rivals - but why it did not. Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, the shaikh of the zāwiya provides the answer. He was undeniably an able, ambitious leader as his career clearly points out, but with quite a limited ambition, certainly not a man of al-Manṣūr's stamp who would "aspire to every distant goal". His goal appears to have been not the "distant goal" of sovereignty over Morocco, but the limited goal of sovereignty over those areas that would ensure the zāwiya economic prosperity and guarantee preservation and protection of its power. Thus the Bū Regreg, because of the economic advantage of its possession, he brought under his control; his control over al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr, Arzila and Tetuan had the same economic justification. His pre-emptive strike against Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf was designed to nip and

contain the menacing sharīfian power in the south in the interest of Dilā''s security; he never annexed Sijilmāsa, but was quite content to exercise sovereignty over five strategic areas in the Saharan region; these areas were to serve as points for surveillance of Mahammad and as advance protection for the southern front of Dilā''s possessions. And when in 1638 the Dilāwite chief inflicted a crushing defeat on Muhammad al-Shaikh al-Aṣghar, he did not march on Marrakesh, as Abū Mahallī had done,[1] to assume power, but allowed al-Shaikh to continue as sulṭān, surely an action inconsistent with sovereign ambitions and unexpected of one who is intolerant of a rival authority; and despite Dilā''s control of Fes from about 1641, Muḥammad al-Ḥajj did not assume the title of sulṭān though he enjoyed no less authority than a sulṭān; the substance rather than the glittering insignia

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1. See Chapter II, p.61

was his desire; his concern was limited sovereignty that was compatible with Dilā''s security and prosperity.

Mahammad ibn al-Sharif was the very antithesis of Muhammad al-Hājj; he had ambition to rule Morocco; he was in fact too eager and therefore reckless and uncalculating about procedure and tactics; hence he failed in his bid for power. His precipitate march on Fes betrayed faulty strategy and lack of sagacity; it was an approach to power through the most difficult route and without adequate preparation. A strategy of conquest through the Sūs and Marrakesh, areas of comparatively weak resistance, followed by a period of military consolidation before a confrontation with Dilā' might have enhanced his prospects of success. Maḥammad had in fact started his political career with a good augur; he defeated Abū'l-Ḥasan

ᶜAlī in a bitter contest and expelled him from the Darᶜa but failed to pursue his victory into the Sūs, thus depriving himself of the opportunities for strengthening himself militarily through the contraband arms traffic in Massa and Agadir. His challenge to the zāwiya of Dilā', the greatest military power in Morocco, lacked proper military foundation; he attempted a great leap without the necessary springboard and thus failed to attain his end. His brother al-Rashīd was to succeed later on because he was the sagacious, patient, scheming strategist which Maḥammad was not.[1]

Such was, in 1659, the political situation in Morocco. The Saᶜdian dynasty had been extinguished and the Shabāna ruled in Marrakesh with Karūm al-Ḥājj as leader. The Sūs was still ruled by the Awlād Sīdī Aḥmad ou Mūsā from their zāwiya at Iligh in the Tazerwalt,

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1. Cf. al-Rashīd's rise to power - Chapter V. p.237ff.

though under a new leader Sīdī Muḥammad, son of Abū'l-Ḥasan ʿAlī (d. 1659)[1] Sijilmāsa, the Darʿa and parts of eastern and north-eastern Morocco belonged to Maḥammad. Following the death of al-ʿAyāshī the Bū Regreg, the Gharb, Tetuan and the two cities of Fes came under Dilā''s jurisdiction. In the Ḥabṭ a new power, al-Khaḍir Ghailān, had emerged and was to become quite important in later political history of Morocco as will be shown subsequently[2]. The Rīf was commanded by shaikh Aʿrās.

By 1659 the zāwiya of Dilā' was still the greatest power in Morocco; it attained its apogee, however, in the ten-year period between 1641, the year al-ʿAyāshī died, and 1651; al-Khaḍir Ghailān's revolt in the Ḥabṭ in 1652 marked the beginning of challenge to Dilā''s military pre-eminence in Morocco; 1659 marked the end of this pre-eminence for in the following year,

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1. Sources Inédites 1ère Série France, t.III, p.583
2. See Chapter V. p.252 ff

the zāwiya suffered a major military defeat at the hand of al-Khaḍir Ghailān.[1] The Ṣanhāja of Dilā', though well-favoured to found a dynasty and regain the Ṣanhāja political leadership which the Masmūda Ahmohades had wrested from the Ṣanhāja Almoravids in the 12th century, did not, and so lost an opportunity which never occurred again after 1659.[2]

In 1659 Mawlay al-Sharīf died in Sijilmāsa and al-Rashīd left the city. This was the beginning of a career which was to bring to fruition what his elder brother Maḥammad had earlier on attempted without success.

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1. See Chapter V. p.252

2. This is not to suggest, however, Dilā''s conscious identification with the Ṣanhāja Almoravids.



The Awlād Sīdi Aḥmad ou Mūsā; the Raʾīs al-Khadir Ghailān; shaikh Aʿrās; the Shabana; the Filālis

CHAPTER IV

THE EARLY CAREER OF AL-RASHĪD : THE ENIGMA OF THE JEWISH KING "IBN MASHᶜAL"

I

Thanks to Pierre de Cenival's illuminating article "La Légende du Juif Ibn Mechᶜal",[1] much light has been shed on an episode up till now considered as a central event in al-Rashīd's early career. The assassination of a wealthy Jew by al-Rashīd and his generous distribution of the Jew's possessions is seen as securing al-Rashīd the support he badly needed in his aspiration to power. This event is thus regarded as an important foundation of al-Rashīd's early success; at least this is the impression conveyed by the

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1. "La Légende du Juif Ibn Mechᶜal et la Fête du Sultan des Tolba à Fes." in Hespéris Vol. 5, 1925 p.137ff. The article is highly recommended, and this chapter is no more than an attempt to further the work of de Cenival in the light of new evidence which were not available to him.

Moroccan historians. According to al-Wufrānī, al-Rashīd came to "Qasbat ibn Mashᶜal and found there a Jew, a dhimmi,[1] possessing immense wealth and precious treasures.... Mawlay al-Rashīd continued to explore ways of assassinating him until he succeeded in his design....he killed him, seized his treasures and distributed them amongst those who followed and joined him; this strengthened his support and increased his following, and the news was disseminated by caravans."[2] Al-Ziyānī also attaches much importance to this episode. The seizure of the Jew's treasures after his assassination "strengthened his (al-Rashīd's)

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1. The dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma) were free non-Muslim subjects living in Muslim countries; they were subject to the capitation tax jizya and in return enjoyed protection.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. pp.301-2 Ar. text; 499 Fr. transl. Al-Wufrānīs Nuzhat al-Hādī was written "...some years before...1137 (1724-5" i.e. about 60 years after the "Ibn Mashᶜal" episode. E. Lévi-Provençal, Les Historiens des Chorfa p.121

position and improved his fortunes; he distributed some of the wealth to the Arabs and the Banū Yaznāsen who were with him."[1] De Cenival after examining the evidence at his disposal accepts the historicity of this episode and is not unimpressed with its contribution to the early success of al-Rashīd. For "it is in this first period of his conquest when he is without resources that the assassination of a rich merchant Jew was able to furnish him with the means to modify his fortunes."[2] The thesis put forward by de Cenival in his article may be summarised as

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1. Al-Ziyānī : Al-Turjumān al-Muᶜarib pp.7-8 Ar. text; p.15 Fr. transl. The major part of al-Ziyānī's work was written in 1207-8 (1792-3) which is about 128 years after the episode under consideration. E. Lévi-Provençal op.cit. pp. 171-2.

2. P. de Cenival op.cit. p.185. Other historians of Morocco also accept the historicity of this episode. Those who wrote before de Cenival's study repeat the error of Nashr al-Mathānī; they name the Jew Ibn Mashᶜal and place his residence in Taza or nearabouts. B. Meakin only echoes Nashr al-Mathānī's error of location: "This powerful general (i.e. al-Rashīd) possessed himself of the wealth of a Jew of the qasbah of Ibn Mashaal, near Taza, with which he had raised an army" - B. Meakin :

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follows:

That a rich Jew of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al was

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2. The Moorish Empire London 1899 p.138. A. Cour is very faithful to the account of al-Qādirī (Nashr al-Mathānī) and he too does not underrate the significance of this episode in al-Rashīd's career; "... they (i.e. al-Rashīd and the Ikhwān of shaikh al-Lawātī) captured the house of the Jew, pillaged it and took from it quantities of precious things and money. The capture of the fortress and the fortune of Ibn Mash^{c}al gave al-Rashīd considerable prestige in the region of the Angad, the Ma^{c}qil and the Banū Yaznāsen." - L'Établissement des dynasties des chérifs au Maroc et leur rivalité avec les Turcs de le Régence d'Alger 1509-1830 Paris 1904 p.182. Historians who wrote after de Cenival's study have avoided al-Qādirī's mistake and have followed de Cenival's conclusion. Henri Terrasse writes: ".... he (al-Rashid) seized the property of a rich Jew who inhabited the village of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al amongst the Banū Yaznāsen. This episode which can hardly be regarded as glorious and which was in fact a simple brigandage has been transfigured as a result of legends. - Histoire du Maroc II Casablanca 1950 p.245. Cf. C.A.Julien: "...he (al-Rashīd) assassinated a rich Jew of the village of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al (in the mountain of the Banū Yaznāsen), who perhaps had succeeded in playing an important role in the country. The pillage

continued on next page/

assassinated by al-Rashīd, and that a legend was later built on this episode. The kind, charitable Jew became in popular Moroccan folklore a tyrannical King who oppressed the Muslims. If owing to their ignorance of Muslim usage the two anonymous Englishmen (theirs were the earliest accounts of the episode) applied very inappropriately European categories of thought in the description of the episode[1] and therefore inadvertently "contributed on their part to deform the original

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continued from previous page/

2. of the Jew's riches enabled him to raise a following and to threaten his neighbours. The legend (which has grown out of this episode) attributes to him (al-Rashīd) other assassinations and confiscations of treasures which no doubt are duplications of the first adventure. Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord Vol. II Paris 1966, p.225.

1. One of the anonymous Englishmen for instance describes the Jew as "Prince", thus conveying, according to de Cenival, a wrong impression - A Short and Strange Relation of some of the Life of the Tafiletta, the great Conqueror and Emperor of Barbary, by one that hath lately been in his Majesty's Service in that Country. London, by T.N. for Samuel Lowndes over against Exeter House in the Strand 1669 p.8.

truth"[1]; and if the French translator of The Life of the Tafiletta, by his grandiloquent language "furnished unwitting support to the legend"[2], these Europeans in fact "did not create" the legend. Its creation was the work of Moroccans themselves, mainly narrators of folklore. In the hands of al-Qādirī, who of the Moroccan historians has the fullest account of the episode and is therefore the main authority on it, the Jew of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al became the Jew of Taza called Ibn Mash^{c}al. Al-Qādirī who wrote in the 18th century[3] was unaware of a city once called Dār ibn Mash^{c}al, Mawlay Isma^{-c-}il

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1. De Cenival op.cit. p. 186.

2. Ibid p.187. In criticism of the two theories, it may be regarded as very doubtful whether the Moroccan historians and the narrators of folklore ever saw these European accounts. How then could they have lent support to this legend which, according to de Cenival, was the creation of the Moroccans themselves?

3. Al-Qadiri's Nashr al-Mathānī was written, very likely, after 1170 (1756/57). Lévi Provençal op.cit. p. 323.

having destroyed it in 1690; Taza or some distance to the east of it, thus appeared a fair and ingenious approximation to the venue of the incident. The same ignorance explains the ascription of the name Ibn Mash^{c}al to the Jew, this being a mistaken interpretation of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al as the house of Ibn Mash^{c}al.

In the light of new evidence which were not available to de Cenival at the time he carried out his study, the episode of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" has again to be critically examined. The historicity of this "wealthy Jewish King or Prince" is indeed questionable.

A people's ideas and concepts about their own world may be erroneous though, within the community concerned, they enjoy nonetheless the authority of truth because they constitute the people's collective episteme and their own understanding of their environment. In this way therefore may misconceptions deceptively acquire the

garb of truth, and myths and legends intermingle with history, the one becoming hardly distinguishable from the other. "Ibn Mash^{c}al" is a classic example of this phenomenon.

Here we would disagree with de Cenival's central thesis that the "Ibn Mash^{c}al" legend was founded on al-Rashīd's assassination of a wealthy Jew; rather we would remove the foundation of de Cenival's structure and say that the Jewish King/Kingdom legend has a long tradition in Morocco (and in the rest of the Maghreb) and that the "Ibn Mash^{c}al" story was no more than a 17th century manifestation of the same ancient historical myth.

In the following pages, an attempt will be made to show that there was no such wealthy Jew or Jewish King, let alone his assassination by Al-Rashīd. The story was a false propaganda by al-Rashīd, designed for his own political ends, though it passed perfectly as authentic at the time it was propagated - and since then the Jew has become

credited with historicity - because the "Jewish King" idea or phenomenon was quite consistent with the people's ordering of their own environment. The truth in the seeming paradox is once more emphasised: the external environment, being man's collective representation, conforms to the schema he has imposed on it.

And how could this fabrication have served al-Rashīd's political ambition? This question we shall attempt to answer in due course.

Since de Cenival published his article, two Jewish chronicles have come to light; these provide additional tools for the solution of the riddle of Ibn Mash^{c}al. The Jewish sources are: "Une chronique juive de Fes: le "Yahas Fes" de Ribbi Abner Hassarfaty" described by Y.D. Semach[1] and Une recuil de textes historiques judeo-Marocaines

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1. In Hespéris Vol. 19, 1934, p.79 ff.

published by G. Vajda.[1] In addition to these two chronicles, there is H. Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg's article The Problem of the Judaized Barbers[2]; the background provided by this article is invaluable to the proper understanding of "Ibn Mash^{c}al".

Let us follow the beginnings of al-Rashīd's career.

II

Al-Rashīd was born in 1040/1631-2.[3] About his early life, the Moroccan historians[4] tell us nothing. He does not come into the full glare of history until the famous "episode of Ibn Mash^{c}al" and this was when he was already thirty-three. It

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1. Ibid. Vols. 35 and 36, 1948 and 1949, pp.311 ff; 139ff.
2. In Journal of African History Vol. 4, 1963, p.313 ff.
3. Al-Ziyānī op.cit. p.2. Ar.text; 3 Fr. transl.
4. I.e. Al-Wafrānī, al-Qādirī, al-Ziyānī and al-Nāṣirī; cf. also Muḥammad ibn Ja^{c}far al-Katānī: Salwat al-Anfās Vol.III Biblio. Nation.Rabat No.A 2817 bis pp.79-80.

is probable, however, that al-Rashīd served with his brother Maḥammad in the conquests which established ᶜAlawī hegemony in the Saharan region and the north-eastern parts of Morocco. The anonymous Englishman, for instance, refers to al-Rashīd's "several encounters with the neighbour(ing) provinces. In one of the Battels the King his brother shared with him in the danger and in the honour of the day".[1] For an unknown reason, the relationship between the two brothers soon became strained and when al-Sharīf, their father, died (13th Ramaḍān 1069/ 4th June 1659) al-Rashīd feeling insecure under his brother's rule (or actuated by personal ambition for power) left Tafilalt.[2] He made for Todra and

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1. A Short and strange Relation ..... p.16.

2. Al-Qādirī Nashr al-Mathānī in Archives Marocaines Vol. 24 p.97. Mouette relates that al-Rashīd escaped from Tafilalt after two unsuccessful attempts; his account, however, does not carry much conviction - Histoire des Conquests de Mouley Archy, connue sous le nom de roy de Tafilet et Mouley Ismael son frere et son successeur à présent régnant, tous deux rois de Fes, de Maroc de Tafilet, de Sus.... in Sources Inédites, 2ᵉ Série*t2 p.15. * France

from there went to Damnat; he next called at the zāwiya of Dilā' [1]. According to Mouette al-Rashīd did not reveal his true identity to the people of Dilā' [2]; this is not improbable in view of the antagonism between Dilā' and Sijilmāsa. He was favourably received at Dilā' where he stayed for some time. Following the discovery of his true identity, there was a plot to kill him but he managed to escape.[3] On leaving Dilā' al-Rashīd met a caravan and he saved it from the brigandage of thieves; some of these thieves died as a result of his attack; he took their horses, chose some members of the caravan as companions and continued on his travels. He called at Azru and then

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1. Al-Qādirī op.cit. p.98; Al-Ziyānī op.cit. p.6, Ar. text, 12 Fr. transl.

2. G. Mouette op.cit. p.16.

3. According to al-Qādirī, however, al-Rashīd was advised to flee Dilā' by a member of the zāwiya who feared that he would be killed, for it had been predicted that al-Rashīd would destroy the zāwiya. Op.cit. p.98.

travelled in the direction of Fes al-Jadīd. On arrival at the walls of Fes al-Jadīd he was refused entry and dismissed by the rebellious Dilāwite governor of the city al-Duraidī.[1] Al-Rashīd therefore continued his journey in a north-easterly direction until he arrived at Quiviane in the country of the Kebdana.[2] Here he was cordially received by the chief of the Kebdana, Haly Soliman - ᶜAlī ibn Sulaimān.[3] According to Mouette, al-Rashīd attained a position of importance in ᶜAlī ibn Sulaimān's administration. This information must, however, be taken with very great reservation. After a period of stay with the Kebdana, al-Rashīd

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1. Before dismissing al-Rashīd, al-Duraidī is said to have given him some money for his maintenance, and some barley as feed for his horses. Ibid, p.99.

2. G. Mouette (op.cit. p.17) is our only authority for this information. The Kebdana are a tribe inhabiting the mouth of the Mulūya on the left bank of the river. Loc. cit. note 1.

3. De Cenival thinks that this figure might be synonymous with the assassinated Jew, an opinion with which we would disagree. We believe that ᶜAlī ibn Sulaimān was the historical figure, but that "Ibn Mashᶜal" or the "assassinated Jew" was legendary.

crossed the Mulūya into the country of the Banū Yaznāsen; these inhabited the north-eastern border region between Morocco and the Regency of Algiers. Al-Rashīd met amongst the Banū Yaznāsen the ra'īs, shaikh Abū ᶜAbdallāh al Lawātī.[1] The shaikh had great veneration for descendants of the Prophet; al-Rashīd was therefore accorded warm hospitality. Shaikh Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Lawātī practised ascetism and headed a local brotherhood. He enjoyed great authority amongst the Banū Yaznāsen. Mouette in fact describes him as the chief of the tribe.[2] The Lawātī, the Berber tribe to which the shaikh belonged as indicated by his nisba were not, as

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1. Al-Qādirī op.cit. p.99; Al-Nāṣirī op.cit. p.30 Ar. text, 40 Fr. transl. Notice however that these authors wrongly locate the abode of Shaikh al-Lawātī "in the environs of Taza".

2. Shaikh al Lawātī was "chief of the principal families (tribes)... i.e. the Banū Yaznāsen. Mouette op.cit. p. 19, and note 1.

de Cenival has shown, traditionally associated with the region in which the shaikh was found.[1] His rise in a foreign environment to such position of prominence as chief of the Banū Yaznāsen might not have been unconnected with his prestige and power as a murābit.

The chance meeting of al-Rashīd with shaikh al-Lawātī must be seen as having an important bearing on al-Rashīd's rise to power. Al-Rashīd left Tafilalt with an overriding sovereign ambition. Al-Wufranī's description of him portrays this picture; "He continued to roam from city to city aspiring and hunting for royal power".[2] His aspiration for power, however, lacked the necessary support. His roaming

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1. On the Lawāta see Ibn Khaldun: Histoire des Berberes (trans. de Slane) p.231 ff. de Cenival op.cit. p.154 ff... In the 14th Century when Ibn Khaldun wrote his history, fractions of the Lawāta were found in different localities between Tunisia and Algeria. E.g. in the Aures Mountains where they constituted, for a time, the dominant force; in Tehert and in the environs of Gabes; a group of them the Banū Makki in fact commanded Gabes. A mountain in the neighbourhood of this city bore their name - Jabal Lawāta.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.301. Ar text, 499 Fr. transl.

from city to city could be seen as a search for opportunities. Todra and Demnat were useful as temporary stopping places but they were hardly advantageous bases of operation; their proximity to Tafilalt made al-Rashīd, while still without resources, easily vulnerable to the hostilities of his brother, Maḥammad. Dilā' had the advantages of location and power that could favour the ambitions of a pretender. Al-Rashīd had to leave, however, when his security could no longer be guaranteed. Denied refuge by Al-Duraidī, al-Rashīd also lost the strategic advantage of Fes al-Jaḍīd. If al-Rashīd found hospitality amongst the Kebdana, he did not find the support he needed for his bid for power. And it is here that his meeting with shaikh al-Lawātī becomes significant. Before meeting the shaikh, al-Rashīd lacked a dependable focus of power to serve his pretentions. Such focus of power was, for instance, not unimportant in the rise to power

of the Almoravids, the Almohades and the Sa^{c}dians; their power was centred round their zāwiyas.[1] Al-Rashīd's deficiency was made good by his connection with shaikh al-Lawāti; through this connection he had at his disposal the power and support of the local brotherhood centred round the shaikh's zāwiya; the erstwhile homeless fugitive who had no resources to back his ambitions, thus had available to him the weight of shaikh al-Lawātī's authority; and since the shaikh showed great deference to sharīfs, al-Rashīd was fully

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1. ^{c}Abdallāh ibn Yasin, founder of the Almoravid dynasty was formerly a student of Wagag ibn Zalwa , shaikh of the Dar al-Murābitin in the country of Nefis. ^{c}Abdallah's movement grew out of a ribāṭ - the location is not exactly known, but it is thought to be very probably the islands of Tidra on the coast of Mauretania. See C.A. Julien op.cit. pp.78-79. His al-murābitūn (Almoravids) provided a local source of power and support for his initial conquests. The ribat of Ibn Tumart at Tīnmāl in the High Atlas was the cradle of the Almohad dynasty; the zāwiya of Tagmadārt in the Dar^{c}a was also the birth-place of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty; and we have seen also how various murābitūn have used the power centred round their zāwiyas to further their ambitions: Abū Mahallī, Abu'l-Ḥasan ^{c}Ali, Yaḥyā ibn ^{c}Abdallāh and Muḥammad al-Ḥājj of the zāwiya of Dilā'. See chapter II p. 80

guaranteed of the shaikh's services. His ambition now enjoyed a moral and material buttress and his wandering and shifting existence was given a measure of permanence and stability essential to the working of a strategy of conquest. It is in this light that shaikh al-Lawātī's intervention in al-Rashīd's fortunes must be seen as a significant development in al-Rashīd's accession to power.

In the country of the Banū Yaznāsen where al-Rashīd chanced on shaikh al-Lawātī, there was a fortified city called Dār ibn Mash^{c}al where history records the presence of al-Rashīd while he was making his bid for power.[1] First mentioned in historical source in 1549 when it recognised the

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1. A Letter from a Gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's Retinue to his Friend in London, dated at Fes. Nov. 1. 1669. Wherein he gives a full Relation of the most remarkable passages in their voyage thither and of the present state of the Countries under the Power of the Taffaletta Emperor of Morocco; with a brief account of the merchandizing Commodities of Africa, as also the manners and customs of the people there. London Anno Dom. 1670 p.2.

authority of Muḥammad al-Shaikh, founder of the Saᶜdian dynasty, the city was to acquire notoriety as a favourite refuge for pretenders to the throne[1]. For about a hundred years, from the second half of the 16th century to the second half of the 17th century, Dār ibn Mashᶜal played this role. Its advantages to the aspirant to power were attractive. Apart from its strong defences, it's position in the far-flung peripheral region between Morocco and the Regency of Algiers shielded it from the immediate attention of the central power in Morocco or the Regency. Dār ibn Mashᶜal could in fact be described as "a no-man's land". Control over it alternated between Morocco and the Regency but neither of these two powers exercised any permanent and sustained authority over it; it thus enjoyed virtual independence. The pretender

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1. P. de Cenival op.cit. p.167 ff.

not only found security in Dār ibn Mash^{c}al but could also draw on the support of the unsubmitted tribes of the border region. Moreover the city's proximity to the Spanish possessions on the Mediterranean coast facilitated the pretender's escape in the event of reverses. Until its destruction by Mawlay Ismā^{c}īl in 1690, Dār ibn Mash^{c}al thus fulfilled the function of a resort for the ambitious and the politically deprived. It was here, for instance, that Mawlay al-Nāsir sought refuge in August 1595 after his defeat by his uncle Aḥmad al-Manṣūr at the battle of al-Rokan.[1] ^{c}Abdallāh ibn Ma'mūn and his uncle Abū Faris also sought refuge here in 1609 after their defeat by Mawlay Zīdān.[2] Al-Rashīd's presence in Dār ibn Mash^{c}al was therefore quite consistent with the practice of some of the previous pretenders to

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1. See chapter II p. 46 note 1
2. See chapter II p. 74

power in Morocco;[1]

It was while al-Rashīd was in Dār ibn Mash^{c}al that the famous episode of Ibn Mash^{c}al "took place". The main Moroccan source of reference for this episode is Muḥammad al-Tayyib al-Qādirī; here is his account of it. We shall bear in mind the errors of fact already pointed out, namely, the transference of the venue of the episode from Dār ibn Mash^{c}al to Taza and the wrong ascription of the name Ibn Mash^{c}al to the Jew owing to the mistaken interpretation of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al as the house of Ibn Mash^{c}al: While Al-Rashīd was staying with shaikh al-Lawātī, he saw a man on a

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1. After al-Rashīd, Dār ibn Mash^{c}al continued to provide shelter for the disaffected and to serve as a centre for political intrigues. It was from this city that Aḥmad ibn Maḥraz threatened the power of his uncle Mawlay Ismā^{c}īl in 1674 and it was to the same stronghold that Mawlay al-Harran and Mawlay Aḥmad al-Ṣaghīr fled (1678) after their failure to sustain their revolt against their brother Mawlay Ismā^{c}īl. It was thus to safeguard his power that Mawlay Ismā^{c}īl destroyed Dār ibn Mash^{c}al in 1690. - Pierre de Cenival op.cit. p. 170 ff.

hunting expedition[1]; he had a princely bearing, accompanied as he was by a retinue of servants, slaves and horses. Al-Rashīd who was curious asked "Who is this man" and he was told, "He is a Jew of Taza by name Ibn Mash^{c}al." Al-Rashīd was resolved to kill the Jew because of the oppression Muslims suffered under him.[2] To do this he asked shaikh al-Lawātī to equip him with five hundred of his Ikhwān. The shaikh willingly granted the request. Al-Rashīd then went alone to the Jew - his house was some distance to the east of Taza - and asked for hospitality; this was accorded him. Meanwhile the Ikhwān whom he

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1. Al-Qādirī p.99 ff.

2. Al-Rashīd dramatised this injustice; he presented himself before shaikh al-Lawātī with a knife clenched between his teeth; this gesture is a Berber practice which signifies that one is a victim of injustice and that one therefore desires to take vengeance - Al-Qādirī op.cit.p.100 and note 1.

had instructed to join him secretly, arrived at night, at a time when no attention would be aroused, and surrounded the house of the Jew. While al-Rashīd and the Jew were alone in the chamber, al-Rashīd killed him; he then alerted his men who had surrounded the house and together with them he seized the Jew's riches and treasures.[1]

Beside this account from a Moroccan source we shall juxtapose the accounts of two anonymous Englishmen. These are the earliest

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1. Al-Qādirī also gives another version of this episode: he says his authority for this account is one of the prominent men of the Banū Yaznāsen. It goes as follows: That the Jew in question lived amongst the Banū Yaznāsen and ruled them; he had his castle on one of the mountains. Al-Rashīd plotted with the Banū Yaznāsen to kill him, but the Jew got wind of the plot and came to al-Rashīd with presents in an attempt to win his friendship and dissuade him from his intentions. He was, however, grabbed and killed, and his treasures seized by al-Rashīd. Op.cit. p.101.
See also Al-Nāṣirī p.30. Ar. text, 41 Fr. transl.

accounts we have of this episode.[1] In view of the importance of these two early sources, and their rarity, we shall quote in extenso from them.

A Letter from a Gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard's Retinue relates the incident as follows:

> "... They (i.e. the Jews) never grow rich, but the Mahometans do accuse them of some crime, to have a pretence to seize upon their treasure, as it happened lately to a Jew, who was grown a petty Prince; he commanded a place strong by situation and art called Darbim mashāal..... This Jew had won the esteem and favour of the Grandees round about by his courteous behaviour and good hospitality; for it was his custom to invite all the persons of note into his city and there entertain them very kindly. This dealing made every-one, especially the Arabs, to love him and got him a great name. When Muley Archeid, otherwise called

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1. The accounts were written within 4-5 years after the 'incident' which is supposed to have taken place in 1664. A Letter from a Gentleman was written on Nov. 1, 1669 but not published until 1670: A short and strange Relation was published in 1669.

> Taffaletta, flung himself into the protection of the Arabs, and that they had owned him for their Prince, he was also entertained by this courteous Jew, and at a small provocation he was massacred: Taffaletta found one point in the Law of Mahomet to justify the murder which was approved of and applauded by the ignorant multitude.....[1]

This account is collaborated in its essentials by A Short and Strange Relation of the Life of the Tafiletta:[2]

> At some distance from the Kingdom of Tafiletta, there is a fruitful province fenced with a ridge of hills .... Within these territories governed a Prince of a Nation and of a Religion ....
>
> From father to son many years one of the same superstition had always succeeded. He was a Jew who had made use of his time and command rather to gather treasure than to increase his Dominions ..... The inhabitants (of his country) do call it by a name which signifies the Mountain, here Tafiletta fled with his small Party, the Jew received him with all honour and civility, and allowed him and his followers a corner in his Metropolis to remain with

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1. pp. 2-3
2. p. 7 ff.

> a Pension for his expenses. Because he was of the Blood-royal of Tafiletta and that the Mahumetans, that were the greatest number of his Subjects, had for his valour and virtues a considerable esteem.

A political motivation is imputed to the Jew for his warm reception of al-Rashīd; his aim was to use al-Rashīd as a buttress to his position amongst his predominantly Muslim subjects.

> "But it fell out otherwise than he had imagined, Tafiletta instead of being a friend proved at last his enemy .... (Al-Rashīd) was not long there before be contrived the mischief and the death of the charitable Jew who perceived not the danger until he felt the Cimeter in his bosom. To bring to pass this assassin-at(ion) the Moores that accompanied our fugitive were instrumental."

Al-Rashīd's weapon of intrigue was religion; he won support and approval for his intended crime by appealing to the religious sentiment of the Jew's subjects; in this way the

Jew was alienated.

> " A pretence of religion, a common engine of state was employed. They (i.e. al-Rashīd and his companions) whispered amongst the people that it was not usual that a Jew of a strange superstition and of a miserable despised nation should bear command; that it was a disgrace unto them to be vassals of such one; that it was not lawful by that religion that they were obliged to maintain, and by which they expect future happiness, that a Jew worse than a Christian should be Sovereign over Musulmans true believers; and that they could never hope for their Prophet's favor if they suffered long this infamy to their Profession, that did give laws to all the Nations of the world."

The traditional deference of Muslims for sharīfs was also exploited: "They represented also the advantages of being under a Mahumetan Prince of a noble spirit". There was furthermore the material benefit that would be conferred on them by al-Rashīd's able leadership: "He would endeavour to enrich them with the spoils of their

neighbour provinces. These and such like suggestions being spread amongst the unconstant multitude made a great alteration in their minds..." The unsuspecting Jew still continued his usual hospitality and kindness towards al-Rashīd. One day "Tafiletta was attended to supper by his followers armed with Cimeter and other weapons" and it was during supper that "one of those that were present strikes his ungrateful weapon ..... A council is called of the most considerable of them where thanks were given to Tafiletta because that by his meanes they had been delivered from the unlawful Authority of the Jew. And with the consent of all he was saluted Prince of the Mountain ....."

Two diametrically opposed pictures of the Jew come out of these accounts. Whereas al-Qādirī regards him as unjust - so also does al-Wufrānī : "He oppressed the Muslims and made a

laughing-stock of their religion"[1] - the two Englishmen are unequivocal about the Jew's kind and charitable nature. All the accounts are, however, agreed on one point, namely that a rich Jew was assassinated by al-Rashīd. Germain Mouette also records al-Rashīd's seizure of the wealth of a Jew who inhabited the castle of "Dar-Michel"[2], though curiously enough, he does not mention his assassination. Before this overwhelming evidence one is naturally inclined to accept the historicity of this Jew. On closer examination, however, one discovers that the accounts present a surprising oddity. This wealthy Jew who had risen to the exalted position of "Prince" has no name; his name is unknown even to people who lived at the time of al-Rashīd, i.e. the two Englishmen and their informants. A Letter from a Gentleman ....

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p. 301. Ar text; 499 Fr. transl.

2. Mouette op.cit. pp. 17-18.

identifies the Jew's "Dominions" precisely - "Darbinmashaal" - but the name of the ruler is conspicuously absent; and yet this same source is specific about a much less remarkable Jew who "did run the same fortune" as our "Prince":

> "Another Jew Ben-Simon, a very great trader and one that corresponds in many places did run the same fortune".[1]

The name of the Jew is also unknown to Mouette another observer who was in Morocco at the time of al-Rashīd. Mouette was captured 16th October 1670; after eleven years of captivity his freedom was bought and he arrived in Marseilles 26th May 1681.[2] He was therefore in Morocco two years before the death of al-Rashīd (d. 1672). His Histoire des Conquests was written from material collected during the period of his

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1. A Letter to a Gentleman p.3.
2. Mouette op.cit. Preface p.4 note 1.

captivity; his work therefore is a contemporary history of the reign of al-Rashīd and the first ten years of the reign of his brother Ismāʿīl. He narrates the Ibn Mashʿal incident as follows:

> "Al-Rashīd surprised the castle of Dar Michel (Dar ibn Mashʿal)... he took away from a Jew who lived in the same castle more than 200,000 mithcals which is more than a million of our money which he had amassed in the general commerce of the country which he exercised alone."[1]

The anonymity of the Jew is even more surprising when it is remembered that Mouette's source was a court official; he tells us that his informant was a certain tālib "Bougknam" secretary of caid Zīdān, one of the favourite companions of al-Rashīd.[2] Names such as "Haly Soliman" and "Checq Louety" etc. occur in Mouette's history,

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1. Ibid. pp.17-18.
2. Ibid. p.8.

but not the name of this rich Jew. It is most curious that a fabulously wealthy "Prince" should have an obscure identity.

J. M. Toledano the historian of Moroccan Jewry claims in his book La Lumière du Maghreb that the Jew in question is Harūn ibn Mash^{c}al; he also claims that his source for this information is the chronicle of Samuel ibn Danān.[1] This information has been checked by de Cenival who asserts that "Ibn Mash^{c}al" is in fact not mentioned at all in the chronicle of Ibn Danān preserved by one of his descendants.[2] By ascribing the name "Ibn Mash^{c}al" to the Jew, Toledano is doing no more than echoing the mistake

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1. P. de Cenival op.cit. p. 179 ff.

2. The manuscript de Cenival checked belonged to Soloman Abū Danān. Samuel ibn Danān whom J. M. Toledano cites as the authority for his information is in fact the first contributor to the historical compilation published by G. Vajda. As will be shown subsequently no mention is made at all of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" in this chronicle.

of al-Qādirī whose Nashr al-Mathānī, de Cenival observes, is his source for this episode.[1] As to the first name Harūn which he gives to the Jew, de Cenival's hypothesis for the choice of this name is interesting, namely, that the name might have suggested itself to Toledano because Moroccan history in fact knows a prominent Jew by name Harūn who suffered exactly the same fate as "Ibn Mash^{c}al".[2] Harūn was the Vizir of the last Marīnid sultan ^{c}Abd al-Ḥaqq. The influence and power he enjoyed because of his high position led to a hostile Muslim reaction against him and the sulṭān, and both of them were assassinated. Toledano has therefore most probably succumbed to the error of a historical "feed-back".

Another attempt that has been made to

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1. P. de Cenival op.cit. p. 191.

2. Ibid p. 181. For details of this information see A. Cour op.cit. p.36 ff.

identify the Jew is that by N. Slousch. He too claims that the Jew is Harūn ibn Mash^{c}al. This information again is of very questionable provenance. Slousch claims as his authority the same chronicle of Samuel Ibn Danān, but in fact his source, de Cenival observes, is Toledano's La Lumière du Maghreb.[1] The thesis of Toledano and Slousch cannot therefore be taken seriously because it is based on a very doubtful, perhaps apocryphal document. Incidentally it is worthy of note that the principal Jewish families of Debdu, according to Slousch, have no traditions about this Jewish King.[2] The Jews

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1. The passage quoted allegedly from the chronicle of Samuel ibn Danān in which the name of the Jew occurs is as follows: "Mawlay al-Rashīd.....went from Tafilalt to Taza where he killed by treachery at the time of Sabbath the Jew Aron ibn Mash^{c}al who governed as King." - N. Slousch: "Les Juifs du Debdu" in Revue du Monde Musulman Vol. 22 p. 254. According to de Cenival (op.cit. p.180) this passage is a free translation from Toledano's La Lumière du Maghreb pp. 113-114.

2. N. Slousch op.cit. p. 257.

of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al were said to have been transferred to Debdu by Mawlay Isma^{-c-}il in 1690.[1] If this information which we have on the authority of Slousch is correct, then one would have expected that traditions about this famous Jewish King would not have failed to feature amongst a people whose ancestors - and literate ancestors at that - lived in Dār ibn Mash^{c}al when the King reigned there.[2] A cloud of mystery therefore still hangs over our Jewish Prince.

Any hope of dispelling this cloud is dashed when, on looking at the Jewish chronicle published by G. Vajda and that

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1. Ibid p. 258 ff.

2. According to Slousch the descendants of the Cohen family at Debdu - this family was one of the principal Jewish families transferred to Debdu from Dār ibn Mash^{c}al in 1690 - have no precise traditions about this Jewish King. As regards this King, here is all the principal families of Debdu have to say: "We have heard it related that there was once a King at Taza by name Ibn Mash^{c}al, that he reigned for more than ten years but that he was assassinated by the Arabs...." Ibid p. 259.

described by Y.D. Semach, one finds no reference at all to this Jew who was assassinated by al-Rashīd. The publication by G. Vajda is a historical compilation to which various members of the family of Ibn Danān have made a contribution[1]; this compilation was made from material collected from the memoirs and notebooks of a dozen rabbis of Fes who lived between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The great merit of the chronicle therefore is that the accounts are by and large contemporaneous with the events described. Thus one would expect that some reference would be made to this wealthy and influential Jewish "Prince" in the notebooks and memoirs of these rabbis, some of whom might have lived at the time he reigned. It is in vain, however, that one explores this document for information about the renowned Jew. On the events of

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1. G. Vajda Hespéris Vol. 35, p. 312.

1664, i.e. the year the episode of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" is supposed to have taken place, this is all the chroniclers have to say:

> "...The situation (i.e. the anarchy in Fes) lasted until the year 5425 (1664/5) on which date arrived Mawlay al-Rashīd. The caid Razzūq opened to him at night one of the gates of the city called Bāb al-Bajāt; he entered the mellah and went to the house of Juda Mansano who was the leader of the community; the next day he went to the gate of New Fes called Bāb al-Sammarin; the gates of the city were opened to him and all who had rebelled and revolted fled ..... The sultan (i.e. al-Rashīd) remained three years in (New) Fes. Then the inhabitants of Old Fes as well as the villages of the area made peace with him....
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Neither does the rabbi Abner Hassarfaty relate the assassination of a Jew by al-Rashīd in his Yahas Fes. Abner Hassarfaty's work grew out of questionnaires on the life of Moroccan

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1. G. Vajda. Hespéris Vol. 36, p.139.

Jews presented by leading Jewish figures in Paris and London to two Moroccan rabbis during their business visit to these two cities.[1] Y. D. Sémach has called this document "a real encyclopaedia of Moroccan Judaism".[2] The assassination of a Jew in 1591 features in the section devoted to The Great Events of the Past, but not our

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1. The two Moroccan rabbis were Haim Yamin Cohen and Jacob Benzimra. The Jews they met in Paris who furnished them with the questionnaire were the chief rabbi of France, and Isidore Loeb, secretary of the Alliance Israelite; and in London they met the chief rabbi Abraham Halévy, president of the Association, Agudath Ahim (The Union of Brothers). Because the two Moroccan rabbis were too involved with their trading activities, they gave the questionnaires, on their return to Morocco, to the rabbi Abner Hassarfaty who supplied the answers. Thus did Abner Hassarfaty become the author of the Yahas Fes - Y.D.Semach: Un Chronique Juive de Fes: Le "Yahas Fes" de Ribbi Abner Hassarfaty in Hespéris Vol. 19, p.80.

2. Ibid. p.81.

famous King who was the victim of al-Rashīd.[1] The Yahas Fes was composed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; by this time "Ibn Mash^{c}al" had already been accepted in Morocco as an established fact of national history. The rabbi Abner Hassarfaty was, no doubt, quite familiar with the current of thought of his time. His failure, therefore, to mention this Jewish King in a chronicle devoted to the history of Moroccan Jewry is very significant; it shows that serious Moroccan Jews, knowing fully well the character and the susceptibilities of their own people, regarded the story with grave misgiving, at

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1. Abner Hassarfaty who must have used the chronicle of Ibn Danān family published by G. Vajda virtually repeats, [illegible] the information contained in this chronicle for the year 1664, the date Ibn Mash^{c}al 'took place'; and of course there is no mention of 'Ibn Mash^{c}al': "In the year 5425 (1664-5) Mawlay al-Rashīd came to Fes; the gate of al-Bujāt was opened to him and he slept that evening in the house of the Jew Juda Mansano, chief of the community. The next day he entered Fes al Jadīd through the gate of Sammarin and it was not until three years after that Fes al-Bālī agreed to treat with him". Ibid p.93.

best as the usual monstrous and fictitious propaganda not uncommon amongst their compatriots. And we shall have occasion in the course of the discussion to say why Jews were interested in propagating stories of this nature.

"Ibn Mash^{c}al" thus presents a most curious problem. It is very surprising that a famous figure so well attested to by a group of sources - and sources of diverse provenence at that - escapes mention entirely by Jewish scholars from whom one would have expected authentic information about the influential Jewish "Prince". And even in those sources where mention is made of the Jew, details about him are extremely vague and romantic. They talk about his fabulous wealth; he is "a Prince of a Nation and of a Religion ... who had made use of his time and command rather to gather Treasure than to increase his Dominions." And what was the value of this "Treasure"? Mouette's estimate is that it was "more than 200,000 mithcals. ...which he had amassed in the general commerce of

the country." Thus the Jew "was grown a petty Prince" and because of "his courteous behaviour and good hospitality" he "had won the esteem and favour of the Grandees round about". His good nature therefore "made everyone, especially the Arabs to love him and got him a great Name...." But what is his name? And it is very important to bear in mind that the authors of these sources were informed by Moroccans who lived at the time this Jewish Prince was supposed to have reigned and as such their information could reasonably be regarded as a reflection of <u>contemporary knowledge</u> about him. This claim can fairly well be maintained, for the source of "the gentleman of Lord Howard's retinue", for instance, is a very well informed man, at least about this Jew, as evidenced by his precise identification of the Jew's "Dominions" - "Darbinmashaal". This source is in fact our earliest authoritative testimony to al-Rashīd's

presence in this locality. The informant of Mouette, tālib "Bougiman", is also quite knowledgeable, for Mouette's Histoire des Conquests enjoys a not unreasonable degree of reliability; it has, no doubt, its own shortcomings - like the other sources - but these shortcomings belong largely to the realm of details rather than that of generalities. All the principal events in al-Rashīd's career, recorded by Mouette, are, for instance, confirmed by the Moroccan sources later on. The claim is thus well founded that these sources reflect the knowledge of the time about the influential Jew. If Bougiman in informing Mouette can be precise about the name of the city in which the Jew lived - "Dar Michel" - why not about the name of its towering figure, its principal inhabitant whose identity could not have been hidden in a city over which he exercised so much influence by virtue of his wealth. Bougiman's failure to mention the name of the Jew cannot be explained away as an inadvertent

omission, for he does not, for instance, omit such names as "Haly Soliman" and "Checq Louety" both of whom al-Rashīd also encountered in his travels through the north-eastern border regions of Morocco. Nor can these figures be considered more prominent than this wealthy Jewish merchant who "had amassed.....more than 200,000 mithcals". This is a fabulous amount; Mouette values this at more than a million pounds of French money in the second half of the seventeenth century. Bougiman's silence about the name of the Jew cannot, therefore, be written off as an oversight. The obvious truth is that he does not know the name of the rich Jew, nor can he be blamed for not knowing his name - the Jew does not enjoy any designation!

And it is here that an understanding of the historical context and perspective into which "Ibn Mash^{c}al" fits becomes very important; for Ibn Mash^{c}al, as has been pointed out above, forms part and parcel of an ancient historical myth.

Without an understanding of this background, the story is not fully intelligible and, therefore, attempts at the solution of its riddle will be Quixotic. This background we shall attempt to delineate. In this connection H.Z (J.W.) Hirschberg's article, The Problem of the Judaized Berbers, is very important and it forms the basis of the discussion that follows.

Jewish connection with North Africa has a long tradition, but this ancient history need not concern us.[1] Evidence from the tenth to the middle of the twelfth century point to old Jewish settlements both in the inland areas of North Africa and in regions

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1. On Jewish history in North Africa see J. Goulven: "Notes sur les origines anciennes des Israelites du Maroc" in Hesperis vol.I 1921, p. 317 ff., L. Voinot: Pelerinages Judeo-Musulmans du Maroc, Paris 1948, p.99 ff., A. Chouraqui : Les Juifs d'Afrique du Nord, Paris 1952; see also R. Mauny : "Le Judaism, les Juifs et l'Afrique Occidental" in Bulletin de l'Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire Vol. XI, p. 354 ff.



After H.Z.[J.W.] Hirschberg

bordering on the desert;[1] the evidence also shows a great deal of communication between these two groups of settlements, both in the religious and in the economic spheres. Amongst the inland settlements we may mention Majāna, Qal^{c}at, Hammād, Ashīr, Mesila, Tāhert, Tlemcen, Tubala, Fes, Meknes, Aghmāt and Marrākesh; while the border settlements include Jadwā, Misān, Ghadāmes, al-Hāma, Nafzāwa, Qafṣāwa, Qafṣa, Warghlān, Sijilmāsa, Dar^{c}a, Mallāl, Talwit, Qubbā and the Sūs. Many of these Jews were traders. Al-Bakri (eleventh century) tells us, for instance, that "Jews are more numerous in Fes than in any other city of the Maghreb; from there they make many voyages into all countries."[2]

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1. H.Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg mentions these sources, some of which are Jewish. See Journal of African History p. 320, notes 13 and 14 where these sources are listed. We may, however, mention an Arabic eleventh century source, al-Bakrī: Kitāb al-Masālik wa'l-Mamālik transl. M.C. de Slane: Description de l'Afrique Septentrional p.25 (Jadwa) 262 (Fes), 330 (Sijilmāsa).

2. Al-Bakrī op.cit. p. 115 Ar. Text: 262 Fr. transl.

It is obvious that many of these voyages were trading voyages. It is thought that Jewish commercial travels to the Western Sudan must have preceded the arrival of the Arabs there in the eighth century.[1] Indeed Jews in the southern regions of the Maghreb like the Sūs, the Darᶜa and the Tafilalt, and in the oases of Tuat[2] and Ghūrāra controlled the trade between the Western Sudan and North Africa and it was largely to their business acumen that this trade owed its impulse. The Genoese, Antonio Malfont writing from Tamentit (Tuat) in the first half of the fifteenth century (1447) says, for instance, that "Jews

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1. R. Mauny op.cit. p.371. Jewish artisans in the region of Darᶜa carried their trade as far as the W. Sudan, at a period not later than the eleventh century. See M. Delafosse: "Relations du Maroc et du Soudan à travers les Ages" in Hespéris Vol. 4, p. 158.

2. The commercial success of the Jews of Tuat had earned them the odium of the Muslims; the anti-Semitism of the 1490's was instigated by the Murābit, shaikh ᶜAbd al-Karim al-Maghilī.

are numerous here (Tamentit); they live pleasantly for they are under the protection of different masters and every master shields his protegés; their communal life is therefore very satisfactory. Trade is carried on through them and there are many who can be trusted."[1] Evidence of Jewish penetration into the W. Sudan is provided by Valention Fernandes (1506/7). "(At Walata) there are very rich Jews but they are greatly oppressed; they are either hawkers, goldsmiths or jewellers".[2] Leo Africanus (1526) also talks of merchants in Tagost (in the Sūs) transporting "cloth in great quantity... once a year to Timbuctoo and Walata."[3] Jews were

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1. Charles de la Ronciere La Découverte de l'Afrique au moyen age Vol.1(Le Caire) 1925 p. 152 quoted from H.Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg op.cit. pp.324-5; R. Mauny op.cit. p. 373.

2. Valentin Fernandes: Description de la côte d'Afrique de Ceuta au Sénégal, (1506-7) trad. P. de Cenival et Th. Monod (Pub. Com. Et. Hist. et Sc. A.O.F. Paris Larose 1938 p.85) quoted from R. Mauny op.cit. p. 374.

3. Leo Africanus: Description de l'Afrique (tierce partie du Monde) edit. Ch. Schefer Paris 1896, p. 179.

certainly amongst these merchants for Marmol (1573) tells us that in Tagost "there are more than three hundred households of Jews, these are artisans as well as merchants."[1]

Thus between North Africa and the Western Sudan there were Jews engaged in commerce, either settled in isolated communities or amongst a non-Jewish population. The existence side by side of two or more communities is accompanied very often by the sociological phenomenon of inter-transmission and absorption of influences. Many Jews willingly adopted Islam, others were forcibly converted as, for instance, during the period of Almohade religious fanaticism. Jewish influence on the indigenous population of North Africa produced greater impact in areas far removed from the centres of power and therefore with a thin veil of Islamisation. It is not impossible that some of the people in these far-flung areas

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1. Marmol: L'Afrique t II p.41.

acquired some veneer of Judaization, although this cannot be said with any assurance for a reason which will be pointed out shortly. There is evidence, however, that populations amongst whom Jews settled did acquire some externals of Jewish culture. Modern scholars have shown that Maghrebi Islam is not free of accretions of Jewish and Berber pre-Islamic practices, with Islam forming a gloss over old-established customs and usages.[1] A feature of this syncretism is the veneration in Morocco, for instance, of certain shrines and tombs by Muslim and Jews alike. L. Voinot has, in fact, been able to identify a hundred Judeo-Muslim murābitūn - and this may not

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1. L. Voinot op.cit. Introduction. See also E. Doutté: "Notes sur l'Islam Maghrebin: Les Marabouts" in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions Vol. 40 pp.343-369; Vol. 41 pp. 22-66 and 289-336. M. E. Michaux-Bellaire: "L'Islam Marocain" in Archives Marocains Vol. 27 p.115 ff. Cf. I. Goldziher: "Le Culte de Sainte chez les Musulmans" in Revue de l'Histoire des Religions Vol. 2 pp. 257-351.

represent an exhaustive list.[1]

As Judaism is not a proselytising religion the Judaization of people amongst whom Jews live may not be taken for granted. Unfortunately, however, the phenomenon of Jewish presence in different areas between North Africa and the Western Sudan either in groups of as individuals amongst non-Jewish population, has probably been responsible for the often erroneous assumption of the Judaization of Berbers and Negroes. Al-Idrisī (first half of the twelfth century) and his informants were probably victims of this delusion or according to R. Mauny fertile Arab imagination. This Ceuta-born geographer is the first Arab source to speak of Judaized people in the Western

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1. L. Voinot gives examples of these Judeo-Muslim murābitūn in his book.

Sūdān

> In the whole country of Lamlam,[1] there are only two towns small as villages. The name of one is Mallāl, and the name of the other Daw; (the distance) between these two small towns is four days. Their inhabitants - as the people of that district point out - are Jews among whom there is much ignorance and unbelief ...[2]

Mallāl and Daw which al-Idrisī has cited were in fact mentioned a century earlier by al-Bakrī who did not speak of their population being Jewish. Al-Idrisī is certainly referring to the same Daw which al-Bakrī tells us is the name of a King "of a great kingdom extending over a distance of eight days journey"; and as to Mallāl, al-Bakrī describes it as the Kingdom "behind this country (Daw) whose King bears the

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1. Reference to Negro population south of the Sahel, also called Demdem, Nemnem. - R. Mauny op.cit. p. 361.

2. ᶜAbdallāh Muhammad al-Idrisī : Kitab Nuzhat al-Mushtāq fī'Khtirāq al-Ifāq transl. R. Dozy and M.J. de Goeje: Description de l' Afrique et de l'Espagne (1866) p.4 Ar. text, 4 Fr. transl.

title al-Muslimānī [1] (because of his conversion to Islam).

There is yet another reference by al-Idrisī to Jews in the Western Sudan; this is in Qamnūriya corresponding to present-day Mauretania:

> "...as regards the country of Qamnūriya.... there were in it well-known towns and famous cities of Negroes. But the Zaghāwa and the Lamtūna of the desert (Sahara) who live on both sides of that country made invasions into it.... until they destroyed most of its inhabitants, exterminated them and dispersed their ranks throughout the country. As traders report the people of Qamnūriya allege that they are Jews. Their beliefs are confused; they have no settled agreed beliefs..." [2]

R. Mauny has pointed out that Qamnūriya though referring to present day Mauretania, is a fictitious name, plagiarised from Ptolemy's

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1. Al-Bakrī op.cit. p. 178. Ar. text; 388 Fr. transl.
2. Al-Idrisī op.cit. p. 29. Ar. text; 35 Fr. transl.

toponomy Thamondakana,[1] and that the people referred to by al-Idrisī as Jewish are in fact Soninke groups related to the people of ancient Ghana who had been dispersed, as al-Idrisī correctly points out, following the conquest of ancient Ghana by the Berbers.

We may <u>now</u> reject al-Idrisī's information as incorrect, but this is not important. What is important is what the people of the time <u>believed</u>. Al-Idrisī was reporting a current tradition and the information was held as true. It is very important to bear this in mind because we are dealing with a people's interpretation of their own environment which inevitably

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1. Thamondakana of Ptolemy has been transformed successively by different Arab authors into Thamtūrqi, Thamanūrqi and finally into Qamnūri by Idrisī, the last name being a wrong graphical transcription of Thamanūrqi; as to Qamnūriya, it is the correct Arabic derivation from Qamnūri.

affects and conditions their attitudes.

We have said that this erroneous assumption of Judaised groups in the Maghreb and the Western Sudan[1] was prompted, very probably, by the presence of Jewish traders or trading communities in various localities between North Africa and the Western Sudan. Another probable factor was the spread of the legend of the Ten Lost Tribes. This was first propagated in the ninth century by Eldad-ha-Danī, who was in Qairawān in 880 A.D. He claimed that he was a

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1. We may mention two other Arab sources which talk of Judaized groups in Africa. ᶜAbd al Halīm ibn Abī Zarᶜ (Rawd al Qirtas transl. A.Beaumier Paris 1860 pp.34, 165) mentions Judaized Berbers in the vicinity of Fes at the time of Idrīs (from 788 A.D.), and Judaized Negroes in the environs of Tātaklatin, (probably modern Mauretania - R. Mauny op.cit. p.364) Ibn Khāldūn (Kitab al ᶜIbar 2nd half of the 14th cent. Vol. 6. p.107, transl. de Slane Histoire des Berberes Vol. 1. pp.208-9) says that the following Berber tribes might have professed Judaism before the advent of Islam: The Jarāwa of the Aurās Mountains, (the tribe of the Kāhina) the Nafūsa, Berbers of Ifriqiya, the Fandalawa, the Madyūna, the Bahlūla, the Ghayāta and the Banū Fazāz.) For further traditions of the Judaized, with regard to the Western Sudan, see V. Monteil: "Les Juifs d'Ifran" in Hespéris Vol.35 p.151 ff.; Ch.Monteil: "Problèms du Sudan Occidental: Juifs et Judaisés" in Hespéris Vol. 38, p.256 ff.

descendant of Dan, one of the Ten Lost Tribes and that in the country of Havila (thought very likely to be modern Ethiopia) was a Jewish Kingdom made up of four of the Ten Tribes - Naphtali, Gad, Asher and the Levites (Bn e Moshe)[1]. The expanse of this kingdom stretched over a territory of five month's journey; its King or Emperor was engaged in war with five Kings of Kush (this name was used to refer to Africa). Eldad ha-Danī also spoke of the mythical River Sambation, a waterless torrent of stones and sand, flowing for six days with a terrific momentum but remaining still on the Sabbath when it was covered by an impenetrable fog. The tribe of Dan to which Eldad belonged was separated from these four tribes by the Sambation. The Danites also constituted a powerful Kingdom whose warriors could repulse all enemy attacks.

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1. For Eldad ha-Danī's story see R. Mauny op.cit. p.361; A. Chouraqui op.cit. p. 71. On Eldad ha-Dani, the Bn e Moshe and the River Sambation see Jewish Encyclopaedia Vol. 9, p.59.

Stories such as this "were disseminated" in the words of H. Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg "in good faith by Jews, who, because of their abject conditions, were interested in raising their social status in the eyes of their neighbours." The propaganda was a psychological compensation for their humiliation and a way of acquiring self-respect. These stories made such great impact in the consciousness of people that a belief was engendered both amongst Jews and non-Jews in the existence of a Jewish Kingdom in Africa. It is this belief that explains legendary traditions of Jewish Kingdom or free-Jewish tribes recorded in the Western Sudan and in North Africa. What has happened on each occasion is that a particular experience or situation has served as a foundation on which to erect the Jewish Kingdom legend; for the idea of a Jewish King or Kings at the command of a Jewish Kingdom in some locality between the Maghreb and the Sudan had become part of the

people's interpretation or ordering of their environment. It would seem that the scattered communities of Jews between these two areas as has been pointed out, may have helped to promote this romantic belief. Below will be given examples of how the Jewish Kingdom legend had so much shaped people's ideas and their view of their surroundings. The first example is a tradition recorded in the Sudanese Chronicle Ta'rīkh al-Fattāsh (16th - 17th century):

> In the year 902 (1496/7) the city of Tendirma (South of Timbuctoo) was built.....; in former times this was the abode of a group of Banū Israel; their tombs and wells were up till then (1496/7) still in evidence.

These wells were very remarkable and impressive both in appearance and in the way they were dug. The Banū Israel who formerly inhabited the area cultivated legumes the sale of which

yielded them much profit; it was water from these wells rather than river-water that favoured the growth of the legumes. This in fact was the raison d'etre of the wells. They were of varying depth; some were as deep as 140 cubits, some attained a depth of 200 cubits while others ranged between 60-100 cubits; water from wells below 60 cubits did not, however, favour the cultivation of the legumes.

At the time this Jewish Kingdom existed (the time is not stated), there reigned seven kings, all descendants of Kings of Israel. They were:

> Jabrūt ibn Hishām, Dhu'l-Yaman ibn ᶜAbd al-Hakīm, Zair ibn Salām, ᶜAbd al-Laṭīf ibn Sulaimān, Malīk ibn Ayūb, Fadl ibn Mizār and Ghalīb ibn Yūsuf; each of these princes had under his command a numerous army and each had a well assigned to him and his army....; each had a cavalry force of 12,000, and as to the force of the infantry..... it is innumerable and countless.
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1. Mahmūd Kaᶜti: Ta'rikh al-Fattāsh fi Akhbār al-Buldān wa'l-Juyūsh wa Akabir al-Nās trans. O. Houdas and M. Delafosse Paris 1913 pp. 62-3 Ar. text; 119-120 Fr. transl.

This story is a good illustration of the success of the Ten Tribes legend. The discovery of the site of an ancient civilisation immediately conjures up an extinct Banū Israel Kingdom. One might ask what evidence Mahmūd Ka'ti has for his claim. As R. Mauny has pointed out, the names of the Kings mentioned could be Arabic as well as Jewish. All Mahmūd Ka'ti has done is to impose his thoughts and concepts on his environment and thus credit to Jews without any proof to substantiate his claim, the work of an ancient people most likely the people of the ancient kingdom of Ghana. The wells and legumes that Mahmūd Ka'ti talks of were in fact mentioned much earlier on by al-Bakrī (11th century) in connection with ancient Ghana:

> In the environs (of the Muslim city of Ghana) are wells which provide sweet water for its inhabitants and around which legumes are cultivated.
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1. Al-Bakrī op.cit. p.175, Ar. text, 382 Fr. transl.

Thus a particular situation has provided material for the Jewish Kingdom legend.

Here is another example of the same phenomenon. It is contained in a letter addressed by Muḥammad al-Shaikh, founder of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty, to David Reubeni, a Jew who was at the court of the King of Portugal Joao III in 1526/7. The letter is a pointer to the fear inspired by these legendary Jewish tribes, all supposedly strong "doughty warriors who fought and subdued their neighbours". An extract from Muḥammad al Shaikh's letter reads as follows:

> "Behold, I have heard of thee that thou has come to the King of Portugal from the tribes. Hast thou knowledge of the people that have gone out into the desert which is between me and the black ones? For they have taken captive all the Arabs that dwell in the desert, them and their wives and their cattle and their children and everything that is theirs. And not one of them hath returned of those that they took, and we know not whether they have killed them or what they have done to them.

> And a fugitive from among them who fled unto me had told me this. And I sent Jews that they might go and see, and they have not returned. And we are amazed at that people, and I have written to thee all this."[1]

There is an obvious tone of romance in the story that "all the Arabs that dwell in the desert, them and their wives and their cattle and their children and everything that is theirs" have been captured by Jews. What leads to the assertion that it was Jews who were responsible for the capture? Why not fellow Arabs, Berbers or Tuareqs? The story would suggest a Kingdom of conquering Jewish warriors in the desert and the evidence for this is no more than sheer belief.

This story of the 'tribes' in the desert seemed to have been "confirmed" in 1527

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1. Ad. Neubauer in Medieval Jewish Chronicles II 1895 p.180 quoted from H.Z (J.W.) Birschberg op.cit. p.330.

by two messengers of Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, the caid of Muḥammad al-Shaikh in the Saharan region of Ghūrāra - such is the tyranny of the belief of which the individual is a product. Legends may, however, be founded on some substratum of experience. We may assume, therefore, that these two messengers (horsemen) experienced something in the Sahara, but this experience has been exaggerated and romanticised in the very tradition of the Lost Tribes legend which was so strong in people's consciousness. Here is an account of the experience of the two horsemen:

> ..... having lost their way on their journey across the desert (they) had come upon a large tribe of proud, warlike and fabulously wealthy nomad Jews. These Jews had no contact with the Muslim world. Their sultan who lived in a silk tent marked with a red flag, was told by the messengers of the down-trodden condition of Jews in Arab lands, with the tribesmen present bursting into tears

at this sad story.[1] The messengers spent the night in the Jewish camp. The next day their hosts would not let them depart until they had given them an example of their military prowess by encircling and capturing a town. They then dismissed them providing them with a supply of two loaves of bread, which miraculously proved more than sufficient to sustain them all the way to Marrakech. They also gave them a message to the Sherīf, which the latter concealed after having it translated from Hebrew into Arabic by Ben Qabīsa a learned Jew of the city.

The desert Jews told their guests among other things that their water-supply came from a hundred wells that moved and stopped with them on their wanderings. As for the identity of these Jews, some say

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1. The commiseration of these legendary tribes with their miserable and oppressed fellow tribesmen in other countries seems to be a common pattern. Cf., for instance, a similar story in the Jewish Encyclopaedia Vol. 9 p.160:

In 1646 Baruch Gad, the Palestinian messenger, fell among thieves and was plundered while travelling through Media and Persia collecting money for the Holy Land. In his wanderings in the desert, he met Malkiel a descendant of one of the Lost Tribes, Naphtali, to whom he narrated the story of Jews in Palestine. When Malkiel passed on this information to the Bne Moshe beyond the Sambation, they were said to have "heard of the pitiful conditions of the Palestinians with tears and sorrow".

> that they are 'Beni-Mushe', while others connect them with the Jewish tribes that lived in the valleys of 'Ghinawa' (Guinea).
> [1]

It is quite clear that parts of this story are imaginary constructions. Such information as the encounter in the desert of "a large tribe of proud, war-like and fabulously wealthy nomad Jews" and the tale about their water supply coming "from a hundred wells that moved and stopped with them on their wanderings", are certainly legendary. But how legendary was it to a people bred in this mythical Jewish Kingdom tradition? This question is important in understanding why "Ibn Mash^{c}al" has been accepted as a historical figure.

Other examples are available of the Ten Tribes legend. A story in the seventeenth century claimed that an independent Jewish Kingdom made

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1. Being an extract from a letter addressed by Yahūda ibn Zamirro to his brothers in Azemmur (or Mazagan) as well as to his mother. See G.S.Collin in Mélanges d'études luso-marocaines, dédiés à la mémoire de David Lopes et Pierre de Cenival (Lisbon 1945) pp.62-66 quoted from H.Z (J.W.) Hirschberg op.cit. p.331.

up of the descendants of Ephraim once existed in the Dar^{c}a. In this Kingdom the Christians and later the Muslims were under the domination of Jews. Subsequently, however, the Muslims overpowered the Jews and wrested power from them, subjecting them to the jizya. When this Kingdom existed remains a matter of conjecture.

In the second half of the seventeenth century it was alleged that "Jews have come from Agadir and Iligh in the district of Sūs and sworn a solemn oath that they saw there, in the desert, many people and spoke to them and they told them that they were Israelites who had come to the border of their brethren"[1] - again another echo of the Ten Tribes legend.

This echo has reverberated down the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The following

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1. J. Sasportas: Ẓizat Nobhel (ed. I. Tish bi Jerusalem, 1945) p. 14 quoted from H.Z.(J.W.) Hirschberg op.cit. p.333.

story, for instance, (middle of the nineteenth century) that "there was among the Kabyles (Algeria) a highly-respected war-like Jewish tribe called by the Arabs "Bnē Moshé"[1] is a case in point. The twentieth century also has its own share of the romance. In the third decade of this century the "discovery" of "a flourishing and tranquil Jewish community numbering several thousand souls in the heart of the African desert"[2] was credited to a fictitious French consul at Akka. Such is the strength of the Lost Tribes legend in people's consciousness, even up to the present century.

It is against the background of this legend that we must examine the story of "Ibn Mash^{c}al". "A Prince of a Nation and of a Religion" who "governed Dominions" and "amassed.....immense

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1. H.Z.(J.W.) Hirschberg, op.cit. p. 334.
2. Loc.cit. note 32.

wealth and precious treasures" and yet possessed no name is certainly anomalous and must be legendary. "Ibn Mash^{c}al" is thus a seventeenth century manifestation of the Jewish King/Kingdom legend. We would think de Cenival was wrong in his theory that the use of such word as "Prince" by the anonymous Englishman to describe the Jew was exaggerated and distorted; the description was perfectly consistent with the legend. The Englishman, unwittingly, was doing no more than recording an old legend passed on to him by his informant.

But what is the connection of this legend, anyway, with al-Rashīd? De Cenival who started from the premise that "Ibn Mash^{c}al" was a historical figure has this to say in answer to the above question.

> It is difficult to know and one must not forget that as regards the reasons for which a legend attaches itself to one subject rather than another, there is always room for chance. However al-Rashīd appeared to have been

> a popular sovereign. The order which he made to prevail after a horrible period of troubles, his glory as founder of the dynasty, his liberality, his reputation as builder and scholar have left in the popular mind a memory which has survived him by many years and caused the legend to become part of that reputation.
> [1]

De Cenival was probably unaware of the Jewish Kingdom legend and so has treated "Ibn Mash^{c}al" as a distinct and isolated phenomenon that was born in the middle of the seventeenth century when al-Rashīd came to power, whereas "Ibn Mash^{c}al" belongs to a long-established historical myth dating back to the last quarter of the ninth century when the Jewish Kingdom legend was first propagated in North Africa. Moroccan history is not wanting in examples of persecution of Jews. Why should the assassination of this particular Jew evoke such

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1. Pierre de Cenival op.cit. p. 201.

melodrama? The truth is that this Jew falls outside the normal category of Jews; he is the King of one of these mythical kingdoms, the commander of "the proud, warlike and fabulously nomad Jews" who had "taken captive all the Arabs that dwell in the desert....."; the leader of the tribe of fierce, "doughty warriors who fought and subdued their neighbours." The assassination of this "King" is worthy of all the hue and cry.

The letter of Muḥammad al-Shaikh to David Reubeni, the story of the two horsemen of Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad and the "solemn oath" of Jews of Agadir and Iligh testifying to the presence of "Israelites" in the Sahara, all show the strength and the persistence of the Jewish Kingdom legend in the consciousness of Moroccans of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What al-Rashīd did was to exploit this myth for political advantage. His story was a false propaganda but it gained credence in the same way as the story of the fugitive to Muḥammad al-Shaikh and

that of the two horsemen of Muhammad ibn Ahmad did.

At this point we may return to the question posed at the beginning of the discussion: How could this fabrication have served al-Rashīd's political ambition? Simply in this way. The idea of a Jew who had acquired his wealth through monopoly of commerce to the detriment of Muslims, and who had thus become so powerful as to subject Muslims to his tyranny was offensive to Muslim pride and honour. By killing this mythical Jewish King, al-Rashīd had therefore served the cause of Muslims and delivered them from the shameful domination of an accursed despot who "oppressed Muslims and made a laughing stock of their religion". Al-Rashīd thus hoped to create popular support for his pretensions to power by posing as the champion of Muslim honour against a Jew "worse than a Christian"; and he did win popular support in the north-eastern border region of Morocco, notably the support of the Banū Yaznāsen, the Maᶜqil and the tribes of the Angad.

The following observations would lend support to the view that "Ibn Mash^{c}al" is a legendary figure. The absence of any reference to this "Jewish King" in the two Jewish chronicles already mentioned, particularly the chronicle published by G. Vajda whose account is more or less contemporaneous with the events described. The more important evidence, however, is the anonymity of the "Jewish King." That people who lived at the time of the "King" (namely the informants of the two anonymous Englishmen and Mouette) did not know his name can certainly not be satisfactorily explained other than that the "Jewish King" has no corporeal existence. No King is so obscure as to have no identity. Vagueness of this nature is characteristic of legends.

It is even doubtful whether al-Rashīd himself specified the name Dār ibn Mash^{c}al as the venue of this non-event. What might have happened was that the story was first propagated in Dār ibn

Mash^{c}al or thereabouts; as to the venue of the "incident" al-Rashīd might have indicated some vague distant locality not easily attainable from north-eastern Morocco, perhaps the Saharan region where, as the examples cited in the discussion show, the fabulously wealthy Jewish tribes exist in popular imagination. The false propaganda which started in Dār ibn Mash^{c}al then spread to other parts of Morocco and this possibly explains the identification of "Ibn Mash^{c}al's" "Dominions" with "Darbinmashaal" by contemporaries of the period as, for instance, the informant of a "gentleman of the Lord Ambassador Howard retinue". The people of Dār ibn Mash^{c}al would hardly have believed al-Rashīd's story had he specified their city as the King's "Dominions" when no such King existed in their midst. Al-Rashīd was too astute a politician to have committed such a blunder.

There is no reason in fact why the name Dār ibn Mash^{c}al should evoke any Jewish connotation; for the word Mash^{c}al has nothing Jewish about it; it is an Arabic word meaning torch and is derived from the root sha^{c}la meaning "to light, kindle, ignite". It is true that a Jew has been known to bear the name Ibn Mash^{c}al; he served under the Abbadid King of Seville al-Mu^{c}tamid who lived in the second half of the eleventh century. There is, however, no connection whatsoever between the Ibn-Mash^{c}al of the second half of the eleventh century and the legendary "Ibn Mash^{c}al" of the second half of the seventeenth century.[1]

As a further clue to the solution of the riddle of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" we may pose the following question: Who were the likely informants of the two anonymous Englishmen? At the end of A Short and Strange Relation there is the following post-

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1. P. de Cenival op.cit. p. 173.

script: "The first part of this relation, so far as concerns Tafiletta was delivered into the author's hands by a merchant of Provence resident in Arzille acquainted with the affairs of the country by reason of his long abode amongst the Moors and his journeys that he has made into the land". Again who might have informed this French merchant? In all probability Jews were the likely informants of the"gentleman of Lord Howard's retinue", and the French merchant from whom the author of A Short and Strange Relation got his information.

Two reasons lend support to this supposition. Jews played a preponderant part in the maritime commerce of Morocco, just as they did in the trans-Saharan trade. In most cases it was to Jews that sultāns farmed the customs of the ports. The following testimony from the second half of the sixteenth century is eloquent:

In this countrye are manie Jewes

> enhabiting, in whose handes consisteth the most parte of the trafique of the countrye, being the onely merchantes of sugars, mallasses and other ritche merchandize which the same (i.e. Morocco) yeldeth, for the which they paye great sums of money to the King.[1]

The gentleman of Lord Howard retinue also observed in the second half of the seventeenth century that "the Jews are to be seen everywhere in the country, they are very serviceable to the inhabitants for they furnish them for the most part with foreign commodities."[2] Because of their wide business contacts, Jews understood European languages; it was they, therefore, very often who served as interpreters and intermediaries between Europeans and Moroccans. This explains, for instance, the importance

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1. "Relation anonyme de la Battaile d'el-Ksar el-Kebir (1578)" in Sources Inédites 1'er Série Angleterre t 1 p.331. A further evidence from the second half of the sixteenth century emphasises the role of the Jews in the maritime commerce of Morocco "....the merchants of that countrye being onely Jewes, wiche twoo onely Jews have all the said commodities of that countrye in ferme of the King" - "Requete de marchands trafiquants au Maroc au Conseil Prive" in Sources Inédites 1'er Série Angleterre t 1 p.93.

2. A Letter from a Gentleman p.2.

of Jews in the diplomatic and court history of Moroccan sovereigns. The most famous example in this connection was the Pallache family, members of whom served the Sa^{c}dians as counsellors and diplomats, as, for instance, Samuel Pallache together with his sons David, Moïse and Isaac.[1] And while al-Rashīd was temporarily established in Taza he had in his court the Jew Aaron Carainet.[2] This role of Jews as merchants, interpreters, counsellors and diplomats would support the postulate that Jews were the probable informants of the anonymous Englishman of Lord Howard's Retinue and the French merchant from whom the author of A Short and Strange Relation got his

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1. See de Castries Introduction to Sources Inédites 1ère Série Pays-Bas t.1 p.xv ff; t.6 Index pp.682-685 contain references to the various members of the Pallache family who filled different functions under the Sa^{c}dians.

2. And it was Jacob Pallache, a Jew, who was intermediary between the French merchant Roland Fréjus and al-Rashīd during the former's visit to Taza in April 1666. "Relation de Roland Fréjus" in Sources Inédites 2^{e} Série France t.1 p.171.

story. The second reason is the great divergence between the accounts of the two Englishmen and those of the Moroccan historians. The kind, charitable and good-natured "Prince" of the two Englishmen is a far cry from the detestable tyrant of the Moroccan historians. Such a sympathetic figure of the Jew which is diametrically at variance with the accepted Muslim version could most probably have stemmed only from Jews. Many Jews, in fact, must have delighted in narrating this story! A feeling of self-congratulation and achievement was engendered by the idea of a wealthy and powerful Jewish King who once subjected Muslims to his rule. This story which belongs to the tradition of a Jewish Kingdom propagated by Jews, satisfied their craving, as victims of discrimination and persecution, for prestige and self-respect in the eyes of their neighbours.

III

Popular Moroccan folklore has its own version of the story of "Ibn Mash^{c}al"[1]; it runs as follows: Owing to the decadence of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty (17th) a Jew of Taza succeeded in seizing power in Morocco. His rule was tyrannical; every year the people of Fes sent to him as present - hadiya - the most beautiful virgin of the city. The mother (a sherifa) whose daughter was to be the next victim of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" implored al-Rashid who was at this time a student in Fes, to save the life of her daughter. Al-Rashid therefore resolved to rid the Muslims of the shameful domination of the Jew. He was disguised as the virgin earmarked for the Jew and sent to Taza together with forty chests supposedly containing rich presents for the King; hidden in the chests,

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1. See Pierre de Cenival op.cit. pp.146-7.

however, were forty students. When the unsuspecting "Ibn Mash^{c}al" had received his presents, the forty students came out of the chests and killed him. They then proclaimed al-Rashīd as sulṭān and marched jubilantly with their new sulṭān to Fes. Al-Rashīd subsequently married the virgin that was intended for the despotic Jewish King.

It is in memory of this event that the feast of students - ^{c}īd al- Tullāb (Tolba) is celebrated every year in Fes. The central feature of the feast is the mock exercise of the power of a sulṭān by the sulṭān al-Tullāb throughout the duration of the feast (i.e. about a week or two). The office of the sulṭān al-Tullāb devolves on the highest bidder amongst a group of prospective students[1]. While the feast lasts the sulṭān al-Tullāb is invested

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1. For a detailed description of this feast, of which a bare outline has been given here, see de Cenival op.cit. 137 ff.

with a respectable paraphernalia of royalty; he has his own court and officials; vizirs, chamberlain, master of ceremonies, inspector of market muḥtasib etc. He is also able to levy taxes on the grandees of Fes; his muḥtasib, like an actual holder of the office, inspects the market and in mock manner imposes fines for infringement of market regulations. Features of the ᶜid include a procession of the mock sulṭān in pomp and majesty through the principal street of Fes attended by his court; a pilgrimage to the cemetery of Bāb al-Futūh where Sīdī ᶜAlī ibn Hirzihim[1] and al-Rashīd are buried and an open air festivity open to all at the bank of Wādī Fes. During the period of his 'rule' the sulṭān al-Tullāb receives in audience on one occasion the actual sulṭān or

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1. Sīdī ᶜAlī ibn Hirzihim died in 560 (1164/5); he was reputed for his learning, and therefore serves as patron of students. Ibid p.141.

his Khalifa and requests from him a special favour - this is part of the reason why competition for the Crown of the mock sultan is very keen amongst students. And what is the purpose of this feast? It is designed, so goes the explanation, as a yearly compensation to the students for proclaiming al-Rashīd as sulṭān after their assassination of the tyrannical Jewish king. This compensatory role of the feast also explains the liberties taken by the sulṭān al-Tullāb during the period of his 'rule'.

The assumptions of this folklore have no historical basis whatsoever. It was the zāwiya of Dilā' rather than a mythical power in Taza which constituted the main political power in Morocco in the middle of the seventeenth century; and after the death of al-ᶜAyāshī in 1641, the zāwiya extended its power to Fes. Moreover al-Rashīd was never a student in Fes before his rise to power as the

folklore purports; it is true that he made a very brief appearance at the walls of Fes-al-Jadīd, but, as has been shown, he was not even allowed to enter the city by its governor, al-Duraidī. The folklore story is therefore totally irreconcilable with the historical facts. The story exhibits obvious imaginative abstractions. The gift of chests in which were hidden the would-be assassins of the Jew is a familiar, indeed a ubiquitous motif of folklores the world over;[1] so also is the story of the annual gift of a virgin to "Ibn Mash^{c}al."[2] Since the "Ibn Mash^{c}al" episode, the name has become in Moroccan folklore a bye-word for a tyrannical upstart. Compare

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1. Cf., for instance, the story of The Trojan Horse. See de Cenival op.cit. for further examples.

2. Cf. the story of the Jewish King Fityaun who had "the right of first night" with the Jewish and the Arab virgins of the Khazraj and Aus tribes in Medina - H.Z. (J.W.) Hirschberg op.cit. p.333 note 30.

the following story of the Beqqālīyin shārifs:

> Once upon a time there was a Jew called Ben Mesh'al who was rich and powerful and had friends of every sort. But his soul deceived him, and lied and said there was none in all the world grander than he, and he believed it, so he wished, believe it or not, to be Sultan. So he swore to exterminate the Idrīsid descendants so that he could become Sultan. He spent some time killing them, until there were only two left, living in the house of a greengrocer (beqqal). And that greengrocer, too, had two sons. One day companions of Ben Mesh'al came to the greengrocer and said "Hand over to us those sharīfs who are with you.'" So he went into his house and brought out to them his own two sons. They in turn brought them to the Jew, who killed them, while the descendants of Mawlay Idrīs remained with the greengrocer. And had he not resorted to this deceit, all the progeny of Mawlay Idrīs would have been exterminated. And this greengrocer who had relinquished what he held so dear, in order that the Idrīsid sharīfs not be wiped out, served well the progeny of the Prophet. And now a tomb is built over him with a wooden catafalque,

> to which people make pilgrimage and address him as "Sid el-beqqal". And that is why the people say as well "The children of Sid el-beqqal are Idrisids indeed!"
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With reference to the legend of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" it is most probable that al-Rashīd was responsible only for the bare skeleton of the story, namely, his assassination of a very wealthy Jewish King who tyrannised Muslims. Such romantic embellishments as the substitution of al-Rashīd for the virgin intended for the Jewish King and the gift of forty chests in which were concealed the forty students who were responsible for the assassination of the King were probably the work of popular storytellers. The connection between al-Rashīd and the students is very far-fetched and its explanation will remain a matter of conjecture.

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1. R.S.Harrell, A Short Reference Grammar of Moroccan Arabic, Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 1962, p.228.

There is no reason to seek an oriental origin, as de Cenival does, for the embellishments of this legend; they could be indigenous to Morocco and there is no reason to presume a one-way traffic in the transmission of influences. Folklores tend to exhibit certain common motifs; men are united by the same elemental passions and emotions and their folklores reflect a certain unity of themes.

IV

The lesson of "Ibn Mash^{c}al" is that even events very well attested by different sources - even by sources of very diverse provenance - may not necessarily constitute history. Traditions hallowed by time tend to have the force of truth and when committed to writing acquire the stamp of authority. But this may be deceptive. Thus

the "gentleman of Lord Howard's retinue" and the author of A Short and Strange Relation were told an ancient legend and unwittingly they recorded it as history; Mouette, too, unwittingly recorded it as history thus helping, like the anonymous Englishmen, to perpetuate the legend. And in the hands of the Moroccan historians who grew up in a tradition where al-Rashīd's story is an accepted fact of Moroccan history, "Ibn Mash^{c}al" received its final imprint of authority and permanence.

CHAPTER V

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ʿALAWĪ DYNASTY

Al-Rashīd's successful use of the Jewish King/Kingdom legend as a means of rallying support, coupled with his ability to command popular following won him adherents in north-eastern Morocco. Notable amongst these were the Banū Yaznāsen and the Maᶜqil. They swore loyalty to him and followed him to Ujda where he established himself to recruit more support.

These activities took place within the sphere of influence of al-Rashīd's brother, Mahammad, whose capital was based in Sijilmāsa. The latter was alarmed at the sudden rise to fame of his brother; because of their mutual antagonism which had earlier prompted al-Rashīd's flight from Sijilmāsa, Mahammad saw his position threatened by the emerging power of

his brother. As a precautionary measure, therefore, he decided to eliminate this power before it assumed more threatening proportions. From Sijilmāsa he marched against al-Rashīd and the confrontation between the two took place in the plains of Angād. At the commencement of the battle Mahammad was hit in the throat by a bullet and he died immediately (9th Muḥarram 1075/2nd Aug. 1664)[1]

Al-Rashīd's victory increased his fame and won him more followers. The soldiers of his deceased brother joined him and he sent emissaries from the lower Mulūya to the neighbouring Arabs and Berbers to solicit their support; he then embarked on further campaigns. He attacked Taza and captured it after a long struggle; the city and its environs recognised his authority.

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.302 Ar. text; 499 Fr. transl. al-Ziyānī op.cit. p.7. Ar. text; 14 Fr. transl; al-Nāsirī : Kitāb al-Istiqsā' pp.29-31, Ar. text; '39-42 Fr. transl. in Arch. Maroc Vol. 9.

Here he established his temporary capital.

The news of al-Rashīd's success was regarded with great apprehension by the people of Fes al-Bālī who had no desire to be subjected to the pretender from the east. They therefore pledged themselves to resist him. The city was put on the alert and in a state of preparedness in anticipation of a possible attack by al-Rashīd. Its inhabitants were ordered to equip themselves with arms and horses and a general review of the troops was held at Bāb al-Futūh.[1]

Al-Rashīd true to his sagacity, desisted from attacking Fes al-Bālī and concentrated on establishing his power on a more

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1. Al-Qādirī : Nashr al-Mathānī (Arch. Maroc Vol. 24) pp.164-5; al-Ziyānī op.cit. p.8 Ar. text; 15 Fr. transl; al-Nāsirī op.cit. pp.33 Ar. text; 44-5 Fr. transl.

secure footing. Thus from Taza, he marched on Sijilmāsa. Muḥammad who had succeeded to power in Sijilmāsa after the death of his father, withstood a seige of nine months after which the city fell to al-Rashīd. Muḥammad took to flight while al-Rashīd restored the defences of the Tafilalt region and saw to its pacification. He left the sons of his deceased brother under the care of his elder brother, Mawlay Harran, whom he appointed as his Khalifa in Sijilmāsa.[1] Al-Rashīd then returned to his temporary capital of Taza.

The people of Fes al-Bālī, learning of his return set out to attack him (15th Shawwāl 1075/ 1st May 1665) but hardly had they and their allies encountered al-Rashīd's maḥalla before they fled in disorder. Al-Rashīd pursued the ill-disciplined band up to wādī Sebū. Emissaries

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1. Mouette op.cit. p. 23.

from Fes al-Bālī came to negotiate peace with al-Rashīd but a modus vivendi was not reached.[1]

The lack of discipline in the forces of Fes al-Bālī is easily explicable. Having overthrown Dilā's suzerainty the city reverted to its endemic power-struggle between the two rival quarters - the ᶜudwat at Andalus and the ᶜudwat at Qarawīyīn. The former was led by Aḥmad ibn Sālih and the latter by Ibn Saghīr.[2]

Fes al-Jadīd also had revolted against Dilā' under the leader, Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Duraidī. This was in 1659. Al-Duraidī together with his kinsmen the Banū Duraid was in the dīwān of the Saᶜdians and he was part of Muḥammad al-Hājj's contingent in Fes al-Jadīd when the city fell to Dilā!. The declining power of the

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1. Al-Qādirī op.cit. p. 164-5; al-Ziyānī p.8 Ar text; 15 Fr. transl; al-Nasirī p.34 Ar. text; 45 Fr. transl.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p. 303 Ar. text; 501 Fr. transl.

zāwiya, however, enabled al-Duraidī to renounce its overlordship. Al-Duraidī, now subject to no one's control, greatly abused his power; he made incursions into Meknes and its environs, pillaging and looting the property of Berbers. His position was strengthened by his relationship with Ahmad ibn Sālih, leader of the Andalus quarter, through the marriage of his daughter to the latter's son Sālih ibn Ahmad.[1]

As the peace negotiations between Fes al-Bālī and al-Rashīd could not produce any satisfactory compromise, al-Rashīd resolved to conquer the city. On two occasions (safar 1076/Aug. 1665; 3rd Rabīᶜ 1 1076/13 September 1665) he laid seige to the city but without any success. He raised the seige to lead a campaign in the Rīf[2].

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1. Al-Nāsirī op.cit. p. 35 Ar. text; 46 Fr. transl.

2. Al-Qādirī op.cit. p. 177; al-Nāsirī op.cit. p. 34 Ar. text; 44 Fr. transl.

The leader of the Rifian region was the ra'īs shaikh Abū Muḥammad ᶜAbdallāh Āᶜrās, In January 1666 a merchant Company made up of the two brothers Jean and Jean-Baptiste Joly, and Guillaume Petit, had entered into commercial negotiations with Shaikh Āᶜrās; this was undertaken on behalf of the Company by Jean Baptiste Joly and the shaikh granted the Company permission to found a trading establishment in his territory. Having concluded this arrangement, Jean-Baptiste Joly left Estienne Desarves in Alhucemas as agent of the Company[1]. Subsequent events, however, were to disappoint the expectations aroused by this promising beginning. The political situation in the Rīf was soon to be changed by al-Rashīd's intervention which put an end to the proposed commercial project.

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1. Relation de Roland Fréjus in Sources Inédites 2ᵉ Serie France t 1 p. 126.

The conquest of the Rīf by al-Rashīd was facilitated by the antagonism between shaikh ʿĀrās and shaikh Amar the caid of Temsaman to the west of Alhucemas. Shaikh Amar and al-Rashīd jointly attacked shaikh ʿĀrās whose son was taken captive by al-Rashīd. As ransom, al-Rashīd demanded the hand of Shaikh ʿĀrās' daughter in marriage and this was immediately granted. This matrimonial link did not, however, prevent al-Rashīd from eventually wresting power from Shaikh ʿĀrās and reducing him to captivity (March 1666). Estienne Desarves, the Company agent, was also led as captive to Taza. Shaikh Amar acknowledged al-Rashīd as suzerain and became his lieutenant in the Rīf and the surrounding country.[1]

It was this changed political situation

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1. Relation de Roland Fréjus op.cit. p.124 ff; see also Ibid p.87, note 3.

that confronted Roland Fréjus when he came to the Rīf in April 1666 on behalf of La Compagnie d' Albouzéme (Alhucemas) to conclude a trade agreement with shaikh Ā^{c}rās who was still thought to be in command in the Rīf. French attempts to establish commerce in the Rīf in the 1650's[1] had been half-hearted and in the 1660's fear was being entertained that trade in the region might "pass into other hands if through prompt action advantage was not taken of the good disposition of all the inhabitants of the country..... especially the illustrious Checq Arras governor of the place for the French....."[2] The reference to "other hands" was to the English who were suspected of having

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1. Memoire de Nicolas de Clerville in Sources Inédites 2^{e} Série France t 1 p.28 and note 1; Memoire de Nicolas de Clerville a Colbert Ibid p.32.

2. Arrêt de Conseil d'Etat Ibid p.87.

designs to occupy the islands of Alhucemas.[1] By such occupation "they would not only be able to acquire a new right to their pretensions to empire on the Mediterranean as well as in the Ocean, but also to make themselves masters of the two mouths of the Strait of Gibralter so much so that with the forces which they have at sea, they would be able to establish a customs station in Tangier...."[2] Such an eventuality would greatly prejudice "in all ways" the traffic in the two seas.[3]

Thus the need to safeguard French commerce against English enterprise in the Mediterranean was an important motivation behind the formation of La Compagnie d'Albouzéme. The idea was mooted by two members of a family of Marsailles - Roland and Michel Fréjus. An

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1. Memoire de Nicolas de Clerville Ibid p.26 ff; Memoire de Nicolas de Clerville a Colbert Ibid p. 29 ff; Lettre de Louis XIV a Godefroi d'Estrades Ibid p.33.

2. Memoire de Nicolas de Clerville a Colbert Loc. cit.

3. Lettre de Louis XIV a Godefroi d'Estrades Loc.cit.

Order in Council (4th November 1664) gave Fréjus and others associated with the Company the exclusive right to establish Commerce "in all sorts of commodities and merchandise..... in Albouzéme, the ports, harbours and other places depending on it on the coast of Barbary"[1]

Fréjus and four others left Almeira (privince of Gronada) on 5th April 1666[2] and were forced by gale to anchor at the Spanish port of Melilla (Morocco) on 7th April, where they were told by its governor Dom Louis de Velasque about the changed circumstances in the Rīf. Fréjus had with him the following letter from Louis XIV to shaikh Ā^{c}rās:

> Very illustrious and magnificent Sir, the favourable reception which - we have been told - you have accorded to our subjects who have traded in Albouzéme (Alhucemas) and other places depending on it which you

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1. Arret de Conseil d'Etat op.cit. p. 88.
2. Relation de Roland Fréjus Ibid p. 128 ff.

> govern is the main reason which has obliged us to give permission to Messrs. Michel and Roland Fréjus to establish a Company to trade in Albouzéme. We have written this letter to you to acquaint you with this (project) ..... assuring you that on our part we shall be very glad to have the opportunity to give proof of the particular regard which we have for your person and your merit.
>
> 19th Nov. 1664.
>
> [1]

The change of leadership in the Rīf made this letter worthless; Fréjus, however, reacted quickly to the new situation. He masqueraded as a commercial agent accredited to al-Rashīd rather than to shaikh Ācrās.[2] Thus shaikh Amar, al-Rashid's khalifa in the Rīf, saw to the safe conduct of Fréjus to Taza.

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1. Lettre de Louis XIV a Cheikh Acras Ibid p.95.

2. Cf. P. Masson "Roland Fréjus was charged by the Company (of Alhucemas) to go to negotiate with Muley Arxid (al-Radhīd)". This obviously is not true. Histoire des Établissements et du Commerce Francais dans l'Afrique Barbaresque 1560-1793 Paris 1903 p.186.

Fréjus arrived in Taza on 28th April where he presented to al-Rashīd a fictitious letter from "Louis XIV" closely modelled on the one addressed to shaikh Ā^{c}rās [1].

The burden of al-Rashīd's reply to "Louis XIV's letter" was "We give to those who have come and who shall come in their name great assurance"[2]. This brief and rather vague reply which contained no specific guarantees of monopoly rights to La Compagnie d'Albouzéme was a disappointment to Fréjus and an anti-climax to his very high expectations of a trade agreement. Al-Rashīd who at this time was preoccupied with establishing his power in Morocco had little or no interest in a trade agreement. What he needed was the means with which to achieve the conquest of Morocco. He therefore requested that Fréjus

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1. See Relation de Roland Fréjus op.cit. p. 165.
2. Ibid p. 175.

supply him with arms. Fréjus left the Rīf (18th June 1666) leaving behind Estienne Royer as agent of the Company. He arrived at the Port of Almeira (24th June) to find that he could procure no more than " 10 quintals of powder"[1] which obviously was insufficient to meet the needs of al-Rashīd. It was thus decided to postpone the shipment of arms to al-Rashīd until sufficient quantities could be bought at Marsailles.

Al-Rashīd did not, however, have to rely on the supply of arms by Fréjus to achieve his aims. In fact ever before Fréjus left the Rīf (18th June 1666) al-Rashīd had already made his entry into Fes al-Jadīd (6th June 1666). The mission of Fréjus was thus

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1. Ibid p. 185.

irrelevant militarily to al-Rashīd[1].

Fes al-Jadid was beseiged by al-Rashīd on 28th Dhū'l-Qa^{c}da 1076/1st June 1666, and it was not until 3rd Dhū'l-Hijja/6th June that he was able to enter the city through a breach in the wall of the Jewish quarter-mellah.[2] The rebel

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1. Cour's statement therefore that Fréjus supplied arms to al-Rashīd is definitely mistaken. Établissement des Dynasties des Chérifs etc. p.184.
As to the Company on whose behalf Fréjus came to the Rīf it soon ran into great financial straits, owing, according to Fréjus, to mismanagement of the Company's funds by its agents on the Rīf. Thus by an Order in Council of 1st July 1670, the Company was replaced by a new one "La Compagnie de Levant - Relation de Roland Fréjus op.cit. p. 122 notes 1, 2, 3; Arret du Conseil d'Etat Ibid p.313. Fréjus came again to al-Rashīd in 1671 as agent of this Company to conclude a trade agreement. The failure of this mission was due to Fréjus; he had carelessly misplaced the plan for a projected fort at Alhucemas and when it was found he was suspected of espionage and he and his colleague Du Pin were imprisoned - Lettre des Directeurs de la Compagnie du Levant Ibid pp.393-4. Al-Rashīd was no longer interested in a trade agreement and the company had to renounce its commercial schemes in Morocco - See P. Masson op.cit. p. 191 ff.

2. Al-Qādirī op.cit. p. 177. Cf. Jewish accounts of al-Rashīd's entry into Fes al-Jadīd. See Chap.IV. p.186, 188 note 1

leader of the city, Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Duraidī, fled the city. Al-Rashīd was proclaimed sulṭān on the same day and in the evening he attacked Fes al-Bālī which fell to him on the morrow (7th June). The city in turn swore the bayᶜa to him. The leaders of the two rival quarters, Ibn Saghīr and Aḥmad ibn Sālih, took to flight but were later apprehended and killed.

Though now invested with the title of sulṭān, al-Rashīd's authority was still unrecognised in most parts of the country. Henceforth he carried out a series of military campaigns aimed at reducing the country piecemeal to his authority. His most redoubtable opponent was al-Khadir Ghailān who since 1660 had become quite a formidable power in Morocco. In this year, he inflicted a crushing defeat

on the zāwiya of Dilā'[1] thus ending its military superiority in Morocco. The defeat was also to lead to the eclipse of its power on the Bū Regreg. Sale and Rabat recognised Ghailān in 1660; the Qaṣbą which still remained loyal to Dilā' was beseiged. Defeat had so crippled Dilā' that it could not relieve the beleaguered stronghold. In desperation its caid, Sīdī ᶜAbdallāh son of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj, appealed to Los Arcos, governor of Ceuta, for rescue proposing to deliver the Qaṣba to Philippe IV of Spain. Spain, however, would not respond to this appeal because of her alliance with Ghailān[2]. Sīdī ᶜAbdallāh later managed to escape secretly to Tamesna aboard an English vessel, leaving as

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1. De Castries Les Trois Républiques du Bou Regrag in Sources Inédites 1ᵉʳ Série Pays-Bas t V p.XXVII ff.

2. Ibid. See also Sources Inédites 2ᵉ Série France t I : Lettre de Godefroi d' Estrades à Louis XIV p.24 and note 1.

caid of the Qaṣba Aḥmad Ajnawī. The Qaṣba was eventually forced to submit to Ghailān (3rd May 1664) but it was not until about five months later (8th October) that he entered the castle[1].

Thus when al-Rashīd was established in Fes in 1666 Ghailān had already gained primacy on the Bū Regreg and the Habṭ. Tetuan also had partly fallen to his control. He had beseiged the city in June 1662 and because the zāwiya of Dilā' who had jurisdiction over it was unable to relieve it, its caid, ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-Naqsīs, in desperation had come to an accomodation with Ghailān which provided for dual leadership in the city. Thus in addition to ᶜAbd al-Karīm al Naqsīs, Ghailān also had his own appointee as caid of the city.[2]

The rise of Ghailān to such position of strength greatly endangered al-Rashīd's

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1. In 1665 Ghailān was represented in Sale by al-Ḥājj Muḥammad Finnish and in the Qaṣba by ᶜAbd al-Qādir Merino. The two caids were later expelled in the same year and replaced by Seron and ᶜAbd al-Qādir Roxo respectively.

2. Journal de du Quesne in Sources Inédites 2ᵉ Série France t I p.61 and notes 1 and 2; see also p.83.

position. Soon after his proclamation, therefore, the defeat of Ghailān was the first major assignment to which he addressed himself.

Ghailān was a very shrewd leader, able to adapt quickly to changing circumstances to satisfy his own ends. He exploited to his own benefit the resentment of Spain at the English occupation of Tangier (29th January 1662).[1] The city was given to Charles II as part of the dowry of his bride Catherine of Braganza. The marriage between the two royal houses had political implications. Portugal which had just freed herself (1640) from sixty years of Spanish domination needed the support of a Power to safeguard this independence to which Spain as yet was not fully reconciled[2]. Spain had tried

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1. E.M.G. Routh: Tangier (England's Lost Atlantic Outpost) 1661-1684 p. 13.

2. Ibid p. 2 ff.

to forestall the Anglo-Portuguese alliance but she failed inspite of diplomatic pressure and even the threat of war against England. Tangier had its own strategic advantages which Charles II could not ignore. A foothold in such an international waterway would enhance English commerce, a persuasive argument in an era of commercial competition. Politically "a station in the straits would be a valuable asset in case of war with either Holland, Spain or France" and a point of surveillance of the southern European countries.[1]

Because of her opposition to the English occupation of Tangier, Spain, which had always coveted this outpost, sought the co-operation of Ghailān in dislodging the English. Ghailān too was opposed to the English presence in Tangier; in fact since the arrival of the

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1. Ibid pp. 5-6.

English colonists in 1662, he had consistently demonstrated his hostility. Spanish overtures for joint action against the English, therefore, met with a favourable response on the part of Ghailān, but he had no wish, however, to exchange one infidel for another as master of Tangier. Thus he benefited from the financial and military subsidies of Spain and conducted his own jihād against the English; but as to the contemplated joint action between him and Spain against Tangier Ghailān remained uncooperative and evasive. Spain which needed him as a useful ally in her designs against Tangier sent her agents to Arzila, Ghailān's capital, for negotiations, but these produced no results.[1] Indeed the financial and military support Ghailān got from Spain did not in any way commit him to any genuine friendship with her. Rather he built up his power with her aid to be able to

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1. Ibid pp.51-53.

prosecute the jihād against her and other infidels in Morocco. Thus early in 1666 he attacked the Spanish post of Larache but was repulsed.[1]

This set back placed Ghailān in a very precarious position as he had become totally alienated. His attack of Larache had demonstrated his perfidy and cost him the Spanish alliance. His relationship with the English in Tangier was not friendly either, marked as it was by hostilities punctuated by occasional truces. And now there was a new addition to his list of enemies - this was al-Rashīd. The spectre of the Great Tafiletta's power was a disturbing nightmare to the lonely Ghailān. His solution to his dilemma was to effect a volte-face; he sought a rapproachment with the English, the enemy with whom at various times he had been at loggerheads.[2] The treaty he

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1. Ibid p.90.

2. Loc.cit. Cf. Sources Inédites 2^e Série France t 1 p. 116 and note 1.

concluded with the English in April 1666 included amongst others the following terms:

> Peace shall last for ever; (no longer for a limited period as on former occasions)
>
> There is to be free trade with the ports of both parties;
>
> Deserters shall be returned by either party;
>
> Gayland shall assist Tangier against any Christian enemy attacking it;
>
> The English are to give Gayland 200 barrels of fine powder;
>
> The English will assist Gayland with ships in case of need against any of his enemies.
>
> [1]

The enemy Ghailān had in mind, of course, was al-Rashīd. The latter attacked him in June 1666 and routed his cavalry[2] Ghailān rallied his forces for a second encounter but again suffered a reverse. Wounded and deserted he fled to Arzila with about three hundred

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1. Routh op.cit. p. 90 note 1.

2. Ibid p. 91; al-Qādirī op.cit. p. 177.

soldiers. Al-Rashīd laid seige to the city (August 1666) but Ghailān and his much depleted forces resisted valiantly thanks to the English alliance.[1] The resistance could not, however, be continued indefinitely under the difficult circumstances. Privation brought with it disaffection and mutiny. Eventually (July 1668) Ghailān had to flee secretly aboard an English vessel to Tangier from where he later

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1. Routh op.cit. p.92 ff. Alliance apart, the support of Ghailān by the English was based on a policy of providing a counterpoise to the power of al-Rashid, the usual practice of divide and rule. "Colonel Norwood (Governon of Tangier) acting on the instructions of Arlington, took up the policy of attempting to maintain a balance of power in Morocco by supporting Ghailān still the leader of resistance to the rising dynasty. He did indeed point out the advisability of negotiating for 'free traffic' with Tafiletta's dominions, but at the same time he promised Arlington that in no case would he 'break off unhandsomely with Gayland'. In accordance with the treaty, he sent supplies by sea to Arzile, now closely beseiged on condition that Ghailan on his part 'under the favour of our Artillery would trouble the enemy with frequent sallyes and surprizals'." Routh op.cit. p. 92.

went to Algiers.[1] Thus ended the resistance of Ghailān to al-Rashīd.[2]

With Ghailān's defeat, al-Rashīd's power stretched to the Bū Regreg. The process had started in June 1666 when he reported his first victory over Ghailān. The latter's representatives on the Bū Regreg, Abd al-Qādir Roxo (the Qaṣba) and Saron (Sale) learning of the reverse of their master fled to Arzila and the Qaṣba and Sale recognised al-Rashīd. The new leader rehabilitated as caids of the Qaṣba and Sale respectively al-Hājj Finmish and ᶜAbd al-Qādir Merino, the two incumbents who were

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1. Routh op.cit. p. 94 ff. cf. Sources Inédites 2ᵉ Série France t 1 p.190 and note 1.

2. But not the end of Ghailān's resistance to the ᶜAlawī dynasty. Ghailān was later to reappear in Morocco in 1673 determined to regain his lost power. Armed by the English he fought courageously but was beaten and killed in a decisive battle near al-Qaṣr al-Kabīr by the powerful Mawlay Iṣmāᶜīl, brother and successor of al-Rashīd.

expelled in 1665 by Ghailān[1]. Tetuan had been captured by al-Rashīd since August 1666,[2] and groups in parts of northern Morocco which as yet had not accepted his authority had, between 1666 and 1667, been subjugated by military expeditions[3]

The zāwiya of Dilā' was the next claim upon al-Rashīd's attention. By 1668 when al-Rashīd attacked it, its power had declined considerably. Muḥammad al-Ḥājj under whose able leadership the zāwiya rose to political eminence in the 17th century was already an old man; he had lost much of his grip of affairs and so parts of his 'empire' had slipped from his control. Because of his age he was unable to lead Dilā''s forces to the battle of Baṭn al-Rummān in the Fezāz (8th

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1. De Castries: Les Trois Républiques du Bou Regrag op.cit. p. XXVIII. Later on the names Muhammad al-Zabidī and Aḥmad ibn Yakkūr occur as caids of Sale and the Qaṣba respectively - Mouette op.cit. pp. 49; 54.

2. Routh op.cit. pp.99-93; al-Qādirī op.cit. p.185; al-Ziyāni op.cit. p. 9; Ar. text, 18 Fr.transl. al-Nāṣirī op.cit. p.36. Ar. text, 49 Fr. transl.

3. As for instance the Āīt Wallāl (1666) and the Banū Zarwāl (1667). The leader of the latter was al-Sharīf - Al-Qādirī, al-Ziyānī, al-Nāṣirī loc.cit.; Cf. Mouette op.cit. pp. 31-32.

Muḥarram 1079/18th June 1668)[1]. This battle marked the end of the zāwiya's existence. Al-Rashīd destroyed it after his victory but showed compassion and magnanimity in his treatment of the people. He spared their lives and ordered the transfer of Muḥammad al-Ḥājj and his family to Fes where they remained for some time before their deportation to Tlemcen.[2]

With the opposition in northern and central Morocco eliminated, al-Rashīd directed his campaigns to the south. On 22nd Ṣafar 1079/1st August 1668, he parted for Marrakesh. In command here were the Shabāna who had usurped the throne in 1659 from the last of the Sa^{c}dians Mawlay al-^{c}Abbās. The first

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1. Al-Qādirī, op.cit. p.200; al-Ziyānī op.cit. p.9. Ar. text; 19 Fr. transl; al-Nāṣirī op.cit. p. 36 ff. Ar.text; 49 Fr. transl; al Wufrānī p.284 Ar. text, 472 Fr. transl.

2. Muḥammad al-Ḥājj died in Tlemcen on 4th Muḥarram 1182/13th May 1671. His family later returned to Fes on the orders of Mawlay Ismā^{c}īl - Al-Qādirī op.cit. p. 220; al-Nāṣirī op.cit. p.37 Ar. text; 49 Fr. transl.

of the Shabāna who ruled in Marrakesh, ᶜAbd al-Karīm, died in 1079/1668 and had been succeeded by his son, Abū Bakr. His reign however, was very short-lived; it was on his fortieth day in power that he was overthrown by al-Rashīd. He and his relatives, together with the Shabāna on whom his power was based, were massacred.[1] Al-Rashīd established as his khalifa in Marrakesh his nephew Mawlay Ahmad ibn Mahraz.[2]

The Sūs and the Darᶜa still remained unsubjugated; the year 1670 witnessed a number

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1. Al-Qādirī Loc.cit.; al-Ziyānī, op.cit. p.10. Ar.text; 20 Fr. transl; al-Nāṣirī op.cit. p. 38 Ar. text; 51 Fr. transl.; al-Ufrānī op.cit. p.287. Ar. text; 476-7 Fr. transl.

2. Mouette op.cit. p.35. Mawlay Ahmad ibn Mahraz was later to revolt against al-Rashīd, but this revolt was quickly suppressed. He was pardoned and sent to Tafilalt while his khalifaship of Marrakesh was taken over by Zīdān. On Mawlay Ahmad's revolt, see also al-Qādirī op.cit. p.221; al-Ziyani op.cit. p.12 Ar. text; 23 Fr. transl.; al-Nāṣirī op.cit. p.42 Ar. text; 56 Fr. transl. This prince was again to revolt against al-Rashīd's successor Mawlay Ismāᶜīl.

of expeditions into these areas.[1] While some tribes were forced through military defeat to acknowledge al-Rashīd's authority, others, rather than resist, sent delegations to him to declare their allegiance. He captured Tarūdant in Ṣafar 1081/June 1670. The stoutest resistance in the Sūs was mounted at Iligh in the Tazarwalt where the zāwiya of the Awlād Sīdī Aḥmad Ou Mūsā was located. The shaikh of the zāwiya at this time was Sīdī Muḥammad. Iligh fell to al-Rashīd on 1st Rabīᶜ 1st 1081/19th July 1670[2]. By this conquest al-Rashīd established his supremacy in Morocco, giving the country a central command after about seven decades of rival leaderships. His kingdom stretched west-east from the Tlemcen frontier to wādī Nūn and north-south from the two seas to Tuat.

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1. Al-Qādirī op.cit. 210; al-Ziyānī p.11. Ar.text; 22 Fr. transl. al-Nāṣirī pp.40-41 Ar. text; 53-4 Fr. transl; al-Wufrānī p.303 Ar. text; 502 Fr. transl. Mouette op.cit. p. 35 ff.

2. Mouette (op.cit. pp. 43-4) relates the escape of the shaikh of Iligh to the Sūdān and how he was unsuccessfully pursued there by al-Rashīd: This information is not given by the Moroccan historians.

II

CONCLUSION

The occupation of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean littorals by the Iberian Powers was based upon mixed motives - religious, economic and political. This occupation, particularly that of the Portuguese on the Atlantic coast, was followed by the penetration and colonisation of the hinterland. The result was a movement of opposition by the Muslims. The ruling power in Morocco, the Banū Waṭṭās, on whom leadership of the jihād would normally have devolved were so much weakened by internal dissensions that they were unable effectively to champion the Muslim cause. Other leaders sprang up - these were the religious chiefs, the murābitūn.

As religious leaders they were able to appeal to a wide public, while through their zāwiyas they enjoyed a solid nucleus of power. This power derived from the clientele of Ikhwan within

the zāwiya's sphere of influence.[1]

The pattern of political arrangement in Morocco was such as to give scope for the growth of local power like that of the zāwiyas. The country, better represented by the ill-defined geographical expression, the Maghreb al-Aqṣā, was an aggregation of communities organised in vaguely delimited, political units and loosely held together by the common authority of the sulṭān. The sulṭān was concerned not so much with direct intervention in the government of the peoples within his jurisdiction as with their fulfilment

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1. A measure of this power and the devotion the shaikhs enjoyed from their fellow brothers (Ikhwān) can be gleaned from the following injunctions (waṣīya) to the Ikhwān by Sī Shadilī founder of the Shādilīya ṭariqa "Obey your shaikh before obeying the temporal sovereign" - L. Rinn: Marabout et Khouan Alger 1844, p.227. Cf. also the following waṣīya to the Ikwan of the Darqawīya "They (i.e. the Ikhwān) shall inform their shaikh about their most serious as well as their most trivial thoughts, and about their important as well as their most insignificant deeds. They shall have for their Shaikh a passive obedience and at all times they shall be in the hands of their shaikh as cadaver is in the hands of one washing the dead". Ibid. p.233.

of the obligations of allegiance - and this meant payment of tax and/or rendering of military service to the sulṭān as well as including his name in the Friday khuṭba. In certain areas far removed from the sulṭān's seat of power, his authority was nominal and his control was at best supervisory. Various localities therefore enjoyed varying degrees of regional autonomy vis-a-vis the central power.[1] If the sulṭān represented the common and supreme authority; power nonetheless was diffused; the continuity of the sulṭāns regime was conditioned by how much he could inspire the respect or compel the obedience of the various local leaders or wielders of power.[2]

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1. As late as the 19th century, for instance, de Foucauld was told in Bū'l-Jad (Tadla) that "here there is neither sulṭān nor Makhzen; nothing except Allah and Sīdī ibn Dāwud (Sīdī ibn Dāwud being the shaikh of the zāwiya of Bū'l-Jad) - De Foucauld: Reconnaisance du Maroc p.52 quoted from E.Doutté : "Notes sur l'Islam Maghrebin: Les Marabouts" in Revue de l'histoire des Religions Vol. 40 p. 361.

2. Mouette for instance justifies the severe disciplinary measure of "the Kings of Barbary" on the grounds that "they would not be respected as much nor would they be so well obeyed as they are" but for such measures. op.cit. p.46.

Prominent amongst these were the shaikhs of the zāwiyas . Starting as forums for religious and mystic instruction, zāwiyas could become centres around which crystallised powerful politico - religious groupings.[1] Such groupings constituted local religious brotherhoods with muqaddams representing the parent zāwiyas in various localities within the zāwiya's purview. These brotherhoods transcended ethnic and political divisions. Zāwiyas thus had a unifying and cohesive influence; they brought under a common religious, spiritual and political guidance groups of diverse traditions and historical experience.

It was a shaikh of a zāwiya in the Dar^{c}a (Tagmadārt) that led the jihād against the Portuguese of Agadir. The success of the

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1. Such, for instance, were the zāwiyas of Dilā' and Iligh.

crusade Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Qā'im initiated derived as much from the weakness of the Portuguese outpost as from the support of his fellow shaikhs of the Jazūlīya. This ṭarīqa was the guise under which the Shādilīya of the 13th century emerged as from the latter part of the fifteenth century, thanks to the inspiration of Muḥammad ibn Sulaimān al-Jazūlī. The struggle against the Portuguese gave a powerful impulse to religious mysticism in Morocco. On the political plane it was to lead to the fall of the Banū Waṭṭās and the rise of the Saᶜdians. The new power was the second sharīfian power in the Maghreb at Aqṣā. The re-emergence of sharīfian political leadership after five centuries of sherifian political obscurity, gave prominence to sharīfs and enhanced their position. It is this enhanced position and the privileges associated with it that explain the marked phenomenon of false sharīfs

in Morocco from the sixteenth century onwards. The corollary of this was a marked interest in genealogy as a way of establishing authenticity.[1]

Sa^{c}dian political history in Morocco lasted for about one and a half centuries, from 1511 when Abū ^{c}Abdallāh al-Qā'im was proclaimed leader of the mujāhidūn at Tedsi by the people of the Sūs to 1659 when the last of the Sa^{c}dians Aḥmad al-^{c}Abbās was assassinated by the Shabāna. Starting from Muḥammad al-Shaikh, the founder of the dynasty, the Sa^{c}dians produced twelve sovereigns. Muḥammad al-Shaikh's persecution of the Shaikhs of the zāwiyas whose support contributed so much to his establishment of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty may not be regarded as representative of general Sa^{c}dian policy. Other sovereigns of the dynasty showed

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1. Cf. G. Salmon "Ibn Rahmoûn et les Généalogies Chérifiennes" in Archives Marocaines Vol. III p.166ff.

deference to and sought the cooperation of the shaikhs as witness for instance ᶜAbd al-Mālik's enlistment of their support in the battle of wādī Makhāzin [1] and al-Manṣūr's historic pilgrimmage to the awliyā of Aghmāt[2].

Al-Manṣūr's rule marked the climax of Saᶜdian power and glory. Coming to power on the wake of the famous Muslim victory over the Portuguese at wādī Makhāzin, he had behind him a large store of popularity and goodwill. The victory established Morocco as a power of international rank and with it came European and Turkish diplomatic missions to al-Manṣūr. In this sense it could be said that al-Manṣūr's reign saw the beginnings of modern diplomacy in Morocco. The demands of international diplomacy, the relative prosperity of Morocco under al-Manṣūr and the size of the army which

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1. E. Michaux-Bellaire: "Note sur les Amhaouch et les Ahancal" in Arch. Berbers Vol.II p.209; M.A. Péretié op.cit. pp.20-21.

2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.121 Ar.text; 205 Fr. transl.

was trained in accordance with new military techniques all entailed new dimensions and elaboration in bureaucracy. In this sense also al-Manṣūr's reign could be said to witness the beginnings of the modern makhzen[1].

Al-Manṣūr's energies found outlet not across the sea but inland in a southward expansion across the Sahara into the Sūdān. By his conquest of the empire of the Askias, Morocco's commercial and religious connection[2] with the Sūdān was supplemented by the political. Maintenance of Timbuctoo as a dependency of Morocco was, however, not a very practical idea. Little wonder therefore that the political connection forged by al-Manṣūr could not for long be maintained by his successors who were men of much less ability.

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1. Cf. M. Bellaire : Article: Makhzen in Encyclopaedia of Islam (First Edition)

2. Cf. Delafosse: "Les Relations du Maroc avec le Soudan à travers les Ages" in Hespéris Vol. IV. 153 ff.

A shrewd and adroit politician, al-Manṣūr was able to maintain Morocco's integrity inspite of Ottoman and Spanish covetousness. Internally he was relatively successful in making his authority respected in Morocco and in ensuring some order and peace. Morocco during his reign was a powerful country, but this power was not so much state power as personal or dynastic power.[1] This power-polarity made the army a very important instrument of the central authority. The stability that was maintained was thus superimposed with much underpinning of force which made it highly vulnerable to disruption when its main prop the power of the leadership was found to be no longer capable of compelling obedience. This was amply demonstrated by the events that followed the death of al-Manṣūr.

The tragedy that plagued Morocco

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1. This observation is by no means exclusive to al-Manṣūr of the Moroccan sulṭāns.

during the first seven years after al-Manṣūr's death is best portrayed by a contemporary observer's description of Morocco as "a country of famine pest and war". The power-struggle of the sons of al-Manṣūr wrecked the fragile stability he had bequeathed to the country. Zīdān emerged from the crisis as the victor and the most resilient of the contenders for power. This victory is a pointer to his inherently dynamic and forceful character; he was, no doubt, one of the most energetic sovereigns of the Sa^{c}dian dynasty, though the very difficult circumstances under which he reigned belied his capability. Though Sa^{c}dian authority had been greatly undermined by the civil war, still it is fair to say that Zīdān was the last of the Sa^{c}dians with any pretence to a real claim to the title of sulṭān. His successors who were much less capable men watched helplessly the encroachment on their sovereignty by local leaders.

The murābiṭūn were prominent amongst these leaders. The emergence of shaikhs into prominence at this time of political crisis is a further illustration of the importance of zāwiyas as centres of politico-religious groupings. The crisis only gave scope for the extension of the power the shaikhs already wielded in their various localities. So much had this power grown that the Sa^{c}dians had lost much of Morocco to the shaikhs. The following were the principal leaders amongst whom the country was parcelled: The Awlād Sīdī Aḥmad Ou Mūsā in the Sūs, the Filālī sharifs in the Tafilalt, the Awlād Sīdī Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad of Dilā' and al-^{c}Ayāshī - later al-Khadir Ghailān - in the Gharb.

Of these potential successors to the Sa^{c}dians the murabīṭūn of Dilā , by virtue of their location and military power, had the best prospects of success. In fact they could very well have risen to political leadership of

the entire Morocco in the middle years of the seventeenth century. Their leader, however, had a strong "patriotism" for Dilā ; the building up of the power of Dilā was to Muḥammad al-Ḥājj an end in itself rather than a stepping stone to political leadership of Morocco. Muḥammad ibn al-Sharīf who aspired to sovereign power could neither match Dilā 's military might which constituted the main stumbling block on his way nor had he his brother's scheming and clever revolutionary techniques to compensate for his deficiency.

The most interesting development in Morocco during this transitional period of its history was the emergency of the Republic of Pirates on the Bū Regreg. Morisco settlement and activity on the left bank of the river led to the resurrection of the derelict ribāṭ al-Fatḥ of the Almohade sulṭān, Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr, and the growth of modern Rabat. Piracy and the trade that went with it fostered more international activity in Rabat than in any other city in

Morocco.[1] The city thus acquired a much more cosmopolitan character; it was, as it were, the "international capital" of Morocco, being prepared, so to speak, for its future role of capital of the country. Another important result of Morisco settlement in Morocco was the growth of the city-state of Tetuan which also enjoyed independence at varying times during this period of transition.

When the Saᶜdians who came to power on the aegis of the jihād could no longer prosecute it because of their own weakness, it was left to individuals to shoulder this responsibility. Al-ᶜAyāshī represents such

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1. Piracy continued in Morocco even after 1640 when the Salatins lost their independence. The zāwiya of Dilā' as well as the ᶜAlawi dynasty benefitted from their harassment of Christian shipping. It was not until the reign of Mawlay Sulaimān (1795-1822) that piracy ceased completely in Morocco, owing to the sultān's decree against the practice and his destruction of the Salatin vessels. See de Castries : Sources Inédites 1er Série Pays-Bas t V Introduction p. XVIII note 2.

independent initiative. When he died his work was continued by the zāwiya of Dilā' and al-Khadir Ghailān. With the rise of al-Rashīd came a resumption of the sulṭān's leadership of the jihād[1].

The emergence of al-Rashīd into the Moroccan political scene was the undoing of Ghailān's opportunities for aggrandizement. But for al-Rashīd it is conceivable that Ghailān would have played a much greater role in the seventeenth century history of Morocco. His defeat of Dilā' (1660), the greatest power of the time, and the steady expansion of his possessions at the expense of Dilā' 's are indications of his potentialities. The circumstances were such, however, that he could not rise to his full political stature.

Al-Rashīd's rise to political leadership of Morocco was the most unexpected and dramatic political event in the middle years of the seventeenth century - a deus

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1. In Ṣafar 1082/July 1671 al-Rashīd sent his cavalry against Tangier - al-Qādirī op.cit. p.221; al-Ziyāni op.cit. pp.11-12 Ar.text 23 Fr. transl.

ex machina. When he left Tafilalt in 1659 following the death of his father, one could hardly have conceived for him such a political future. In the Moroccan politics of the time he was an unknown quantity, a wandering, homeless fugitive in need of hospitality. His wandering was later to prove useful in terms of the direct experience it provided of the political situation in Morocco. Compared to the rise of the Sa^{c}dians, the establishment of the ^{c}Alawī dynasty was a single-handed adventurous event.[1] The success of al-Rashīd may be explained in the light of the following factors. The shaikh al-Lawātī connection was one which furnished him early in his career with a nucleus of support on which he later built. If unlike the Almoravids, the Almohades and the Sa^{c}dians the rise of the ^{c}Alawīs was not the product of a ribāt or zāwiya, nevertheless a zāwiya, that of

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1. Cf. A. Cour op.cit. p. 185.

shaikh al-Lawātī, did play a not unimportant role.

The decline of the power of Dilā' was another important factor. Whereas Mahammad attacked Dilā' at the height of its power, al-Rashīd's attempts at establishing the ᶜAlawī dynasty synchronised with Dilā''s growing decadence. 1659 could be said to mark the beginning of a downward trend in the fortunes of Dilā'. In this year its governor of Fes al-Jadīd, Abū ᶜAbdallāh al-Duraidī, successfully revolted against its power, while in 1660 it suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Ghailān. Henceforth Dilā' was on the defensive against Ghailān. Al-Rashīd's victory over the zāwiya in 1668 was the culmination of this process of decline.

The anarchic situation in Fes al-Balī precluded any effective resistance to al-Rashīd; the city too had claimed its independence in response to Dilā''s decadence; its politics was characterised by the same endemic power struggle between the two rival

quarters - cudwatain. It was al-Rashīd's arrival that stabilised the situation.

> Hitherto (i.e.before al-Rashīd's proclamation) the city was torn by insurgents and there emerged on each side a leader..... The two sides were very often embroiled in wars....[1]

Al-Rashīd's success owed much to his own personal qualities - his charisma, his ability for leadership and command. He possessed a personality and a disposition that inspired popular devotion. Thus in a country in which he was a complete foreigner (north-eastern Morocco) he was able quickly to win the loyalty of groups of Berbers and Arabs. It was their proclamation of him as their leader in 1664 that established him as a new factor in the Moroccan political scene.

> He (al-Rashīd) is a Mouletta[2] and hath an insinuating Presence where those characters of a noble Soul

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.303 Ar. text; 501 Fr.transl.

2. Mulatto. Al-Rashīd was born of a negro woman. See also Relation de Roland Fréjus op.cit. pp. 169-70.

> do appear, that seem to command both Love and Respect. This being accompanied with a popular spirit that knew as well how to dissemble as to command rendered him odious to his brother but honoured of the People.
> [1]

Roland Fréjus who visited al-Rashīd in Taza (1666) remarks that he

> has a.....very pleasant visage...which compels love at first and still more when one knows him through his actions and generosity..... There is nothing in him and in his person which would not so charm one that it could be said that he is an accomplished man favoured by nature and with a fortune above all others.
> [2].

The strict military discipline he instilled in his men ensured an ease of manoeuvrability in battle

> One recognises in him a martial visage, a natural aversion to all sluggards and an inclination to punish vigorously all their faults; the result is that everybody is punctual to serve him.
> [3].

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1. A Short and Strange Relation etc. p. 6.
2. Relation de Roland Fréjus op.cit. pp.169-70.
3. Loc.cit.

Al-Rashīd used religion effectively as a political weapon. He appealed to the religious sentiment of the people, their Muslim honour and pride, posing as the avenger of their dignity, their liberator from the humiliating domination of a despotic Jewish King. The successful use of the Jewish King/Kingdom legend by al-Rashīd would suggest that during this period of crisis when there was no effective central leadership under which Muslims could feel a sense of security, there was a great consciousness of, and apprehension about, the warrior - Jewish tribes who were conceived of as capturing and subjecting Muslims to their domination. The dramatic appearance of al-Rashīd in north-eastern Morocco with the proud label of murderer of a sovereign of the dreaded Jewish tribes met with enthusiastic reception. If the Sa^{c}dians came to power as defenders of Muslim honour against Christians, the ^{c}Alawīs could also claim that their raison d'etre was as champions of the same cause, this time not against Christians, but against a Jew "worse than a Christian" howbeit a hypothetical Jew. By exploiting the fear and the religious sentiment of the people al-Rashīd showed himself a master intriguer and revolutionary.

His approach to power reflects that sagacity which his brother badly needed as an

adjunct to his bravery and military prowess. A patient and intelligent schemer, he desisted from attacking Fes al-Bālī when he learnt of the state of readiness of the city, and concentrated on strengthening his position before resuming his plans. Thus he embarked on the easier task of conquering Sijilmāsa and its dependencies, thus eliminating the potential danger of his nephew. This conquest enlarged his sphere of influence and broadened his base of support. When, on his return to Taza, therefore, he was attacked by Fes al-Bālī he completely routed its army pursuing it as far as wādī Sebū. In a tactical move to preserve a measure of their sovereignty the city made overtures for peace, but the negotiations never went through (as al-Rashīd was determined on nothing short of total surrender and recognition of his authority). He would therefore impose hispower on the city through conquest. He laid seige to Fes al-Jadīd the gateway to Fes al-Bālī but having failed to reduce it he had to improve his

military position. This would explain his subjugation of the Rīf and the surrounding country. Apart from the men he was able to recruit here, he also possessed an outlet to the sea which probably gave him access to arms through traders on the Mediterranean.

And having established his power in Fes al-Bālī, he immediately sought to win the goodwill of the people.

> When the ceremony (of the bayᶜa) had been completed, he distributed money to the ᶜulamāʾ of Fes (al-Bālī) and loaded them with presents; he showed benevolence to the people....

Religion again served a useful role:

> ....and saw to the revival of the Sunna and the upholding of the Sharīᶜa. Thus he occupied a high position in people's hearts and won the affection of the entire population.[1]

Al-Rashīd's reign was a most welcome sequel to the

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.303 Ar. text; 501-2 Fr. transl.

political disturbance that characterised the history of Morocco after the death of al-Mansūr. With his rise to power came a period of relative calm and security. The same ability for leadership, the same courage, firmness and intelligence which had brought him success as a soldier also served him well as a statesman. A great disciplinarian, he emphasised proper moral conduct. He decreed examplary punishment for prostitutes and drunkards. "Persons accused and convicted of adultery would be punished according to the law of the Quran"[1]. He also prescribed the death penalty for highwaymen[2]. "This decree was no sooner announced than the people blessed the day that he commenced to reign; for the highways which had always been full of robbers became

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1. Mouette op.cit. p. 45.

2. Loc.cit. on 7th Rabī[c] 1st 1081(25th July 1670) 60 highwaymen were executed - al-Qādirī, op.cit. p.210; al-Ziyānī, op.cit. p.11 Ar.text; 22 Fr. transl; al-Nāṣirī; op.cit.p.41 Ar. text; 54 Fr. transl.

free (of them). The result was that trade was guaranteed, there was abundance everywhere and things became so cheap" that one could live very well with very little amount.[1] Learning flourished under al-Rashīd; he was very fond of the company of ᶜulamāʾ and they benefited much from his generosity.[2]

Al-Rashīd based his military support on the Arabs from the north-eastern part of Morocco i.e. the region where his rise to power began. These Arabs, he constituted into a military force known as the Jaish Sharāqa (Shraga)[3]. This army was stationed in the Qasbat al-Khamīs (now Sharārda) in Fes. To improve communication, he constructed a bridge over the wādī Sebū. He also built the

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1. Mouette Loc.cit. Cf. al-Nāṣirī p.44 Ar. text, 59 Fr. transl.
2. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.303-4 Ar. text; 502-3 Fr. transl.
3. Al-Nāṣirī pp.41-42 Ar.text; 54-55 Fr. transl.

madrasa Sharātīn in Fes. Students (tolba) from Tafilalt and the north-eastern region of Morocco i.e. Ujda, Tlemcen, Taza and Rīf originally inhabited this madrasa[1]. Perhaps this is the origin of al-Rashīd's connection with the tolba in the Ibn Mash^{c}al story.

With regards to external relations, al-Rashīd's attitude towards the Christian Powers was one of arrogance and defiance. Confident of his military strength after having established his supremacy in Morocco, he did not have to court external support to prop up his position or be solicitous about his rivals entering into foreign alliances against him. He probably also did not want to forfeit his fund of Muslim goodwill and support which he needed to consolidate his newly-established power by entering too soon into "liaison with.....Christian prince(s)" . In 1671 i.e. a year after his campaigns in the Sūs which

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1. P. de Cenival: "La Légend du Juif Ibn Mech^{c}al etc." op.cit. p. 215.

definitely established his pre-eminence in Morocco, the following observation is made of him by a contemporary:

> .... Muley Arxid.... since his last victory in the Sus and since his previous conquests access to him has become so difficult..... that he has not only refused to reply to the letter of the King of England but has even refused entry to his ambassador[1] who had
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> rich presents to give to him and who has had the displeasure to return without any response. The letters of Holland and the Council of Spain have not had better success in his Court. This has engendered the belief amongst all in the country as well as amongst the English, the Dutch and the Spaniards that this prince who has always shown a deaf ear to all offers which have been made to him will never maintain liaison with any Christian prince.[2]

Al-Rashid's regime exhibited the same power-polarity between the sovereign and the state; military power was thus also an indispensable accompaniment of his political power. No sooner had

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1. Lord Ambassador Howard. On his mission to Morocco see Routh op.cit. p. 99ff.

2. Lettre de Roland Fréjus in Sources Inedites 2e Série France tl p. 357.

he died than there were revolts against the dynasty he had established. The suppression of these revolts was a major problem Mawlay Ismā'īl had to face on succeeding his brother. At this early period of the history of ʿAlawī leadership in Morocco when it was confronted with serious trials, the capability and dynamism of Mawlay Ismā'īl contributed much to ensuring the continuity of the power al-Rashīd had established.

The reign of al-Rashīd had been a very short one, indeed too short for him to be able properly to consolidate his power. A major part of this short reign was spent in military campaigns against his opponents. Though he was proclaimed sultān in Fes al-Jadīd in June 6th, 1666, his power was not fully established in Morocco until 1670 when the resistance of the zāwiya of Iligh was broken. Two years later (11th Dhū'l-Hijja 1082/9th April 1672) he died in Marrakesh from a head injury.[1] He was riding a horse in a garden on the 2nd day of ʿĪd

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1. Al-Wufrānī op.cit. p.304 Ar. text; 503 Fr. transl. al-Qādirī op.cit. p.216; al-Ziyani op.cit. p.12 Ar. text; 23 Fr. transl; al-Nāṣirī p.43 Ar. text; 57 Fr. transl.

al-adhā (Feast of Sacrifice) when he lost control; he hit his head against the branch of an orange tree and he died immediately. He was buried in Marrakesh but his corpse was later transferred to the tomb of shaikh Abū' l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī ibn Hirzihim in Fes.